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IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
There are no question legitimately presented before this court for the
determination. The question that Petitioner is asking this court to decide is in essence the
following:

Must an Appellate court take jurisdiction to consider a Motion to
"Recall the Mandate" in a case in which the Appellate court did
not issue any mandate, but merely affirmed the judgment of the
trial court; and when the motion is based solely on affidavits that
are not part of the record which criticize the Appellate courts
decision, but do not provide any newly discovered information, or
reveal misconduct, or fraud on the court, or give the court any
compelling reason to resume jurisdiction; and after the moving
party's petition for rehearing and for certiorari have been
previously considered and denied?

V. REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORTS
The Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in this case (Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co..
Inc.) is reported at 781 P.2d, 445 (Utah App. 1989).
VI. GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
Although this court has discretionary authority to grant certiorari pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-2-2, and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

jurisdiction is improper in this case. The Court has already denied the first Petition for Writ
of Certiorari filed in this case. The present Petition is merely an attempt by the petitioner to
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata and the appellate process.
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VH. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a collision between a car and semi-truck which was parked on
the shoulder of an interstate highway. A jury returned a verdict for defendant.

Plaintiff

appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court verdict.
Plaintiff now seeks for a second time a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Vm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

This case involves a collision between a car and a semi-truck which was

parked on the shoulder of an interstate highway.
2.

At trial a jury found for Defendants and Plaintiff appealed.

3.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court on

September 8, 1989. (See Exhibit A attached hereto)
4.

Mr. DeBry, counsel for Plaintiff, filed a Petition for Reconsideration of

the appeal on September 21, 1989. Attached to the Petition for Reconsideration was the
Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of
Utah. The thesis of this Affidavit was that the opinion of the Court of Appeals "reflects a break
down in the decision making process". (See paragraph 6, page 2 of Affidavit, Exhibit B
attached hereto) Ms. Hanna also said "that the opinion was the equivalent of failing graduate
work." (See paragraph 6, page 2 of Affidavit)
5.

The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Reconsideration on October

18, 1989. (See Exhibit C)
6.

Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 15, 1989.

(See Exhibit D attached hereto)
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7.

Seven days later Mr. DeBry filed a substitute Petition for Writ of

Certiorari. (See Exhibit E attached hereto)
8.

Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the Substitute Petition for Writ

of Certiorari on January 15, 1990. (See Exhibit F attached hereto)
9.

Mr. DeBry filed a Reply to Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari on

January 25th, 1990. (Incorrectly denominated "Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari". See
Exhibit G attached hereto)
10.

Mr. DeBry again included the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna in the Petition

and Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
11.

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the above mentioned Affidavit and

presented oral argument to the Utah Supreme Court on February 5, 1990. (See Exhibit H,
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached hereto. Attached as Exhibit J is a
certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion to Strike the Affidavit).
12.

The Utah Supreme Court granted the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

Patricia Hanna on February 5, 1990. (See Order attached to Exhibit I.)
13.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on

March 6, 1990. (See Exhibit K, attached hereto)
14.

Defendants through counsel filed a Motion to Impose Sanctions against

Robert DeBry, with the trial court on January 4, 1991. On February 21, 1991 the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
issued an order indicating that such sanctions should be addressed to the Utah Court of Appeals
and allowing Defendants/Respondents filed a Motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate
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Procedure 33, to impose sanctions. (Order of the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, dated
February 21, 1991 attached hereto as Exhibit L)
15.

Defendants then applied to the Court of Appeals to impose sanctions on

Mr. DeBry pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33(a); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
11 and UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1989). (See Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J.
DeBry in his capacity as counsel for Plaintiff Ralph Ostler, Exhibit M, attached hereto)
16.

On June 21, 1991 counsel Robert DeBry filed in the Utah Court of Appeals

a "Motion to Recall the Mandate and to Correct the Opinion," attempting to consolidate such
Motion with the pending Petition for Sanctions against Robert DeBry. (See Exhibit N attached
hereto) The Motion was based on the Affidavits of Samuel D. Thurman, Carl S. Hawkins and
Michael Goldsmith. These Affidavits were all outside of the Trial and Appellate Court records.
The Affidavits were provided by former Law School Deans and Law Professors in an attempt
to demonstrate the supposed merit of Robert DeBry's filing of the Petition for Rehearing. The
affiants attempt to accomplish this purpose by criticizing the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals. (See Exhibit O attached hereto)
17.

On August 5, 1991 the Utah Court of Appeals denied Defendants' Petition

for Sanctions against Robert DeBry for lack of jurisdiction. (See Exhibit P attached hereto)
18.

The Court of Appeals also dismissed the Motion to Recall the Mandate in

its Memorandum Opinion dismissing the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert DeBry on August
5, 1991. (See Exhibit P attached hereto)
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19.

On September 3, 1991, Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for a Writ of

Mandamus to the Utah Court of Appeals (See Exhibit Q attached hereto)(Now pending before
this Court).
20.

On September 3, 1991 Mr. DeBry also filed the present Petition for Writ

of Certiorari in this Court on the same issue presented in the Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
(See Exhibit R attached hereto)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court Should Deny The Petition For Writ of Certiorari
A.

Introduction

Petitioner would have this court review and condemn the Utah Court of Appeals
disposition of a "Motion to Recall the Mandate." However, "Review by a Writ of Certiorari
is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion and will be granted only for special and
important reasons." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46.
In light of the factual and procedural background in this case, petitioner's
contentions are not only neither special nor important, but in fact are wholly without merit. In
the first place, the Appellate Court did not issue any "mandate" that it could recall. The
Appellate Court merely affirmed the trial court's decision without issuing any "mandate" or
further instructions to the trial court.
Petitioner based the Motion to Recall the Mandate on the Affidavits of two former
law school deans and a law professor (see Exhibit N). These affidavits were all outside of the
trial and appellate records. The affidavits criticized the Appellate Court's decision, but did not
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provide any newly discovered information, did not reveal any misconduct or fraud, and did not
give the court any compelling reason to resume jurisdiction (see Exhibit O).
Furthermore, even if Mr. DeBry would have the Court overlook these facial
defects, it would appear from Mr. DeBry's contentions in the present Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, that the Petition is in substance a new petition for rehearing. Mr. DeBry was merely
attempting once again to persuade the Court of Appeals to abandon its decision on the merits.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 35 expressly prohibits consecutive petitions for
rehearing. Subsection d reads "Petitions for rehearing that are not timely presented under this
rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing will not be received by the clerk." Rule 35(d)
Accordingly the Court of Appeals appropriately dismissed Mr. DeBry's Motion for lack of
jurisdiction.
In Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384, 386, this Court noted:
In the present appeal plaintiffs' seek to resurrect the issues that
were raised on the first appeal. The assignments of error in
plaintiffs brief are directed towards the original judgements, the
same judgement from which Plaintiffs appealed [previously] ...
The express ruling by this Court on all issues raised by the prior
appeals is binding upon the parties, the trial court and this Court.
The court's holding is readily applicable to the case at hand. The Court of Appeals has already
expressly ruled on all the issues now raised by Mr. DeBry. The Court of Appeals is bound by
its' prior express ruling and hence appropriately dismissed the Motion to Recall the Mandate for
lack of jurisdiction.
By filing the present petition, Mr. DeBry makes a mockery of the doctrine of res
judicata. After the Trial Court entered its judgment based upon a jury verdict in Defendant's
favor, the Utah Court of Appeals fully reviewed the Plaintiffs case and affirmed the Trial
6

Court's decision.

Mr. DeBry then filed a Petition for Rehearing, based on the "Hanna

Affidavit" which this court later deemed as "bordering on contempt" (See exhibit J). After the
Court of Appeals denied the Petition, Mr. DeBry filed the first Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to this court. This court struck the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna and denied the Petition. Then
Mr. Debry responded to a motion for sanctions against him by filing a Motion to Recall the
Mandate based on the Affidavits of three law professors. The Affidavits were all outside of the
record and each criticized the opinion of the Court of Appeals (exhibit O). The Court of
Appeals dismissed the Motion for Sanctions against Mr. DeBry on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction. In the same Memorandum opinion the Appellate Court also dismissed Mr. Debry's
Motion to Recall the Mandate "on the same basis" (see Exhibit P).
Mr. DeBry has responded to the ruling of the Appellate Court by filing two
additional Petitions in this Court, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Utah Court of
Appeals and the present Petition for Writ of Certiorari. These latest Petitions are further
examples of Mr. DeBry's relentless disposition for filing inappropriate and meritless claims in
this case.
Despite the foregoing Mr. DeBry attempts to create "a special or important"
reason why the court should grant certiorari to review this case by reference to each possible
basis for certiorari in sub-parts a-d of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46. In each
instance however, Mr. DeBry's contentions are unfounded.
B.

Petitioner has not presented an adequate basis for the Court's Certiorari
Jurisdiction.

1.

Mr. DeBry first asserts that the Court of Appeals ruling in this case is "in

conflict with prior decisions of this court" (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 5, exhibit R).
7

In an attempt to create this conflict, DeBry first cites Fenton v. Salt Lake County. 4 Utah 116
(1885) a case which was decided over 100 years ago and has not been cited by the courts since
its appeal on the merits in 1885. Fenton is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the case at
bar.

In Fenton, the Supreme Court merely allowed the Plaintiff to Appeal from a final

judgement dismissing his case after the Defendant had effectively taken an interlocutory appeal
of the trial court's ruling against his demurrer. The Fenton Court implicitly held that the
resolution of a prior interlocutory appeal by the defendant did not affect the plaintiffs statutory
right to appeal from the trial court's judgment. Unlike Fenton, Ostler has not only received the
opportunity of a full trial and an appeal on the merits, but has also had the opportunity to
petition the Court of Appeals for rehearing, and to petition this Court for Certiorari. Both
petitions have already been denied.
Mr. Debry next cites Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 24 P.2d 380 (1950) for the
proposition that an Appellate Court can recall a remittitur if it was "issued improperly or to
correct an irregularity or error in the issuance of the remittitur." However, Mr. DeBry has
distorted the Court's holding in the case, by omitting the dominant clause of the holding. In
Miller the Supreme Court acknowledged that "we are without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur,
except upon a showing that the remittitur was issued through fraud, or inadvertence, or was
issued prematurely, or otherwise improperly or to correct an irregularity of error in issuance of
the remittitur." Miller. 24 P.2d at 381 (Utah 1933) (Emphasis added). (This is not the direct
holding of the court, but rather the court held so indirectly by asserting in the following
paragraph "in the absence of a statute or rule of court to the contrary the great weight of judicial
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authority as to the first proposition [i.e. the one quoted above] is as contended by the
respondant." Miller)
The Supreme Court's reference in Miller is clearly to its own jurisdiction, not to
that of other appellate courts, as Mr. DeBry has asserted. Furthermore, the court clearly states
that it is without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur except upon a showing of inadvertence,
fraud, prematurity, or to correct an irregularity, or other impropriety. Hence, even if this rule
applies by analogy to the jurisdiction of appellate courts, the Utah Court of Appeals was indeed
without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur issued in this case absent the required showing.
Because the Motion to Recall was based solely on affidavits that were not part of the record and
in any event, failed to provide any showing of fraud, inadvertence, prematurity, impropriety,
etc. the court was correct in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
2.

Mr. DeBry next asserts that "the Court of Appeals ruling conflicts with

another decision of the Court of Appeals" (Petition for Writ of Certiorari page 5, Exhibit R
attached hereto). To support this contention he cites Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 P.2d
878 (Utah App. 1988). Again the supposed "conflict" is an illusory one. In Baker the Court
of Appeals merely reiterated the provision contained in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)
providing that a trial court may consider a motion for relief from a judgment even while an
appeal is pending in the Court of Appeals. Baker is simply not applicable to the case at bar.
Rule 60(b) applies only to trial courts and is supported by notions of judicial economy. Judicial
economy can be served if, in the discretion of the trial court and upon a showing of good cause,
the trial court can correct its own errors, hence obviating the necessity of appellate review in
some cases. In the case at bar the Court of Appeals has no rule or statutory authority that would

9

permit it to recall its decision. Furthermore, judicial economy would not be served because
Ostler's petitions have been heard prior to the Motion to Recall twice by the Court of Appeals
and once by the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals should not be forced to entertain
Petitioner's motion after so much judicial time has been wasted by Mr. DeBry's repeated and
meritless petitions and motions. Neither should this court waste any more of its time in
considering this illusory "conflict of authority" created by Mr. DeBry.
3.

Mr. DeBry goes on to assert that the present petition raises an "important

question of state law, which should be settled by the Supreme Court" (Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Exhibit Q attached hereto). In an attempt to support the assertion, Mr. DeBry cites
several cases from other jurisdictions. Again Mr. DeBry has mis-characterized the law in these
cases in an effort to create "illusory conflicts." He cites eight cases for the proposition that
appellate courts have "inherent power or jurisdiction to recall and review their own judgements,
mandates, and orders," however, not one of these cases is an appellate court decision. Each is
a supreme court (either State of Federal) decision referring to the supreme court's discretionary
powers to correct its decisions. These cases do not make reference to any supposed power or
jurisdiction of appellate courts in recalling their decisions.
A Tenth Circuit Court case, Coleman v. Turpen. 827 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1987)
does refer to appellate court power to set aside a mandate. However, Mr. DeBry has failed to
provide a full citation of the pertinent passage of the opinion that he quotes. The Tenth Circuit
Court notes:
While a mandate once issued by our court will not be recalled
except for good cause shown, an appellate court has power to set
aside at any time a mandate that was procured by fraud, or act to
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prevent an injustice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process.
Coleman. 827 F.2d at 671 (10th Circuit 1987) (Citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC. 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir 1971)). (emphasis added)
Clearly the General Rule among federal appellate courts is that a mandate once
issued will not be recalled. Only under exceptional circumstances "for good cause shown" can
it be recalled. In the present case the Affidavits of Samuel Thurman, Carl Hawkins, and
Michael Goldsmith, all extraneous to the record, did not and could not have presented any
"exceptional circumstance" to the Court of Appeals.
Mr. DeBry also quotes from Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.. 322
U.S. 238 (1944). However, in that case the Circuit Court's judgement had been procured by
fraud, hence the Supreme Court Ordered the Circuit Court to vacate its judgment and to give
instructions to the trial Court accordingly.
Opposing counsel cites Boudar v. E.G.G. Inc.. 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987), for
the proposition that "[Appellate decisions] must be final because they are right and not right
because they are final ...." Boudar at 443. However, Mr. DeBry has again mis-characterized
the Court's decision. In giving its opinion the Supreme Court of New Mexico referred to its
own decisions and not to the decisions of other appellate courts.
Counsel for Petitioner also cites Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC. 463
F.2d. 267 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In that case the D. C. Circuit refused to recall its mandate even
though new "prejudicial information" had been discovered after the Circuit Court's decision.
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The court concluded:
We assume doctrines deeply rooted in equity jurisprudence permit
a recall of an appellate mandate of affirmance to avoid an
unconscionable injustice growing out of misconduct undercutting
the integrity of the administrative or judicial process. But there is
no claim of such misconduct.
Greater Boston at 291.
The court noted further that:
The power to recall mandates should be exercised sparingly and is
not to be availed of freely as a basis for granting rehearings out of
time for the purpose of changing decisions, even assuming the
court becomes doubtful of the wisdom of the decision that has been
entered and become final.
Greater Boston at 277. (Citing Estate of Iverson v. Comm'r. 257 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir. 1958).
The D. C. Court also cited Legate v. Malony. 348 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1965): "If we were in
error . . . we believe it would be far greater error to permit reconsideration now after denial of
Petitions for Rehearing and Certiorari. There must be an end to dispute." Legate at 166. The
Court continued:

"There must be special reason, 'exceptional circumstances', in order to

override the strong policy of repose that there be an end to litigation". Legate at 278.
The D. C. Circuit in Greater Boston also provides an excellent summary of the
circumstances that might be deemed "exceptional." These are: to set aside a mandate procured
by fraud; to correct clerical mistakes, or make the judgment consistent with the opinion; to
clarify an outstanding mandate; to irradiate the fraud or misconduct of a party that would
undercut the integrity of the judicial process; to avoid differences of result for cases pending at
the same time; to give co-defendants the benefit of the same principle; to provide uniformity in
companion cases; and to avoid inter-circuit conflict; to revise unintended or inadvertent
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instructions of the appellate court. (See Greater Boston at 278-280). Mr. Debry presented no
such "exceptional" circumstances to the Utah Court of Appeals.
4.

In a final attempt to provide a basis for the present petition, Mr. DeBry

apparently relies on the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46(c). This subsection provides for
certiorari "when a panel of the court of appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the supreme courts power of supervision"
(emphasis added). However, in Mr. DeBry's attempt to demonstrate the Courts supposed
departure, he cites the substantive contents of the Affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins, and
Goldsmith, (See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Page 10, Exhibit R). As has been noted all three
affidavits are outside of the record, and cannot serve as a basis for any argument advanced
before this court. Furthermore, even if such affidavits were legitimately before this court, they
are entirely inapplicable to Petitioner's argument for Certiorari. The affidavits criticize the
original opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in which the court affirmed the trial court's
judgement. The affiants offer no opinion regarding the supposed impropriety of the Court's
disposition of the Motion to Recall, presently at issue in this Petition. The Court should not be
mislead by Mr. DeBry's confusion of the merits of the original appeal with those of the present
petition.
In short every point raised by Mr. DeBry in his argument for Certiorari in this
case, is either false illusory or misleading. The present Petition for Writ of Certiorari like all
of the other post appeal petitions and motions filed by Mr. DeBry, is merely another attempt to
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata and the appellate process. Mr. DeBry's present petition
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like his other post appeal petitions and motions in this case, is meatless, frivolous, and
inappropriate.
POINT n
Sanctions Are Appropriate Pursuant To
Rule 33 Of The Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure
And Rule 11 Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure,
Generally, attorney's fees may be recovered in Utah if provided for by statute
or contract. Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, pursuant to
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, attorney and/or double costs are awarded in cases of
frivolous appeals.
Rule 33 states in relevant part:
If the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award . . .
single or double costs. . . and/or reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party.
Sanctions for frivolous appeals have been applied in egregious cases, such as when
an appeal was filed in order to "take unconscionable advantage" of the other party and therefore
failing to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah App.
1987).

"Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with no reasonable

likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment" (emphasis added).
Maughan. 770 P.2d at 162. See also, Porco v. Porco. 759 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) (Appeal
filed to harass defendant).
Moreover, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate when a pleading or motion is
filed without reasonable inquiry as to whether it is "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
14

law," and is brought for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation" (emphasis added). See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor.
770 P.2d at 171, 172 (Utah App. 1989).
The standard to be employed under Rule 11 is an objective one: did the attorney
act reasonable, under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163 (Utah
App. 1989). The Court said in Taylor that this objective standard "allows sanctions to be
imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith'
standard." Taylor at 170. The Court also stated that whether specific conduct violates Rule 11
is a question of law. If this rule is violated, based on an objective standard, it is mandatory to
impose sanctions. It is within the Court's discretion to tailor the sanction to the circumstance
but usually is based on costs and attorney's fees.
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion
to Strike the Affidavit before the Supreme Court. On page 8, line 6, Justice Stewart suggests
that the Affidavit "borders on contempt". Justice Durham states, beginning line 25 of page 8:
"It boggles the mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on the inherent logic of an
appellate court."
The Affidavit was not part of the record on appeal and was an attempted criticism
of the thought processes of the appellate panel to persuade them, first, to reconsider the appeal
and, secondly, to provide that as a basis for the requested Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Counsel for the Appellant in arguing the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia
Hanna characterized it as a "once in a lifetime motion". Exhibit J, page 7, lines 14-17. Justice
Durham readily saw that allowing an affidavit outside the record as a basis for a Petition for
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Certiorari could be abused and would be a whole new concept in an attack on a lost appeal.
(Transcript Exhibit J, page 8, lines 170-25). Justice Durham also characterized this particular
Affidavit as a Mspecific critique and attack upon the work of an appellate court". (Transcript,
Exhibit J. page 9, lines 20 and 21.) An examination of the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna clearly
demonstrates that it is nothing more than a criticism of the court and judges of the court "with
no reasonable likelihood of success". Though previously stricken by this Court, Petitioner again
has the audacity to resubmit to the Court the Hanna affidavit.
There can be little doubt that the Justices of the Supreme Court hearing this
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna were exercised at the audacity of Plaintiffs
counsel in submitting such an attack on the court as a basis for a Writ of Certiorari. Such
recognition by Plaintiffs counsel was shown by his own statement on page 10 of the transcript,
Exhibit J, wherein Mr. DeBry said, "Now* I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's question,
because you're looking at me very sternly, when I say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and
you say it borders on contempt".
While counsel tried to urge the court that it was a matter of the gravest concern,
an examination of the Affidavit itself shows how direct the attack was on the logic and analysis
process of the Court of Appeals. Referring the court directly to the parts of the Affidavit, Page
2, paragraph 6:
In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have
given it a grade of 4D'; from a graduate student, it would have
counted as failing work.
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The last sentence of paragraph 7:
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis
which they deserved and required.
The first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 3:
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the
interrelated nature of the arguments in the appeal; . . .
The third sentence of the last paragraph on page 3:
Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no appreciation of
the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a bearing on
more than one aspect of the case.
The last sentence of the top paragraph on page 4:
I can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a
serious breakdown in the present case.
The middle of the first paragraph on page 4:
. . . indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' decision to
reject the appeal fails to take account of or to address the points
raised by Ostler's counsel.
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6:
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic
of Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the
Court of Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal.
The next to the last sentence on page 9:
The Court of Appeals' decision shows absolutely no appreciation
of this fact, and in no sense addresses it.
The last sentence on page 11:
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. . . this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's case
it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to
comprehend the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did
to Ostler's case.
The last sentence under point 1 on page 12:
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision that Ostler does not
prove a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to
me to show a failure to read the briefs carefully.
The last sentence on age 13:
The Court of Appeals . . . says that taken in context, the remark
caused no harm. This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects
the Court of Appeal's failure to take the misstatement and its
correction in context, viz. the larger context of the legal issues
involved in the jury's deliberations and the fact that their
instructions on these matters were unclear and confusing.
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 15:
Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.
The first sentence in the first paragraph on page 17:
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point.
The first sentence on page 20:
The Court of Appeal's grounds for their decision to reject the
appeal are confusing.
The last sentence in the second paragraph on page 20:
In short, the entire section on p. 10 stands as an enigma in the
Court of Appeals' reasoning.
The conclusion of the affiant, Ms. Hanna shows the thrust of the Affidavit:
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude
that in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take
into account many important aspects of the arguments made in the
18

appeal; at several points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is
beside the point and fails to address the arguments made in the
appeal. Due to time pressures or misunderstandings, a single
individual might fail to grasp the points at issue and the structure
of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems highly unlikely that
three individuals could all have made the same errors in analysis.
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis
which they deserved and required.
In the present case, all pleadings filed by Mr. DeBry after the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court jury verdict, including the two present petitions before this Court, are
predicated upon affidavits outside the record which attack the fundamental process of judicial
review and challenge the integrity of the judges who sat in review of the trial court.
Accordingly, Mr. DeBry has inappropriately created "needless increase in the cost of litigation."

Every motionfiledby Mr. DeBry after the appellate decision came down has been
denied. The affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached as Exhibit B, was improperly submitted to the
Court and had no basis for admittance under existing law. Mr. DeBry has submitted the
Affidavit on four separate occasions, once to the Court of Appeals, and now three times to this
Court. Likewise, the Affidavits of Samuel Thurman, Carl Hawkins and Michael Goldsmith have
been improperly submitted to both the Court of Appeals and to this Court, especially to the
extent that they are advanced affirmatively in support of the Motion to Recall. (Contrary to Mr.
DeBry's representations, the Affidavits have not merely been advanced defensively.)
Appellant's counsel did not present any valid argument why the law should be
extended to allow the filing of such disparaging affidavits. Certiorari was denied Mr. DeBry
after a Petition and a Substitute Petition to the Utah Supreme Court. Clearly, after the Court
19

of Appeals affirmed, the subsequent pleadings were "without merit."

Utah Courts have

interpreted "without merit" to mean an appeal "without a reasonable legal or factual basis."
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309, (Utah App. 1987).
Moreover, even if Mr. DeBry contends that he has submitted the 5 meritless
pleadings in good faith, subjective good faith is not a defense to Rule 11 or Rule 33 sanctions.
If pleadings are not well-grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law or create needless
litigation, a sanction is mandatory under Rule 11. Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank. 804 F.2d 588
(10th Cir. 1986); Taylor. Supra.
In Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. the answer to every pleading filed after the
appellate decision was in keeping with the trial court's and Court of Appeals' decision. Mr.
DeBry filed Petitions that were supported by an affidavit he himself saw as a "once-in-a-lifetime
shot". See Exhibit J. page 7, line 23. The Court stated it shouldn't even happen "once-in-alifetime". Id.

Now, Mr. DeBry has further demonstrated his audacity by seeking three

additional opportunities after his "once-in-a-lifetime shot" was appropriately denied by the court.
In sum, Mr. DeBry after having been denied rehearing and certiorari has filed
three additional meritless pleadings. The first was a Petition to Recall the Mandate based solely
on affidavits that further disparage the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals. In Mr. DeBry's
last two petitions to this Court, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, he has again included the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna which this court struck from
the record. He has also included the extraneous Affidavits of Mr. Thurman, Mr. Hawkins and
Mr. Goldsmith. The Petition now pending in this court is meritless and should be denied. It
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is yet another example of Mr. DeBry's relentless disposition for filing inappropriate and
meritless claims.
Defendants have incurred in excess of $14,000 in attorney's fees (see affidavit of
counsel attached as Exhibit S) subsequent to the Appellate Court's decision affirming the trial
court's judgment. Defendants are entitled to reimbursement in the form of sanctions against Mr.
Debry for having to respond to and defend against five meritless motions and petitions. (Six,
counting the Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
Mr. DeBry, not his client Ralph Ostler, should be sanctioned. "If there is a
frivolous appeal and the fault lies with the attorney, that is where the sanction will lie." Braley
v. Campbell. 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987).

Defendants hereby pray that the Court find Mr. DeBry's post-appeal pleadings
without merit and thus warranting an award to Defendants of reasonable attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied and sanctions should be
imposed on Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Ralph Ostler.
Sanctions are proper pursuant to Rule 11, as Mr. DeBry created needless litigation, Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1989) as Mr. DeBry's post appeal pleadings have all
been without merit and have not been brought in good faith. Defendants hereby pray for

sanctions of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any additional amount the Court deems
appropriate.
Dated and signed MsSO ^oay of September, 1991

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing was delivered to the Clerk of
the Court, Utah Supreme Court, and 4 copies to the below named party by hand delivery to the
same this 1st day of October, 1991, addressed as follows:
Robert J. DeBry, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

November 21, 1989
REMITTITUR
Ralph Ostler,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Albina Transfer Company, Inc.,
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R
Roe, Inc.,
Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No, 880228-CA

Wanda Ostler, Stephen K, Ostler,
Gary W. Ostler, Vyron R« Ostler,
Dale F. Ostler, Donnell B. Ostler,
Sonda Mae Ostler, Ralph 0. Ostler,
Brian L. Ostler, Carlyle E. Ostler,
Margaret Ostler, and Nathan J.
Ostler, as heirs of Stephen Ostler,
Gary Ostler, Dale Ostler, and
Eugene Ostler, d/b/a Go Cars,
Third-Party Defendants.

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted,
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the
premises, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the judgment of the trial court herein be, and the same
is, affirmed.
Opinion of the Court by Judge Russell W. Bench;
Judge Pamela T. Greenwood and Judge Norman H. Jackson
concur.

Issued:

September 8, 1989

Record:

11 VOLS and 1 ENV

EXHIBIT- ft

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of November, 1989, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in
the United States mail.
Daniel F. Bertch
Robert J. Debry
Dale Gardiner
Attorneys for Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
M. Dayle Jeffs
Attorney for Respondents
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
DATED this 21st day of November, 1989

By y?^77^f///,
/

//s&S.
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Exhibit B

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER,

]

Plaintiff,

;)
)
]

vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
OF &R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

]
}

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

AFFIDAVIT OF
PATRICIA HANNA

Case No. 88-00228-CA

'
)
)
)

My name is Patricia Hanna.

ss.

I give the following testimony under

oath:
1.

I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati.

2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Utah.
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I 'trained in law. However, I am trained
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My
curriculum vita is attached.
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina. et al. I have been asked to
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes
issues raised in the briefs.
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking.
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have given it a
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing
work.
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems,
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
8.

My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows:
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General Structure of Appeal

There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III,
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full
force.
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this.
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler
(hereafter, Wheeler)ef al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability.
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable

1

The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48.
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious
breakdown in the present case.
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeals
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals'
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points.

Assumptions
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked his
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson,
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran into
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given.

Point I
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of the
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although a
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause,
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict againsi
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this
decision.
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit,
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive
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fairness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no
indication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was
that the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is
rejected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be
irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that
it would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors
already were fully aware of the phenomena. The appeal argues that these
grounds are all inadequate.3
1. The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices.
and denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in

emergency lane
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory,
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether
flashing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them,
much as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at
the time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this
"luring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's
truck.
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided.
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck
had not been present in the- emergency lane, it was most likely that the
Ostler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field.

At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to
testify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;N however, it is clear from the
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245).
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections.
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether father
Ostler was awake or asleep. Taking each point in isolation, might give
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlooks
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time
of the accident.
2. Was father Ostler awake?
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter.
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisive
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate.
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says that
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jury
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, the
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear
would be directed verdicts.
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic o
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention
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does give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying
only that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
accident" (Opinion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is
simply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context.
3. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his
negligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable.
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability.
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would
affect whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if
Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an
attempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The
Court of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid. 402
("evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6).
4. The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of
such an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a
possibility
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues
to show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless
there was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within,
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane),
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen.
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grounds
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling.
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in this
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence a M to proximate
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common
knowledge.
Admissibility of this evidence
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case arid
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable.
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a wellunderstood and valid form of argument.4
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the
accident.
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect on
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is
therefore liable for the accident.

4

According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic (London: 1962),
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D.,
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178).
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes
of the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no
accident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes.
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a
proximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least
partially liable for the accident.5
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it
prevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further.to argue that each
piece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of
our lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant
(pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it
ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals'
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion
clearly demonstrates this.

5

A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate
causes of the accident.
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall,
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant,
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied
the law-and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion of
Ostler's arguments against this decision.
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded if
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the
jury. Under this standard, since'we all can understand the use of
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) and
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them.
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, this
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case.
Rule 702 states
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will a s s i s t the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact in understanding evidence that is simply
difficult
[though]
not beyond
ordinary
understanding.
United States v. Downing 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd
Cir. 1985)
(Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18).
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of
understanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have
that evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically:
1) Members of
the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might
think possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no
reason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and
flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like
that at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually
understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4)
Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the
slightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to
significantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers.
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the
jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as
the higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a
clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part,
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liability.
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that
no expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues
that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial
judge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide
discretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this
discretion.
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case.
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of the
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to
make an essentially comparative judgment.
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimum
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is,
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a
failure to read the briefs carefully.
Point II and Point III
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to

urinate
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations MO- 15-. and 70- hour rules)
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim is
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that this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and
liability. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back
once again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is
appropriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals
appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony.
Point IV
Misstatements during closing defendant's closing statement
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his
truck at just that time.
[T]he foreseeabiiity question is: How was Stan
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances
that it would happen right at that particular timequoted in Opinion, p. 8).
This clearly is not the standard to foreseeabiiity; if it were, no one would
ever be able to foresee anything.
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to
direct the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection,
clearly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it
causes harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to
the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear,
complicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more
detail under Point X below.
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together
with Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its
instructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm.
This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals'
failure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations and
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and
confusing.

Point V
Who Pavs
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that the
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformation
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems well
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV.
Point VII
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or

triangles
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.C.
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury.
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of
a highway from any cause other than necessary
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible,
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule,
quoted in Appeal, p. 41).
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so.
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer ox if parked
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances.
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to
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determine whether or not Wheeler should
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42).
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even
if substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g.,
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary
drivers.
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals'
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict.
Point IX
Video tape demonstration
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act;
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?"
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful.
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila
enough to the incident to count, as a re-enactment. Second, that it was
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury.
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing.
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual
accident. In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case.
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc
nol have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on
the issue of proximate cause.
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna

Page 17

not a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling
on the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or
that the trial court abused its discretion.
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature
of decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by
its nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied
the jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim
that showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial
the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that
Wheeler's truck was not simply something for father Ostler's truck to hit
(as though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been
there), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident
of the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries
are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary
causal factor. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see
this point.
Point X
Court's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect.
Ostler objected on several points:
1.

"Intervening independent cause" was undefined.

2.

Foreseeability was not the only test of causation

3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to
be the standard of foreseeability.
4.

6

The instructions were confusing.

If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you
fatally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot
me, I die.

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna

Page 18

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion.
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of some
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in which
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructions
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates.
Point XI
Directed verdict on causation
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked to
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however, i
the case at hand the error runs even deeper.
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds that
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similar
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply
that there is such an implication in every case.
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running into
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked

Affidavit of Patricia Hanna

Page 19

next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. Here the negligence implies
causation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of
parking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60).
Thus, causation is implied by negligence.
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited
by Ostler clearly support this contention.7
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree
because the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are
apparent."
Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree;
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even
though we are reasonable
The present case is of this unfortunate sort. The jurors were led to
draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw
the correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed.

7

The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief. AnnpnriiY T onw ~~ >.«..>
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal
are confusing.
First it is stated that generally proximate causation is
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case.
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of
Appeals' decision does not address this argument.
Second the Court of Appeals states that "'proximate cause' is one of
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence.
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning.
Conclusions
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS CASE
IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
This is not Robert DeBry's case.
Jeff's case.

Nor is this Dayle

Nor is this Judge Bench's case.

No lawyer or

judge should have a false pride in winning the case; or in
losing the case; or in writing an opinion; or in changing an
opinion.

Presumably, the attorneys on both sides, as well as

the entire panel of judges, have a joint goal of seeking justice.
This is Ralph Ostler's case.
his body —

from the waist

down.

Ralph Ostler lost half

He deserves a thoughtful,

informed, reasoned analysis by each judge.
is not what he got.

Unfortunately, that

What Ralph Ostler got was a superficial

Opinion that did not even touch on the core issues,
spend his lifetime in a wheelchair.

Surely his case

Ralph will
merits a

few extra hours of time by the judges.
Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this
case, Ostler has employed an expert to determine whether the
decision making process has broken down in this case.
experts opinion is attached as Exhibit A.
1

The

Ostler's expert

is chairperson of the Department of

Philosophy at the University of Utah.

Plaintiff's expert has

rated the quality of this Court's Opinion as a D or E grade.
This

is not

intended

to criticize or embarrass

the Court.

Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing
a grave injustice.

Hopefully the Court will be inclined to

thank counsel, rather than to retaliate.
POINT II
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECENT PRECEDENT
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon."

The trial

court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a
foundation could be laid that father Ostler was awake just
prior to the accident.

(See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.)

This

court echoed the trial court's reasoning:
[T]he theory was premised on the fact that a
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured"
. . . without this foundation, the Court determined that the expert testimony would not be
helpful to the jury . . .
Slip Opinion, at p. 4.
However,

this

Court

overlooked

the

recent

case

of

Huddles ton v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed 2d 771
(1988):
2

In determining whether the government has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule
104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the government
has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court simply examines all the evidence and decides whether the
jury could reasonably find the conditional
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Compare, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 & 7.)
In this case, there was abundant evidence from which
the jury could have concluded that father Ostler was awake.
(See, Brief of Appellant at p. 4 & 5.)

Contrary to Huddleston,

the trial court did not permit the evidence of the preliminary
fact issue to go to the jury.
the Huddleston analysis.

Nor did the trial court apply

(viz, whether the jury could reason-

ably find from the evidence that

father Ostler was awake.)

This is not a matter of discretion.

Huddleston must be applied

to the facts of this case.
POINT III
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT FAILED
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECENT PRECEDENT FROM
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A second major issue in the case was that defendant
Wheeler had misstated the law in his closing argument.
generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 33.)

(See

This Court's Opinion

holds that any error was cured by the following comments of the
judge:

The jury is directed to look at the instructions. They set forth the law in that regard.
Statement of counsel is to be disregarded
except a: it is accurate.
Slip Pp..I i li 01 i, «*'
Howevei.

<.
his Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on

the issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure
the error.

Strangely, this Court's

P:-.

v. Yandellf 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App. 1977
s (j u a i' e I y

\ i o J <J s

t A i a f: s t I c I i c o m m e n i .*

2--:i^s uoon Halford
However, Halford,

• * ' •'

•«.: *

•

not suffi-

cient to cure the error.
*!.•><

• jortantly, tl Lis court's opinion totally ignores

the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Shickles, 760
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988)
ps

3 5 & 36.)

(See discussion at Brief of Appellant at

A proper application

\ the Shickles case should

have led to a reversal.
POINT IV
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS
IN THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Ostler challenged the Court's instruction ori independent intervening cause on
define the term

four grounds:

intervening

first, failure to

independent cause; second, that

foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test) to determine causation; third, that only a generalized risk of harm
4

need be foreseeable; and fourth, confusion.

(See generally,

Brief of Appellant at p. 56-58.)
r

.

viz. confusion.

:

-. . . \

JHd, •

v,

* • : mirth

issue:

Rehearing is necessary to analyze the other

three defects i n t lit- \\\\ ) » nst met .ions „ ^
With respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that
the confusion was not "substantial
v. Utah Transit Authority, >

prejudicial".

In Harris

. .-' (Utah 1983), the Su-

preme Court reversed, in part, upon HIP confusion of an ins t r i i c t i o i i o i i s u p e i: c e d i n g c a i i s e

It i; •« oh' /

• Utah

Supreme Court regards confusion regarding superceding cause to
be serious enough for reversal.
POINT V
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT" S OPINION
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIABILITY
There were two theories of liability:
First, that Wheeler was i n llaw fu 1 1 y parked < in i the side
<"•: the road I n violation of §4 1-6-103 ( I) ( I j . As this Court has
pointed out, that theory was conceded by the defense, and the
It is tr UL L ;..-.:. Liie Court did instruct the jury on
concurrent negligence, (Slip opinion p. 9.) However, concurrent negligence does not "fill the gap." The instruction on
concurrent negligence does not inform the jury of the dividing
line between concurrent cause and intervening cause.

5

Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proximate cause).
The second theory of

liability was that Wheeler was

parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes.
This theory was not conceded.
However, this Court has f.-;;Led to appreciate that the
< hain of. «. ausat, 11 »n is different <j. «-i iing upon wh i < h tdiieory of
liability applies.

Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 minF-..'

- \ arked

for more than 10 minutes must additionally i\>

flares or

utes must simply tun i on blinking lights'.

triangles.

(See generally,

B r1e t o f Appe11an t at p.

12.)

Ostler's expert exclaimed that flares and triangles offer an
additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and
that the accident could have 'been ave».ided
warning had been in place.

if this additional

(Transcript, 232-233, 284.)

In

short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proximate cause.
second

This Court's

Opinion

simply

overlooked

this

theory of liability.
POINT V 1
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED RESTATEMENT 442 AND 447
This Court glossed over the claim for a directed ver-

dict by saying that it was a jury issue.
6

However, our Supreme

Court has adopted Section

*1? n!

the Restatement 2

Court also accept a Sec U on

• •

III*1 Restatement, tl lere i s i u :

jury issue.
dee<

If this

The result must follow as a matter of logic,

-

•

S'v:t 1 TI 'I ,ii .'

'

Ln-

/ the Restatement

is

very similar to this case:
A loads his truck so carelessly that
jolt might cause its heavy contents *
from it. He parks it in a street where to '
knowledge small boys congregate for play.
B,
one of the b o y s , tries to climb on the truck.
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he causes
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt C r a
comrade standing close by,
B f s act is not a
superseding cause of C's harm,,
Reply Bi'iM-l ».f Appo I I ahi ni r.i »poii,i i :\ I'wn .
To dispose of Ostler's motion

for a directed

verdict

without analyzing the interplay between Section 442 and 447 of
the Restatement is grossly superficial.
DATED this o*L/

£f^C^S^--

day of

i98y.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

' RO&gRT"jV /DEBRY '/

^

Harris
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) .

v.

Utah

Transit
7

Authority

*
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IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals

refused to follow binding precedence of this court2.

Certiorari

is

proper

because

of

the

unusual

course of proceedings in the Court of Appeals.
3.

Certiorari

is

proper

because

this

court

has

already granted certiorari on an identical issue.
4.

Certiorari

is proper because the Utah Court of

Appeals refused to consider an alternate theory of liability.
5.

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals

refused to consider Ostler's expert testimony.
6.
did

not

Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals

give

adequate

consideration

to

defects

in

jury

instructions.
V.
OFFICIAL REPORTS
This case
(Utah 1989).

is reported

at

117 Utah Adv. Rep. P. 2d 14

(See Appendix.)
VI.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals Opinion was filed on September 8,
1989.

On October 18, 1989, rehearing was denied.
On October 26, 1989, this court granted enlargement of

time for filing a petition for certiorari to December 15, 1989.
This court has power to grant certiorari pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Rules 42-48 of the Supreme Court.
1

semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled
access highway in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-103(1)(i) (1988). The court reserved
the issue of whether Wheeler's negligence was
a "proximate cause" of the accident.
The
jury eventually concluded that Stephen
Ostler's negligence was the "intervening and
sole proximate cause" of the plaintiff's
injuries, and rendered a special verdict for
defendants. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
REFUSED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENCE OF THIS COURT
It is clear that the rule of superceding causation set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965) has been
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority 671 P. 2d 217 (Utah

adopted.
1983).

In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah

1984) this court held:
An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superceding cause that
relieves the original actor of liability.
The earlier actor is charged with the
foreseeable negligent acts of others.
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is
foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a
concurring cause.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra, holds that
once

the

negligence

established,
superceding

of

one

the negligence
cause

unforeseeable."

unless
671 P.2d

it

stopping

(parking) a vehicle

of a subsequent
is

at 220.

"so

driver

extraordinary

is

is not a
as

to be

Harris having adopted the

Restatement position on superceding cause, further states that
the focus of the trial should be on a comparison of the relative
3

lane. . An errant (sleepy or distracted) driver drifted into the
emergency lane and hit the truck.
This

scenario

triggers

the

application

not only of

Section 447 of the Restatement, but also Sections 442A and 442B1.
The risk of an errant driver striking a truck parked on
the shoulder of the interstate is a foreseeable risk which the
statute was

intended

to

remedy.

Under

Restatement

Sections

442A, 442B and 447, the occurrence of the very event the statute
was designed to prevent precludes a finding that the negligence
of Father Ostler was an intervening cause.

The focus of Harris,

supra, is a comparison of the relative fault of the two negligent
parties under the comparative negligence statute instead of (as
allowed by the trial court in this case) a defense based upon the
fact that the negligent truck driver did not foresee the specific
negligence of Father Ostler.

Harris, supra, at 222.

The defense

at trial effectively overruled the principles of the Restatement
Sections (442A, 442B & 447) as well as the principles set out by
this court in Harris and Godesky, supra.

If allowed to stand,

the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case effectively
overrules the-principles of Restatement Sections 442A, 442B, and
447 and is a distinct departure from the principles set out in
Harris and Godesky.
As a matter of law, it was not "highly extraordinary"
to suspect that an errant driver might drift onto the emergency
•'•Given the adoption by this court of Section 447 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), this court should also
specifically adopt and follow Sections 442A and 442B.
5

It

would

appear

proper

for

this

court

to

grant

certiorari for the purpose of resolving the following:
a)

Why the Court of Appeals ignored the provisions of
Restatement § 442A, 442B & 447 as well as the
precedents set in Godesky, supra; and Harris.

b)

Whether it is appropriate

for a trial court to

direct

issues of superceding

cause

a verdict
and/or

on

the

proximate

cause

in

cases

where

negligence resulting from violation of a statute
is admitted and the asserted superceding cause is
an act clearly intended to be protected by the
statute.
c)

What type of jury instruction should be given to
allow the issues raised by Sections 442A, 442B and
447 of the Restatement to be properly presented to
the jury?

The
development

trial

of

court

plaintiff's

should
second

also
theory

have
of

allowed

full

negligence

and

proximate cause, i.e. that the failure of the truck driver to
place warning devices was negligence and a proximate cause of the
injury.

Failure to allow this alternative theory to be developed

was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals, but was not
adequately covered in the Opinion.

See, Point IV, infra.

This clearly appears to depart from Harris where the
court held that a plaintiff is entitled to present all of his
theories

to

the

jury.

It

is
7

reversible

error

to preclude

POINT II
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL COURSE
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Rule

43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

states that certiorari is appropriate where the Court of Appeals
has "• * .departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedingso"

This case involves such a departure.

A part of the record of the Court of Appeals is an
affidavit by Ms. Patricia Hannah, Ph.D.
Hannah

is

Chairperson

University of Utah.
Ostler's
Appeals^.

Petition

for

of

the

(See Appendix.)

Department

This affidavit was
Reconsideration

in

filed
the

of

Dr.

Philosophy,

in support of
Utah

Court of

In substance, the affidavit is a 21 page analysis of

the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The affidavit states in

part:
I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.
However, I am trained in logic and argumentation.
Indeed, the field of philosophy is
in large measure devoted to the study of
arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning.
I have taught classes in
deductive and inductive logic, as well as in
J

Basic considerations of due process demand that a
litigant be given an opportunity to be heard on all pertinent
issues raised by his case at both the trial and appellate level.
In every instance the litigant is entitled by due process to have
the court consider and deal with all issues fairly raised. It is
clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opinion.
Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the trial
advocate.
Nor was that step taken lightly.
However, it is a
serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a passing grade
on a college level.
Hopefully, the Court will not criticize
counsel for this unusual step. Hopefully, the court will value
this input, as it undertakes the serious task of supervising the
inferior courts of this state.
9

presented to an appeals court.

A real question exists in the

present case as to whether such was done in the present case.
POINT III
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT
HAS ALREADY GRANTED CERTIORARI ON AN IDENTICAL
ISSUE IN ANOTHER PENDING CASE
In the trial court, Ostler submitted evidence of a
recent advertising campaign by insurance companies designed to
scare

the

public

about

jury

awards.

(R.

1255-1273.)

The

capstone to this advertising program was a letter by Farmers
Insurance Group.

The letter was sent to all policy holders

shortly prior to this trial.

The letter states in part:

pay for plaintiff's lawyers."

(See Appendix.)

"You

Ostler submitted various voir dire questions inquiring
about jury attitudes regarding this "tort reform" publicity.
particular, Ostler asked which of the prospective

In

jurors were

covered by Farmers Insurance*^.
The trial court refused to give Ostler's requested voir
dire questions.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In so doing,

the Court of Appeals relied on its reasoning in Doe v. Hafen, 772
P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1989) the court stated:
In their totality, and in context with the
remainder of voir dire, their questions are
substantially responsive to plaintiff's
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in
Doe. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.
3

Each juror covered by Farmers would have received Exhibit
B shortly before the trial.
Farmers was also the insurance
carrier defending the case on behalf of defendant.
11

Appeals addressed the issue of negligence for failure to put out
flares and triangles.

On each occasion, the Court of Appeals

refused to even consider the issue.
We last address plaintiff's claim of error
regarding the exclusion of evidence on
federal motor carrier regulations. . . .
[This] evidence goes to the issue of
Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously
decided by directed verdict, and may be
excluded as irrelevant. 117 Utah Adv.Rep. at
16.
•

*

*

Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to
permit him to show that Wheeler had been
parked on the shoulder of the highway for as
long as 30 minutes unduly restricted crossexamination. . . .
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument
when the alternate basis for the court's
ruling is considered, namely that the
questions of how long Wheeler had been parked
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's
negligence.
Since that issue has been
resolved by directed verdict.
The excluded
testimony was irrelevant. Id.
•

•

•

Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury
instructions. The first instruction involves
the placement of emergency warning devices
behind Wheeler's parked truck. We agree that
the given instruction significantly differs
from plaintiff's requested instruction.
However, the instruction concerned the issue
of Wheeler's negligence.
We have already
established that this issue had been taken
from the jury.
Any error could not have
affected the substantial rights of plaintiff
and was therefore, harmless.
117 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 17.
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reasoning.
The chain of causation for negligent parking is different from
13

truck.

A central issue is why.

asleep.
"lured"

Plaintiff's
off

scientific

the

road

phenomenon

expert
by

The defense argued that he was

proffered

the

testimony

illegally

is sometimes

parked

referred

to

that

he was

truck.
as

the

This
"moth

effect"6.
The trial court
"moth effect".

refused

to receive evidence of the

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of

Appeals stated:
Even if such a theory is admissible under the
threshold requirement of inherent reliability
[citation omitted].
The theory is premised
on the fact that a driver must be awake to be
lured.
117 Utah Adv.Rep. at p. 15.
Thus, a foundation issue was whether Stephen Ostler
(father) was awake or had his eyes open7 so he could be lured8.
On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of
b

For example, California Highway Patrol cars are struck
approximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing
lights.
Upon the advise of Ostler's expert, the California
Highway Patrol has done away with off and on flashers.
(Tr.
231.)
Indeed, the Federal Department of Transportation has
recently recognized the "moth effect" as an industry wide
problem. (Tr. 284.)
defendants offered a series of night-time photos of the
parked truck. The foundation for the night-time photos was that
Ostler's eyes were open. Ostler thereupon proffered evidence on
the "moth effect" as rebuttal testimony.
Thus, the foundation
for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect theory was
identical, viz. that Ostler's eyes were open.
The Court of
Appeals, likewise, ignored this crucial issue. (See Exhibit F.)
8

Ostler's experts gave five reasons to conclude that
Stephen Ostler was awake (so that he could be lured).
The
reasons are summarized at Exhibit G. The trial court rejected
all of this proffered testimony.

15

in this case is superficial.

No attempt was made to discuss

Huddleston or Harris and no reasoned explanation was given as to
why the evidence should not have been allowed.

POINT VI
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS
DID NOT GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO DEFECTS
IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The core issue in this case is whether the trucker's
negligence

was

a proximate

cause of the accident.

Or, was

Stephen Ostler's^ negligence the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
The law on this issue was purportedly presented by the
trial court's Instruction No- 27.

(See Appendix.)

In the trial court, Ostler challenged Instruction No.
2 7 on four grounds:
a)

failure of the jury instruction to define the term
independent intervening cause;

b)

foreseeability

is

only

one

test

(not the sole

test) to determine causation;
c)

only

a

generalized

risk

of

harm

need

be

foreseeable;
d)

confusion.

The Court of Appeals only dealt with confusion.
other three

issues

are

serious matters

10

The

supported by abundant

Stephen Ostler was the father of plaintiff Ralph Ostler.
Stephen Ostler was driving. Ralph Ostler was asleep.
17

The jury returned a verdict for defendant.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed.
The

head

of

the

Department

of

Philosophy

at

the

University of Utah (Dr. Patricia Hannah) made a 21 page analysis
of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals.

(See Appendix.)

Ms.

Hannah testified that she was not a lawyer; and thus she could
not comment on the correctness of the opinion.
Hannah

testified

that

she

has considerable

teaches logic and argumentation.

However, Ms.

expertise

in and

Ms. Hannah summarized that if

the opinion were written by an undergraduate student, she would
give a "D" grade for the analysis.

A graduate student would get

a failing grade.
Among

other

things,

the

Opinion

of

the

Court

of

Appeals:
a)

Ignores the position of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts on independent intervening cause.

b)

Almost

totally

whether

the

ignores

jury

was

the

central

properly

issue

of

instructed

on

independent intervening cause.
c)

Ignores

the

precedent

Utah

from

Rules

of

the United

Evidence and recent
States

Supreme Court

with respect to foundation of expert testimony.
d)

Failed to follow binding precedent of this court
on the sufficiency of curative instructions and to
apply Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447.

e)

Ignored an alternative theory of liability.
19

Rule

43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

states that certiorari may be proper

where

the lower court, M.

. -has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings."
Ralph Ostler will be tied
lifetime.

to his wheelchair

for a

He will ponder for his lifetime why the Court of

Appeals did not even consider his arguments on appeal.

He will

wonder for his lifetime whether he got true justice when the
head of the Department of Philosophy gave the Opinion a failing
grade.
Certiorari should be granted where the Court of Appeals
in rendering

its

opinion

in this

case has

failed

to follow

established precedent and has made such a radical departure from
the traditional high standards of the Bench in Utah.

DATED this /5~"^day of

jJ-^jL^^-t<^/

, 1989.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

EDWARD T. WELLS

0566-128\jn
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day of

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
Edward
Ostler,

certifies

Certiorari
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T.

that
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Wells, attorney
the
good

foregoing

for
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Petition

faith, and not

for

Ralph

Writ

for purposes of

delay.
DATED this / *?

day of

1989

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

EDWARD T. WELLS
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APPENDIX

STATUTES

41-G-103.

Standing or parking vehicles — Restrictions and exceptions.
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of
a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall
(1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle
(a) on the roadway side of any vehicle
stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a
street,
(b) on a sidewalk,
(c) vwthin an intersection,
(d) on a crosswalk,
(e) between a safety zone and the adjacent
curb or within 30 feet of points on the curb
immediately opposite the ends of a safety
zone, unless a different length is indicated bv
signs or markings,
(0 alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing,
or parking would obstruct traffic,
(g) upon any bridge or other elevated
structure upon a highway or within a highway tunnel,
(h) on any railroad tracks,
(i) on any controlled access highway,
(j) in the area between roadways of a divided highway, including crossovers,
(k) any place where official traffic-control
devices prohibit stopping
(2) Stand or park a vehicle, whether occupied
or not, except momentarily to pick up or discharge a passenger or passengers
(a) in front of a public or private driveway;
(b) within 15 feet of a fire hydrant,
(c) within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection,
(d) within 30 feet upon the approach to
any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign or
traffic-control signal located at the side of a
roadway,
(e) within 20 feet of the driveway entrance
to anv fire station and on the side of a street
opposite the entrance to any fire station
within 75 feet of said entrance when properly signposted,
(0 at any place where official traffic-con
trol devices prohibit standing
(3) Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not,
except temporarily for the purpose of and w.hile
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers
(a) within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a
railroad crossing,
(b) at any place where official traffic-con
trol devices prohibit parking
(4) No person shall move a vehicle not lawfull>
under such persons control into any prohibited
area or an unlau ful distance from the curb
1978

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawyers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission,
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with
d) the Public Service Commission,
(u) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the Board of State Lands and Forestry,
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or
(v) the state engineer,
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e),
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution,
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests,
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers,
(e) general water adjudication,
(0 taxation and revenue, and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a)
through (0
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b)
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
1^9
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TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 44. Certification a n d transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case.
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) J o i n t and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
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(c) C r o s s - p e t i t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t Counsel for a respondent wishing to file
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 45(d), pay the certiorari docketing fee and file, with proof of service as prescribed by Rule 21, ten
copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all
respects with Rule 46 The cross-petition will then be placed on the certiorari
docket Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve four copies of the ciosspetition on counsel for each party separately lepiesented It shall be the duty
of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all parties in the case of the date of
the filing and of the certiorau docket number of the case Service and notice
shall be given as requned by Rule 21 A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari
may not be joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accept any filing so
joined
(d) P a r t i e s . All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be
deemed parties in this court, unless the petitioner notifies the clerk of this
court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties below
have no interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of such notice shall be
served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party noted as no longer
interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with service on the
other parties, t h a t the party has an interest in the petition
(e) M o t i o n for c e r t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n of r e c o r d . A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petJJtiflji-Qr at any
time prior to action by thus court on the petition, ma}' file a motion for an
order to have the clerk of the Court of Appeals certify the record,, or any p a r t
of it, and provide for its transmission to this court Motions to certify the
r e c o r d p n o r to action on the petition by the court should rarely be made, only
when the record is essential to this court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from
the contents of the petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix
(See Rule 46(a)(10) ) If a motion is appropriate, it shall be made to this court
after the filing of a petition but prior to action by this court on the petition, or
in the case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a
motion may be made before the filing of the petition Thereafter, the clerk of
this court or any party to the case may request t h a t additional parts of the
record be certified and transmitted to this court Copies of all motions for
certification and transmission shall be sent to the parties to the proceeding
All motions and orders hereunder shall comply with and be subject to the
requirements of Rule 23
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )

Rule 45. Time for petitioning.
(a) T i m e l i n e s s of p e t i t i o n . A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
with the clerk of this court within 30 days after the entry of the decision by
the Court of Appeals
(b) R e f u s a l of p e t i t i o n . The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a
writ of certiorari which is junsdictionally out of time
(c) Effect of p e t i t i o n for r e h e a r i n g . The time for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur If, however, a
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties (whether or not they requested
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rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the date of the
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the
rehearing.
(d) Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed:
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this
rule; or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari.
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to Paragraph (d)(1)(B) of
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
(e) Extension of time. This court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration
of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever is applicable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the prescribed time
may be ex parte, unless the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such
motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to
the other parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 46, Petition for writ of certiorari,
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order
here indicated:
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in this court
contains the names of all parties.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the petition wrhere they are cited.
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious. General conclusory statements, such as "the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not
acceptable. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered
by the court.
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions
issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this
court is invoked, showing:
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of
time within which to petition for certiorari;
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(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari.
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and
regulations t h a t the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph
(10) of this paragraph.
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the n a t u r e of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.)
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order:
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
orders, judgments, or decrees t h a t were rendered in the case or in
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by
administrative agencies and t h a t are relevant to the questions presented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the
case, and the date of its entry); and
(C) a n y other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case
t h a t is the subject of the petition.
If the material t h a t is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented.
(b) F o r m of p e t i t i o n . The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except t h a t the cover of the
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and this
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
(c) No s e p a r a t e brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subparagraph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief.
(d) P a g e l i m i t a t i o n . The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of
this rule, and the appendix.
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(e) A b s e n c e of a c c u r a c y , brevity, a n d clarity. The failure of a petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate undeistanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )

Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless enlarged by the couit p u r s u a n t to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any mattei or ground why the
case should not be reviewed by this court Such brief shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except t h a t the cover of the brief shall be orange
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared Four copies of the brief
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each paity separately
represented
(b) P a g e limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and
the appendix
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received Objections to the junsdiction
of the court to g r a n t the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in
opposition
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon t h e filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file,
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the cierk to the court
for consideration However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a w rit of certiorari will be
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to a r g u m e n t s first raised in the
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages Such
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(1) (3),
except t h a t the cover of the brief shall be yellow The clerk shall examine all
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned
to be properly prepared Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each part} separately
represented
(0 Brief of a m i c u s curiae. A brief of an amicus cur lae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on
motion, or a t the request of the court A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae is desirable Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae
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shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose position it will
support, unless the court for cause shown shall grant leave for later filing, in
which event it shall specify within what period an opposing paity may answer Such brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 46, as applicable,
and comply with the form of briefs as specified in Rule 27(a), with the cover of
the brief being green The brief may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule
46(a)(7), and the appendix Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four
copies shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party
separately represented
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )

Rule 48. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule 47, the court will enter an order denying the peti
tion or granting the petition in whole or in part The order shall be decided
summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision on the merits
(b) Grant of petition. Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of
certiorari is entered, the clerk forthwith shall notify the clerk of the Court of
Appeals and counsel of record. The case then will stand for briefing and oral
argument If the record has not previously been filed, the clerk of this court
shall request the clerk of the Court of Appeals to certify it and transmit it to
this court. A formal writ shall not issue unless specially directed
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certioraii is denied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the clerk forthwith will notify
the Court of Appeals and counsel of record
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 )
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442 A,

Intervening: Force Risked by Actor's Conduct

Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, and is a substantial factor in
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section applies to any intervening force, whether it be a force of nature, or the act of a human
being, or of an animal.
b. Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk
of harm to another because of the likelihood of such intervention,
the actor is not relieved of responsibility merely because the
risk which he has created has in fact been fulfilled. The same
is true where there is already some existing risk or possibility
of the intervention, but the negligence of the actor has increased
the risk of such intervention, or of h a r m if it occurs.
Illustration:
1. In the month of December A voluntarily ships
potatoes in an unheated car of B Railroad through the s t a t e
of New York. B Railroad negligently delays the shipment
for three days, thereby increasing the already existing risk
t h a t the potatoes will be damaged by cold. During the extra
three days severe cold weather sets in, and damages the
potatoes. B Railroad is subject to liability to A.

§ 4 4 2 B , Intervening Force Causing Same H a r m as T h a t
Risked by Actor's Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial
factor in causing t h a t harm, the fact that the harm is
brought about through the intervention of another force
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is
not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's
conduct.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application
of the principle stated in § 435 ( 1 ) , t h a t the fact t h a t the actor
neither foresaw nor could have foreseen the manner in which
a particular h a r m is brought about does not prevent his liability where the other conditions necessary to it exist. Compare
Illustration 1 under t h a t Section.

b. If the actor's conduct has created or increased the risk
t h a t a particular harm to the plaintiff will occur, and has been
a substantial factor in causing that harm, it is immaterial to the
actor's liability that the harm is brought about in a manner
which no one in his position could possibly have been expected
to foresee or anticipate. This is true not only where the result
is produced by the direct operation of the actor's conduct upon
conditions or circumstances existing at the time, but also where
it is brought about through the intervention of other forces
which the actor could not have expected, whether they be forces
of nature, or the actions of animals, or those of third persons
which are not intentionally tortious or criminal. This is to say
t h a t any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor
has created or increased the recognizable risk, is always "proximate, " no matter how it is brought about, except where there
is such intentionally tortious or criminal intervention, and it is
not within the scope of the risk created by the original negligent
conduct.
Illustrations:
1. A negligently fails to clean petroleum residue out
of his oil barge moored at a dock, thus creating the risk
of harm to others in the vicinity through fire or explosion
of gasoline vapor. The barge is struck by lightning and
explodes, injuring B, a workman on the dock. A is subject
to liability to B.
2. A negligently leaves an obstruction in the public
highway, creating the risk t h a t those using the highway
will be injured by collision with it. B's horse runs away
with him and charges into the obstruction, and B is injured.
A is subject to liability to B.
3. The A Telephone Company negligently allows its
telephone pole, adjoining the public sidewalk but several feet
from the street, to become riddled with termites, thus creating the risk t h a t the pole will fall or be knocked over and
so injure some person using the sidewalk. An automobile
negligently driven by B at excessive speed leaves the highway, comes up on the sidewalk, and knocks the pole over.
It falls up C, a pedestrian on the sidewalk, and injures him.
A is subject to liability to C.
4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except t h a t the
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into it. The same
result.
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public sidewalk, creating the risk t h a t a traveler on t h e sidewalk will
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject
to liability to C.
0>. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full
of gasoline and damages it, so t h a t gasoline runs into the
public street. The risk is thus created t h a t persons using
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander,
negligently strikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline

c. Intentionally
tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated
in this Section docs not apply where the harm of which the risk
has been created or increased by the actor's conduct is brought
about by the intervening act of a third person which is intentionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal
acts may in themselves be foreseeable, and so within the scope
of the created risk, jn which case the actor may still be liable
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the intervention of the third person. The reason usually given by the
courts is t h a t in such a case the third person has deliberately
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).)
Illustrations:
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to
C.
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except t h a t B
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen.
A Railroad is not liable to C.
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negligently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating
the risk t h a t it may accidentally or negligently be knocked
off of the railing in the dark, and will injure some person
below. Without any reason whatever on the p a r t of the
Theatre Company to anticipate such conduct, B, a boy
attending the t h e a t r e , deliberately throws the chair off
of the railing, and it falls upon C and injures him. A Theatre
is not liable to C.
10. A, the owner of an office building, negligently leaves
the door of the elevator shaft open and unguarded. As C
is leaving the building B, impersonating an elevator boy,
politely invites C to step into the shaft. C does so, falls,
and is injured. A is not liable to C.
§ 4 4 7 , Negligence of Intervening Acts
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does
not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
should have realized t h a t a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing
when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly e x t r a o r d i n a r y t h a t the third person
had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a
situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.

Comment on Clause ( a ) :
a. The statement in Clause (a) applies where there is a
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the conduct being negligent because of other and greater risks which
it entails. If the realizable likelihood t h a t a third person will
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which
make the actor's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449.
Illustration:
1. A loads his truck so carelessly t h a t a slight jolt
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks
it in a street where to his knowledge small boys congregate
for play. B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck.
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article
to fall upon and h u r t C, a comrade standing close by. B's
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm.
Comment on Clause ( b ) :
b. The actor a t the time of his negligence may have no
reason to realize t h a t a third person might act in the particular
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts,
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason
to realize t h a t it will create the situation which the third person's
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation
is known to exist, the likelihood t h a t some negligent act may
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious.
Illustration:
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except t h a t A
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm.
Comment on Clause ( c ) :
c. The word " n o r m a l " is used in the sense stated in § 443,
Comment b. It, therefore, denotes t h a t the court or j u r y looking
at the m a t t e r after the event and knowing the situation which
existed when the act was done, including the character of the
person subjected to the stimulus of the situation, would not
regard it as extraordinary that such an act, though negligent,
should have been done.
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligence"
are used in the sense stated in § 442, Comment d.
e. The words "extraordinarily negligent" denote the fact
t h a t men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, looking at the m a t t e r after the event and taking into account the
prevalence of t h a t "occasional negligence, which is one of the

incidents of human life," would not regard it as extraordinary
that the third person's intervening act should have been done
in the negligent manner in which it was done. Since the third
person's action is a product of the actor's negligent conduct,
there is good reason for holding him responsible for its cflfects,
even though it be done in a negligent manner, unless the nature
or extent of the negligence is altogether unusual.
/ . The statement in Clause (c) applies to any negligent
act which is a normal consequence of a situation which the actor's
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in creating (see §§ 4 4 3 44G).
g. While the fact t h a t such an intervening act of a third
person is negligent does not prevent the actor's negligent conduct
from being a legal cause of the h a r m resulting therefrom to
another, the negligence of the act may be so great or the third
person's conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extraordinary response to the situation created by the actor and therefore a superseding cause of the other's harm.
h. The rule stated in this Section applies to acts done either
by the person who is harmed or by a third person. If the act
is done by the injured person and is done in a negligent manner,
it does not prevent the actor's negligence from being a legal
cause of his harm, but it constitutes contributory fault which
precludes him from recovering from the negligent actor (see
§ 467). If it is done by a third person, he, as well as the actor
whose negligence has created the situation, is liable to another
injured by it.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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EXHIBIT B

YOU Pay for Plaintiffs' Lawyers
P

laintiffs' attorneys, who file
lawsuits on behalf of injured
persons, often call the contingency
fee they charge the key to the
courthouse door. A contingency
fee is an amount of money a
person agrees to pay an attorney
for services in conducting a
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney
winning an award for the clicnL If the client loses, the
attorney receives no pay.
Contigency system-spawns suits —
Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half
of the damages awarded to their clients, the
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the
increase in both the size and number of lawsuits filed
in recent years. They claim it is in the lawyer's own
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the
award money.
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are
added together, you can understand why so many
victims complained when they received less of the
award than their attorneys.
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses.
Who really pays the fees?
Who pays the plannffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and
leave it at that. But uiumatelv it's vou—the

consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums
that arc the source of the payments to these attorneys.
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily.
Some states have acted to correct the situation by
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a
plain tiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed
statements showing how their settlements are spent—
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to
satisfy the victim's damages.
Many state legislatures are considering other
alternatives, as well. One such alternative is a sliding
fee scale, with the percentage of the serdement that
goes to the victim increasing as the setdement itself
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers
of legal services have adequate information available to
them when they shop for lawyers. For example,
lawyers might be required to use a standard form
itemizing the fee agreement.
More ideas to consider
Other measures deserving consideradon include fines
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are cosdy to defend,
clog the courts, and require taxpayers to foot the bill
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support
personnel. Another possibility is awards for defense
costs to people who successfully defend themselves and
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies
don't have to pay for being proved innocent.
We commend all efforts to bring legal costs into
line and believe that it will serve all aspects of the
public to do so.

Leo E. Denlea Jr.
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Farmers Group, Inc.
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FRIENDLY EXCHANGE

EXHIBIT C

OcC - 1A 1989

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo——-

Regular October Term, 1989

November 29, 1989

Jane Doe,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v•
Shirlene Hafen, as personal
representative ad litem of
the Estate of Melvin Reeves,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 890331

Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as
prayed.

EXHIBIT D

The Court's Instruction No. 27 reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 27. If an injury arises
from two distinct causes, consideration
then must be given to the question
whether the causal connection between the
conduct of the party responsible for the
first cause and the injury was broken by
the intervention of a new, independent
cause.
If so, the person responsible for
the first cause would not be liable for
the injury. If, however, the intervening
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence
of the same general nature was foreseen
or should reasonably have been foreseen
by the person responsible for the first
cause, then such person's conduct would
be the proximate cause of the injury,
notwithstanding the intervening cause,
and he would be liable therefor.
Thus, if you find the collision of
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of
the highway, or the likelihood of an
occurrence of the same general nature,
was within the natural and continuous
sequence of events which might reasonably
be foreseen to follow the actions of
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that
the actions of Stanley Wheeler were a
concurring proximate cause of the
collision, even thought the later
negligent act of Stephen Ostler cooperated to cause the accident.
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler
in causing the collision were of such
character as not reasonably to be
foreseen in the natural and continuous
sequence of events started by Stanley
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler
are the independent intervening cause
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause
of the injury.

EXHIBIT E

The major flaw m

Instruction No

27 is that the

term intervening independent cause (as introduced m
first paragraph of Instruction No
]ury

the

25) is not defined for th<

The Restatement Torts, 2d includes 13 sections defmirv

that concept

(See Restatement §440-453 )

Of course, all ot

those sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447
is relevant

(For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-

15, above )

Other sections are also relevant

(See Point

XI, below )

In the absence of a fair definition, the jury

was left to flounder
Second, Instruction No. 25 assumes that 'foreseeability" is the only test which is important in determining
causation in this case.
description would be as

That is simply wrong.

A textual

follows:

The Restatement, Torts r 2d contains a
detailed, definitional discussion of an
intervening force—which by its active
operation, may or may not prevent an
actor's antecedent negligence from being
a 'legal cause in bringing about harm to
another person. . .The Restatement,
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as
the important considerations in determining whether an intervening force is a
superceding cause of harm to another,
thus breaking the chain of causation
Speiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11 9 (1983)
(emphasis added)
Third, the instruction says that, 'if the actions
of Stephen Ostler in causing the collision were. . .not
reasonably to be foreseen
broken.

, the chain of causation was

This is saying that the precise or specific manner

of harm or accident ( the actions of Stephen Ostler )

must be foreseeable.

Instead, only a generalized risk of

harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events
need not be foreseeable.

Rees v. Albertsons, supra.;

Restatement of Torts,2d §435, "Foreseeabillty of Harm or Its
Manner of Occurrence.
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confusing.

It is likely that the judges of this Court W L 1 1 have to

read that instruction two, three or four times to understand
it.

It is simply impossible for a lay person without three

years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that
language.
The object of jury instructions is to
enlighten the jury on their problems.
Instructions should fit the facts shown,
making them as clear in meaning and
concise as possible in lay people's
language without belaboring definitions.
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24
(1965).

When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal

is proper.

Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 113 7, on

rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986).

EXHIBIT F

POINT FOUR
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE
SHOULD NOT ILAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-inchief.

The court reasoned that the "moth phenomenon" only works

if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck.
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler
was awake:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for
a determination on his part that there was a
man that was either, that was not asleep or
that the was merely Somewhat impaired in his
appreciation of things around him.
(R. 2226.)
However, the defense offered several photographs into
evidence showing how a parked truck would have appeared to father
Ostler at various distances.

(Exs. 53 through 68.)

Ostler's

brief explained that those photographs rest on exactly the same
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon."

Specifically, the

photographs of the parked truck are not material if father
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the truck.
Appellant, at p. 19.)

(See Brief of

But likewise, testimony on the "moth

phenomenon" is not material if father Ostler's eyes were not
open to "lure" him toward the lights.
In short, the trial court should have admitted both
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck and Ostler's rebuttal
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or the trial court should
have

rejected both pieces of testimony.

However, it was

logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime

phenomenon."

Both pieces of evidence were based on the

foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked
truck.

.
Again, 0 3 11 c r l -s brief was entirely silent on this

critical issue!

EXHIBIT G

Ralph Ostler's experts testified that father
Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis)
that testimony was as follows:

The basis for

First, Wheeler testified, by

offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were
awake:
MR. WHEELER: "Well, it appeared to me as
if the guy was driving in a daze. He
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off
the road, and cut over figuring this
truck was on the road, and just pulled
right directly in behind me. And there
was nothing I could do, just sit there
and hold on."
QUESTION:
'Was it a sudden cut or did he
sort of gradually veer off 9 "
ANSWER:
"No, it was like he was changing
lanes, like you change lanes going down
the freeway."
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane
had he been in?"
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't
know, but you know it was very apparent
that he was pulling, trying to get in
behind me, that's the way I'm looki_nq at
it any way
It looked 1jke he thought to
himself, 'I'm off the road and that
truck's on the road, and I'd better get
in behind him.'"^
(Tr. 256.)
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a
reconstructionist that the driver was awake.

If a driver

fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn.
(Tr. 249-250.)

Ostler's expert was able to monitor this

phenomenon in his sleep laboratory.

J

(Tr. 251.)

Wheeler's observations were made through his rear view
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research

Third, there was testimony that father Ostler had
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop.

(Tr.

250. )
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior
to th^ accident scene.

If father Ostler had been asleep, he

would have run straight off the road at the curve.

(Tr.

252. )
Fifth, there was testimony that a sleeping truck
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep
his foot on the gas.

(Tr. 283.)

In this case, the Ostler

vehicle was travelling at approximately 48 miles per hour at
impact.

(R. 1029.)

The inference is that father Ostler was

not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more.
(Tr. 2 8 3.)
The court rejected all of this evidence.

Thus, the

court stated:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis
for a determination on his part that
there was a man that was either, that was
not asleep, or that he was merely
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of
things around him.
(Tr. 2 45.)
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Preliminary Questions. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment
of the condition.

EXHIBIT H

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER,

)

Plaintiff,

]I

AFFIDAVIT OF

)

PATRICIA HANNA

vs.

]

ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.

;

OF& RROE, INC., and

)

Case No.

88-00228-CA

STANLEY E. WHEELER,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)

My name is Patricia Hanna.

ss.

I give the following testimony under

oath:
1.

I hold a Ph.D in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati.

2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Utah.

Affidavit of Patricia

3.

Page 2
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I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.

in logic and argumentation.

However, I am trained

Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large

measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning.

I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well

as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry.

My

curriculum vita is attached.
4.

I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the

Utah Court of Appeals in

Ostler v. Albina. et al.

render an opinion of that Opinion.

I have been asked to

Since I am not an attorney, I have not

been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong.

Rather, I have

been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes
issues raised in the briefs.
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking.
6.

In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision

making process.

If this Opinion had been written by one of my

undergraduate students as an exercise in a course,-! would have given it a
grade of 'D;'

from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing

work.
7.

In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could

have been endorsed by three judges.

Due to time pressures or

misunderstandings, "a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis.

I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a

single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
8.

My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows:

airiaavit or r a t n c i a

uina

rage J

General Structure of Appeal
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III,
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full
force.
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this.
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler
(hereafter, Wheeler)e? a/, cannot be resolved without a decision on the
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability.
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable

1

The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48.

Affidavit of Patricia
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect
on the matter.

This does not seem to have been the case; consequently,

I

can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious
breakdown in the present case.
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeal
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the
points raised by Ostler's counsel.

I shall comment only on the 9 points

involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points.
Assumptions
There is no dispute on the following:

Wheeler negligently parked h

semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson
Utah.

He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of

his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intc
the back of Wheeler's truck.

Throughout, I will take these as. given.

Point I
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of It
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows.

It is argued that although a

major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause,
almost all of the evidence proffered by
court.

Ostler was rejected by the trial

As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict agair

Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this
decision.
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit,
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive

GclVIl

ness.

ui

( a m ^ i a

IICMIUVA

In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no

ication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was
t the evidence was entirely without merit. 2 Instead, the evidence is
?cted on at least one of three grounds:

1. because it was held to be

jlevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that
/vould confuse the jurors, and 3.

because it was felt that the jurors

eady were fully aware of the phenomena.
)unds are all inadequate.

The appeal argues that these

3

The "moth-phenomenon", Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices,
d denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in
lergencv lane
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory,
lich is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether
ishing or not, have a tendency to l u r e " sleepy drivers towards them,
uch as a moth is drawn to a light.

Thus, if father Ostler was awake at

e time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this
uring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's
uck.
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler
'as not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such
evices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided.
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact
^cation, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck
lad not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the
Dstler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field.

- At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to
testify on the matter of the so-called Mmoth-phenomenon;M however, it is clear from the
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245).
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections.

/UIIUUVII

VJ i

I ctlli^ld

Kage 6

dlllld

In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fathe.
Ostler was awake or asleep.

Taking each point in isolation, might give

this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlook
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time
of the accident.
2.

Was father Ostler awake?
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern

whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter.
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisiv
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate.
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law.
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this:

As a

Rule 104(b) says tha

if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jur\
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision.

In the case at hand, the

trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the
evidence was not c o n c l u s i v e .

It strikes me that if indeed this were the

standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear
would be directed verdicts.
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic <
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal.

In its decision the Court of

Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal.

What attention

inucivii

ui

I aiiioio

rage /

i lainicl

oes give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying
nly that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive
ay to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
Dcidenf (Opinion, p. 4).

In light of Ostler's point, this statement is

mply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context.
. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in
olation of several federal regulations governing interstate

truck

rivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that
meeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane.
ilevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold.

The

One, it contributes to his

egligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not
ilevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable,
owever, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability,
xhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's
Dsition and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would
ffect whether and to what extent he should be held liable.

Further, if

fheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and
seded to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an
.tempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability.

The

ourt of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by
rected verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant.

See

Utah R. Evid. 402

evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6).
The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of
jch an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a
jssibilitv
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues
show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the
tended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless
ere was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to
ovide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within,
lowing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would

rdye e

occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane),
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen.
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the groui
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's rulin
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in thi:
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximate
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common
knowledge.
Admissibility of this evidence
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable.
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a w
understood and valid form of argument. 4
1.

Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the

accident.
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect oi
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is
therefore liable for the accident.

4

According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Ionic (London: 1962
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D.,
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178).

Affidavit of Patricia

3.

Hanna

Page 9

If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there

vas no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes
)l the accident.
Kxident.
4.

Had the truck not been there, there would have been no

Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes.
Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or

*sfeep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a
Koximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least
martially liable for the accident. 5
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful
0 the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it
nevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further,to argue that each
nece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of
wents.
war lives.

Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of
For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant

pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make
1 irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our
atmosphere and light's reaction to it.

So too, the fact that all the

evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto

render it

rreligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of
wrcwcimate cause.

This is especially so given the fact that the issue of

araximate cause was the key to the decision.

The Court of Appeals'

tecision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense
addresses it.

Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion

rlearly demonstrates

:

this.

A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or
sleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency
5evices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most
Rely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would
awe alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the
ccident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the
me of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate
anses of the accident.

Page 10
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall,
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc.

Ostler

presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant,
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard.

misapplied

The Court of

Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion

c

Ostler's arguments against this decision.
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the
jury.

Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of

emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) an
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them.
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thk
requirement is relaxed.

It is now no longer necessary to show that the

expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case.
Rule 702 states
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will a s s i s t the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact in understanding evidence that is simply
difficult
[though]
not
beyond
ordinary
understanding.
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd
Cir. 1985)
(Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18).
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of
mderstanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have
hat evidence placed clearly before them.

Specifically:

1)

Members of

he jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not
>ntail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so
is to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might
link possible only for driver who was in fact asleep.

2)

There is no

eason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions
aused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights,

blinking tail-lights, and

ares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like
lat at issue.

3)

It is unclear that the average driver actually

nderstands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal
bservation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not).

4)

lor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the
lightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to
ignificantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers.
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the
jry need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is
verwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as
le higher common law standard requires).

Not knowing these facts has a

lear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part,
nd on a judgment of Wheeler's liability.
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that
o expertise was needed to understand it.

The Court of Appeals argues

lat in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was
jbstantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial
dge's ruling.

It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide

scretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision
ithout exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this
iscretion.
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's
ase it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend
e nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case.

/-wiiuavu
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could
take:

each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself

make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument.

In denying

Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of th
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to
make an essentially comparative judgment.
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with
only one case available.

In short, the jury was to make a comparative

ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing
A to nothing).

In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its

decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what
happened.

Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is,

the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler.
allowed access to Ostler's

If they had been

evidence, in virtue of the form of the new

deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a
failure to read the.briefs carefully.
Point II and Point III
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to
urinate
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations M0-. 15-. and 70- hour rules)
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony.

The

trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant.

Ostler's claim i
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at this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and
bility.

The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back

ice again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is
>propriately excluded.

There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals

'predates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony.
)int IV
sstatements during closing-defendant's closing statement
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue
is not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some
le run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have
eseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his
>ck at just that time.
[T]he foreseeability question is:
How was Stan
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances
that it would happen right at that particular time—
(Quoted in Opinion, p. 8).
is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would
er be able to foresee anything.
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to
ect the juror's to their instructions.

He did not rule on the objection,

iarly leaving the misstatement uncorrected .

In some cases this might

ve caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it
uses harm.

The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to

* instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear,
mplicated and difficult to understand.

This will be discussed in more

tail under Point X below.
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together
h Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its
tructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm,
is decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals'
lure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations anc
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and
confusing.
Point V
Who Pavs
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading
statement made during closing.

Here there is only an implication that th

defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformatioi
was clearly stated.

The Court of Appeals 1 ruling on this point seems we

taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with
this,

the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV.

Point VII
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or
triangles
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury.
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of
a highway from any cause other than

necessary

traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible,
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning
devices

[flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule,

quoted in Appeal, p. 41).
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the
devices.

However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so.

Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer Q I , if parkt
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances.
However

if you find that defendant

Wheeler

was

parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to

Minudvii ui r a u i c i a
determine
nevertheless
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whether

or

not

Wheeler

should

have set out the flares or

triangles

under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42).
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the
driver's judgment.

The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, e v e n

if substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to
negligence.

Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.

Ostler's point is that the LC.C. regulation makes it clear that
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g.,
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary
drivers.
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning
devices is related to negligence; of course it is.
that it is also related to proximate cause;
been stated clearly and correctly.

The point, once again, is

on that ground it should have

It does not help the Court of Appeals'

ludgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation
was stated correctly.

In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply

left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly

relevant

matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict.
Point IX
^/ideo tape demonstration
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide
he issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause

Since

hese decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the
'cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not
)een there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth

Affidavit of Patricia I
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case).

The

idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act;
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?"
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful.
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds.

First, that the

video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment.

Second, that it was

just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury.
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to
call for a through-going revision of legal standards.

In deciding these

issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then
there would be no case requiring a decision.

If the reason for disallowing

the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing.
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals.

Here Ostler argues

that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual
accident.

In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be

taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case.
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc
m i l have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on
the issue of proximate cause.
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong
test:

relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video

failed the first two.

It then considered the argument that the video was
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ot a re-enactment, but an illustration;

and upheld the trial court's ruling

n the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or
lat the trial court abused its discretion.
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point.

The very nature

f decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by
s nature confusing.

In view of

the vast body of evidence already denied

le jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim
lat showing them the video would be confusing.

At this stage of the trial

le video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that
/heeler's truck was not simply s o m e t h i n g

for father Ostler's truck to hit

*s though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been
iere), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident
f the sort that occurred.

The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries

re not causally overdetermined, 6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary
ausal factor.
lis

Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see

point.

pint X
o u r f s instructions on intervening causes was incorrect.
Ostler objected on several points:
1.

"Intervening independent cause" was undefined.

2.

Foreseeability was not the only test of causation

3.

Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to

be the standard of foreseeability.
4.

The instructions were confusing.

If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes
:curs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you
tally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting
mstant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot
e, I die.
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as
given, that the. contested instructions concern negligence and were
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion.
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of son
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whii
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury.

The

jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I).

Taken in this context, Ostler's

case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instruction
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates.
Point XI
Directed verdict on causation
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the
judge were unclear and confusing.

In view of this it seems at least

unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however
the case at hand the error runs even deeper.
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th.
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similaverdict on causation.

The defendant's response claims that if this were

allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and
causation; this is simply not so.

Ostler argues only that in this case is

there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply
that there is such an implication in every case.
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int.
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked

arnaavu or r a i n c i a
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next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any
case.

The case at hand is not of this sort.

causation.

Here the negligence implies

This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of

parking in the emergency lane negligent.

The answer is two-fold:

to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2)

1)

risk

subjecting Ostler to

the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60).
Thus, causation is implied by negligence.
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury.
by Ostler clearly support this contention.

The standards cited

7

Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed
verdict is met:

reasonable minds cannot disagree.

They cannot disagree

Decause the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict.
Appellant's Substitute Brief,

p. 62, Ostler makes this clear:

In the

" The fact

:hat reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated
Dy the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with
massing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are
apparent."

Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree;

otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic.

If we

are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even
hough we are reasonable
The present case is of this unfortunate sort.

The jurors were led to

jraw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but
Decause they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw
he correct conclusion.

They were neither allowed to judge the issue of

causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the
elevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to
hem that as a matter of logic the case was closed.

The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially
lear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.)
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal
are confusing.
taken to be a

First it is stated that generally proximate causation is
determination of fact to be made by the jury.

This may be

true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case.
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to
relevant evidence and could not make the determination.

The Court of

Appeals' decision does not address this argument.
Second the Court of Appeals states that "proximate cause' is one of
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10).

This

implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence.
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason
for denying that appeal.
makes this citation.
unmotivated.

It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals

What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally

It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of

Ostler's arguments or contentions.

In short, the entire section on p. 10

stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning.
Conclusions
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges.

I can only conclude that in

reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to
address the arguments made in the appeal.

Due to time pressures or

misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis.

I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a

single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
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waist down.

This case does not include any claims by Father

Ostler.
During a jury trial, plaintiff admitted that Father
Ostler

(the driver of the car) was negligent and partly at

fault in causing the accident (for drifting onto the emergency
lane where the truck was illegally parked).
a verdict

against

the trucker

The Court directed

for negligent parking.

central issue at trial was proximate cause.

The

Was the trucker's

negligence in parking illegally in the emergency lane, or in
failing to put out warning devices as required by Federal law,
a proximate cause of the accident?1
The jury returned a verdict for defendant.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed.
IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

head

of

the

Department

of

Philosophy

at

the

University of Utah (Dr. Patricia Hannah) made a 21 page analysis of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals.
lf,

(See Appendix, Ex.

The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate cause of an injury. . . To the contrary, the acts of two
or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of
the injury, and in such case, each of the participating acts or
omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause and both may
be held responsible.
J.I.F.U. §15.7
3

A part of the record of the Court of Appeals is an
affidavit by Ms- Patricia Hannah, Ph.D.

(See Exhibit B.)

Dr.

Hannah is Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, University of Utah,

This affidavit was filed in support of Ostler's

Petition for Reconsideration in the Utah Court of Appeals^.

in

substance, the affidavit is a 21 page analysis of the opinion
of the Court of Appeals.

The affidavit states in part:

I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.
However, I am trained in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is
in large measure devoted to the study of
arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well as in
epistemology (theory of knowledge) and
scientific inquiry. . . . (p. 2 paragraph
3.)
I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to
read the Opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals in Ostler v. Albina, et al. I have
been asked to render an opinion of that
Opinion.
Since I am not an attorney, I
have not been asked to determine if the
Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have
been asked to determine the extent to which
the Opinion fairly analyzes issues raised
in the briefs, (p.2, paragraph 4.)
^It is clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opinion.
Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the
trial advocate. Nor was that step taken lightly. However, it
is a serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a passing grade on a undergraduate level. Hopefully, the Court will
not criticize counsel for this unusual step.
Hopefully, the
court will value this input, as it undertakes the serious task
of supervising the inferior courts of this state.
5

the interstate.

Plaintiff was severely injured.

He is para-

lyzed from the waist down. Plaintiff sued the owners and driver
of the semi-trailer,
Utah Code Ann, §41-6-103(1)(i) states:
No person shall: stop, stand or park a vehicle.,.on any controlled access highway.
The trial court relied on this statute and directed a
verdict on negligence. The court reserved the issue of proximate cause for the injury.
The

defense

claimed

that

driving

into

the parked

semi-truck was a superceding cause of the accident. At trial,
the defense argued that it was not foreseeable that Father
Ostler would stray onto the emergency lane and hit the parked
semi-trailer.

The jury found for the defendant.

On appeal,

the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
B.

Legal Analysis of Superceding Cause.
The rule of superceding causation has been estab-

lished by two leading cases of this Court.
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d

217

(Utah

Harris v. Utah

1983) and Godesky v.

Provo City Corp. , 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984).

In Godesky,

supra, this Court held that:
An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superceding cause
that relieves the original actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with the
foreseeable negligent acts of others.
7

Ostler

offered

evidence

that

the purpose of this

statute was to safeguard errant (sleepy or sleeping or distracted) drivers.

For example:

Parked tractor trailers on shoulders of our
high speed highways introduce unnecessary
obstacles in the clear recovery area. (R.
1359)
Ultimately, if the parked vehicle had not
been there, an accident might not have
occurred. (R. 1368.)
Compare Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co., 267 So. 2d
714, 718 (La. 1972):
. . . [T]his statute [parking on the highway] is designed to protect against the
risk that a driver, whether cautious or
inattentive, would collide with a stationary vehicle. Id.
In summary, the legislature passed a law to protect
errant drivers who stray onto the emergency

lane.

It was

not "extraordinary" or "unforeseeable" that Father Ostler would
negligently drift onto the emergency lane.

Since this event

was "foreseeable", it could not be a superceding cause.
ky v. Provo City Corp., supra; Harris v. Utah

Godes-

Transit Author-

it- y, supra, Restatement (second) of Torts §442A, 442B and 447
(1965) .
The trial court erred by refusing to direct a verdict
on causation.

9

The Court of Appeals only dealt with the confusion
issue^.

The other three issues are serious matters supported

by abundant authority7.
acceptable

judicial

The Court of Appeals departed from

standards

by

refusing

to even consider

these crucial issues.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS REFUSED TO FOLLOW
BINDING PRECEDENT WITH RESPECT TO CLOSING
ARGUMENT.
In closing argument, defendant's attorney argued:
Foreseeability has to do with whether he [Wheeler]
could perceive, that in his drive, Stephen Ostler
would at that precise moment become inattentive and
go off the road . . . But in that, the foreseeability
questions fsic] is: How was Stan Wheeler expected to
foresee that at that precise time if, as Mr. DeBry
said, one in a billion chances that it would happen
right at that particular time?
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 19-20.)

^The sole issue treated by the Court of Appeals was confusion. The Court of Appeals concluded the instruction was not
confusing. However, it was absurd to conclude that Instruction
No. 27 was understandable to a lay person. (See Exhibit C.)
7

See Restatement
of Torts 2d. §442A and 442B; see also
Harris and Godesky, supra.
11

The jury is directed to look at the instructions. They set forth the law in that
regard. Statement of counsel is to be disregarded except as it is accurate.
(Abstract of Tr. at 20.)
To plaintiff's

assignment of error on appeal, the

Court of Appeals stated:
Even if counsel's remarks misstated the
law, any prejudicial impact appears to be
negated by the Court's admonishment.
117
Ut. Adv. Rep. at 17.
This totally ignores State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291
(Utah 1980).

In Shickles, this court held that if the trial

court failed to act to dispel erroneous statements of counsel
by (1) ruling on the objection when made, and (2) instructing
the jury with positive correction of the misstatement, reversal
is required.

760 P.2d at 299-300.

This Court stated in Shickles that where the misstatements are made in closing argument and can have a misleading impact on the jury, the error is clearly prejudicial.
P.2d at 300.

760

See also Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.

1977) .
Certiorari

should

be

granted

where

the

Court of

Appeals refuses to follow binding (and recent) precedent.

13

In their totality, and in context with the
remainder of voir dire, their questions are
substantially responsive to plaintiff's
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed
in Doe, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.
However, this court has recently granted certiorari
in Doe v. Hafen.

(See Exhibit E.)

Since this case and Doe v.

Hafen involve identical threshold issues (viz. jury voir dire)
and since this court has already granted certiorari to review
Doe v. Hafenf it would be a matter of judicial economy for this
court to consider both cases together^.

It would seem unjust

for Ostler to lose his case based, in part, upon the reliance
by the Court of Appeals on the case of Doe v. Hafen if Doe were
to be subsequently overturned by this Court.
POINT VI
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT
OF APPEALS REFUSED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE
THEORY OF LIABILITY,
Plaintiff's first claim of negligence was based on
the

illegal

parking

of

the

semi-trailer.

claimed a second basis for liability.

Plaintiff

also

The second theory was

based upon the failure of defendant driver to set out flares or

10

The influence of "tort reform" publicity on jury voir
dire raises serious constitutional issues and is of intense
interest in other courts. See Exhibit F.
15

tions of how long Wheeler had been parked
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's
negligence. Since that issue has been resolved by directed verdict. The excluded
testimony was irrelevant. Id.
•

•

*

Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury
instructions.
The first instruction involves the placement of emergency warning
devices behind Wheeler's parked truck. We
agree that the given instruction significantly differs from plaintiff's' requested
instruction.
However, the instruction
concerned the issue of Wheeler's negligence.
We have already established that
this issue had been taken from the jury.
Any error could not have affected the
substantial rights of plaintiff and was
therefore, harmless. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at
17.
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reasoning.

The chain of causation for negligent parking is different

from the chain of causation for failure to put out warning
flares.

If the defendant did not cause the accident by parking

illegally, he may well have caused the accident by failing to
put out emergency flares.

For example, if Stephen Ostler was

awake, the flares or triangles may have guided him around the
danger area.

If Ostler was asleep, driving over the triangles

would have caused a noise awakening the driver.
2824.)

(Tr. 232-34,

Thus, a completely independent act of negligence and a

separate chain of causation was kept from the jury by the trial
court's

rulings.
17

The trial court refused to receive evidence of the
"moth effect".

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of

Appeals stated:
Even if such a theory is admissible under
the threshold requirement of inherent
reliability [citation omitted]. The theory
is premised on the fact that a driver must
be awake to be lured.
117 Utah Adv. Rep.
at p. 15.
Thus, a foundation issue was whether Stephen Ostler
(father) was
lured1^.

awake or had his eyes open1-^ so he could be

On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104(b) of the

Utah Rules of Evidence
U.S.

^

and Huddleston v. United States,

, 108 S.CT. 1496, 99 L.ed. 2d 771 (1988).

iJ

Defendants offered a series of night-time photos of the
parked truck.
The foundation for the night-time photos was
that Ostler's eyes were open.
Ostler thereupon proffered
evidence on the "moth effect" as rebuttal testimony. Thus, the
foundation for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect
theory was identical, viz. that Ostler's eyes were open. The
Court of Appeals, likewise, ignored this crucial issue. (See
Exhibit G.)
14

Ostler's experts gave five reasons to conclude that Stephen Ostler was awake (so that he could be lured). The reasons
are summarized at Exhibit H. The trial court rejected all of
this proffered testimony.
15

"When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon,
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
19
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Ralph OSTLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ALBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC.,
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R Roe, Inc.,
Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
Wanda Ostler, Stephen K. Ostler, Gary W.
Ostler, Vyron R. Ostler, Dale F. Ostler,
Donnell B. Ostler, Sonda Mae Ostler, Ralph
O. Ostler, Brian L. Ostler, Carlyle E. Ostler,
Margaret Ostler, and Nathan J. Ostler, as
heirs of Stephen Ostler, Gary Ostler, Dale
Ostler, and Eugene Ostler, d/b/a Go Cars,
Third-Party Defendants.
No. 880228-CA
FILED: September 8, 1989
Fourth District, Utah County
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
ATTORNEYS:
Robert J, DeBry, Daniel F. Bertch, Warren
W. Driggs, and Dale F. Gardiner, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
M. Dayle Jeffs and Robert L. Jeffs, Provo,
for Respondents
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and
Jackson.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict against
him in a negligence action. We affirm.
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father
Stephen home to Utah from a business trip to
California. At approximately 3:00 a.m., the
Ostler's compact pickup was northbound on
Interstate 15, a few miles south of Payson,
Utah. Stephen Ostler was driving. For
unknown reasons, the pickup left the lane of
traffic and struck the rear of a truck and
semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoulder
of the roadway. Stephen Ostler was killed
instantly. Plaintiff, who had been sleeping on
the bed of the pickup, was thrown onto the
roadway and critically injured.
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist down
as a result of his injuries. He brought a personal injury action in the district court against
the driver of the semitrailer (defendant Stanley
E. Wheeler), the driver's employer (defendant
Albina Transfer Co., Inc.), and the semitrailer
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•the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded that
Stephen Ostler was negligent and partially at
fault for the accident. Early in the trial, the
court determined that Wheeler was also negligent and directed a verdict of negligence
against him. The basis for this ruling was that
Wheeler had parked his semitrailer on the
shoulder of a controlled access highway in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6103(1)0) (1988). The court reserved the issue
of whether Wheeler's negligence was a
I "proximate cause" of the accident. The jury
eventually concluded that Stephen Ostler's
negligence was the "intervening and sole proximate cause" of plaintiffs injuries, and
rendered a special verdict for defendants.
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict, alleging
numerous errors.
VOIR DIRE
We first address plaintiff's claim that jury
voir dire was inadequate to reveal bias related
to a "tort reform" advertising campaign conducted by a national insurance company. It is
obvious from the trial transcript that the gist
of plaintiffs questions went to the issue of
potential juror bias against large monetary
awards.
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to permit the parties
to supplement voir dire with questions that are
material and proper. However, the court has
considerable discretion to "contain voir dire
within reasonable limits." Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929,
932-33 (Utah Ct. App. J 988). Whether that
discretion has been abused is determined from
the totality of the questioning. Doe v. Hafen,
772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In lieu of plaintiffs proposed questions, the
judge informed the venire that plaintiffs
claim may exceed a million dollars and asked
if any would object to an award of that
magnitude. None did. The judge also asked if
any of the prospective jurors believed that
people Should not resort to the courts to settle
disputes or recover damages for injuries.
Again, none did. The judge followed with a
question asking whether any believed they
were incapable of rendering a fair and true
verdict based on the evidence. None responded
affirmatively. In their totality, and in context
with the remainder of voir dire, these questions are substantively responsive to plaintiffs
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal "tort
reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe,
772 P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has
not shown an abuse of discretion in the
court's voir dire of prospective jurors.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly rejected his evidence on the issue of
proximate cause, resulting in prejudicial error.
All of this evidence was in the form of prof-
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fered testimony from two experts. The excl- based on such pure conjecture.
This is consistent with the principle that
uded evidence covered a variety of topics,
including a scientific theory referred to as the "any expert evidence, scientifically based or
"moth phenomenon/ certain federal motor otherwise" must, on balance, "be helpful to
carrier regulations, road safety and design, the trier of fact." Id. at 398 n.8. Such evidand a videotape prepared for plaintiff that ence must be scrutinized carefully to avoid the
purported to show what Would have happened "tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its
if the semitrailer had riot been unlawfully responsibility to decide the critical issues and
simply adopt the judgment of the expert
parked.
The general rule regarding the admission or despite an inability to accurately appraise the
exclusion of evidence is that the trial court's validity of the underlying science/ Id. at 396.
decision will not be overturned in the absence Whether the probative value of evidence is
of an abuse of discretion. Pearce v. Wistlsen, substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). Witnesses effect is a determination within the sound
qualified as experts may testify if "scientific, discretion of the trial court. State v. Johnson,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will 115 Utah Adv. Rep, at 9. Under rules 403 and
assist the trier of fact to understand the evid- I 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we concence or to determine a fact in issue/ Utah R. ! lude that the trial judge was within his discrEvid. 702. However, "(i]t is within the discr- etion to exclude the testimony.
etion of the trial court to determine the suitSimilarly, the trial court concluded that
ability of expert testimony in a case and the plaintiffs videotaped demonstration was more
qualifications of the proposed expert/ State v. apt to be confusing to the jury than helpful.
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982) The videotape depicted a compact pickup
(decided under former rule). Although such truck driving off the roadway at the actual
testimony may be relevant, it may be excluded accident location. It purported to show that
if the court determines "its probative value is no mishap would have occurred had
substantially outweighed by the danger of Wheeler's truck not been parked on the road
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or shoulder. Plaintiff first argues that the videmisleading the jury, or by considerations of otape was for illustrative purposes and was
undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres- proper under Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita
entation of cumulative evidence/ Utah R. Hour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958)
Evid. 403. The probative value of evidence is and other cases. It is obvious, however, that
determined on the basis of need and "its the film did not illustrate the accident, but
ability to make the existence of a consequen- rather portrayed plaintiffs prediction of
tial fact either more or less probable." State v. events under a different set of facts. As such,
Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (1989) the potential for unfair prejudice as illustrative
(quoting State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, evidence was significant, and the trial court
1370 (Utah 1989)).
was within its discretion to exclude it.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that the videWe have examined the record and can find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court's I otape was admissible as evidence. Plaintiff
decision to exclude the testimony of two of cites DiRosario v. Havens, 196 Cal. App. 3d
plaintiffs seven experts. It is quite clear that 1243, 242 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1987) for
the reason or reasons why Stephen Ostler's the proposition that experimental evidence is
vehicle slammed into the rear of Wheeler's admissible provided it is conducted under
semitrailer could not be established. Plaintiffs substantially similar conditions as that of the
case relied significantly on scientific evidence actual incident. "The standard that must be
of the "moth phenomenon," a theory that met in determining whether the proponent of
motorists are "lured" at night to the lights of the experiment has met the burden of proof of
parked vehicles. Even if such a theory is establishing the preliminary fact essential to
admissible under the threshhold requirement the admissibility of the experimental evidence
of inherent reliability, see State v. Rimmasch, is whether the conditions were substantially
775 P.2d 388, 398-99 (Utah 1989), the theory identical, not absolutely identical." Id. at 426
is premised on the fart that a driver must be (quoting Culpepper v. Volkswagen of
awake in order to be so "lured." Plaintiffs America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 521, 109
own expert admitted that there was no concl- Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973)). DiRosario imposes two
usive way to determine Stephen Ostler's state other requirements- that the experimental
of consciousness prior to the accident. Nor evidence be relevant and not consume undue
does the theory necessarily establish causation time, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Id.
because plaintiffs expert conceded that there at 426.
was no evidence of the factors triggering the
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales
moth phenomenon. Without this foundation, Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (1989), the
the court determined that the expert testimony Utah Supreme Court discussed the Culpepper
on the moth phenomenon would not be three-prong test in determining the admissihelpful to the jury, and furthermore, that it bility of motor vehicle crash test films. The
would be prejudicial to present an opinion court upheld the admission of the films into
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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evidence and held that certain discrepancies
between the films and the actual accident went
to weight, rather than admissibility. The circumstances of the accident were known and
and the films were offered to show the handling characteristics of similar vehicles.
In this case, application of the Whitehead
test supports exclusion of the evidence. Plaintiff admits that the videotape differed from
the actual accident in that the videotape was
produced during daylight conditions and
employed an alert, professional stunt driver.
He further argues that even with these discrepancies, the demonstration was substantially
similar. It appears, however, that the conditions of the film's production were far from
similar to the actual accident. The differences
in lighting and driver alertness and skill were
crucial. The literal controversy of this lawsuit
is the inexplicable departure of a vehicle from
the lane of traffic. The videotape does not,
and cannot, depict the conditions that caused
that departure. Any other depiction is, as the
trial court concluded, not reconstruction, but
speculation. In contrast to Whitehead, the
circumstances of this accident are not known,
and there is no indication that the design
characteristics of vehicles were responsible.
The discrepancies between the film and plaintiffs accident seem to go beyond weight.
Since trie film would not "make the existence
of any fact ... of consequence ... more probable than not" under Utah R. Evid. 401, we
are not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the
first two prongs of similarity and relevance
under the Whitehead test.
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our
doubt as to the film's relevance and similarity,
we conclude that, in any event, the trial court
properly excluded the videotape as substantive
evidence on the grounds of potential confusion. See Utah R. Evid. 403. Under Whitehead's third prong, such evidence may be
excluded in the court's discretion even if it is
relevant, when a determination is made that it
may confuse or mislead. 101 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 31 (trial court upheld although unclear
whether court excluded evidence under rule
401 or 403, either theory of exclusion being
proper). Since plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the finding of potential confusion was an
abuse of the court's discretion, we hold that
the videotape was properly excluded.
We last address plaintiffs claim of error
regarding the exclusion of evidence on federal
motor carrier regulations and road safety and
design. Plaintiff argues that this evidence was
relevant to the issue of foreseeability under his
theory of concurrent negligence. Plaintiff
quotes Codesky v. Provo City Corp., 690
P.2d 541, 545-46 (Utah 1984):
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate cause of
an injury, consisting of only one
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factor, one act, or the conduct of
only one person. To the contrary,
the acts and omissions of two or
more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of an
injury, and in such a case, each of
the participating acts or omissions is
regarded in law as a proximate
cause and both may be held responsible.
We have examined the record and agree that
some of this evidence may be relevant to the
issue of foreseeability. Other evidence goes to
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter
previously decided by directed verdict, and
may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R.
Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible."). The court excluded the relevant portions of the expert's proffered testimony on the grounds that such evidence
would not be particularly helpful to the jury.
The court believed that the jury was as
capable as the expert to make the determination of foreseeability. In any event, plaintiff
has failed to carry his burden of showing that
the claimed error was substantial and prejudicial. SeeAshton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154
(Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. In the
absence of such a showing, we consider plaintiffs claim to be without merit.
IMPEACHMENT
Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to
permit him to show that Wheeler may have
been parked on the shoulder of the highway
for as long as thirty minutes unduly restricted
cross-examination. Although plaintiff concedes that the trial judge has broad discretion
in regulating the scope of such testimony, see,
e.g., Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, he
claims that the court abused its discretion by
misapplying the law. Plaintiff claims that he
was attempting to show consistency with prior
deposition testimony, and the court ruled that
only prior inconsistent statements may be
compared.
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument
when the alternate basis for the court's ruling
is considered, namely, that the question of
how long Wheeler had been parked ultimately
went to the issue of Wheeler's negligence.
Since that issue had been resolved by directed
verdict, the excluded testimony was irrelevant.
Similarly, plaintiff claims that he was not
permitted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's
"prior bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's violation of federal motor carrier regulations.
These acts also concerned the issue of
Wheeler's negligence and were properly excluded.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Plaintiff complains of statements made by
defense counsel during closing argument.
Defense counsel made the following remark:

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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This case is to decide whether
Wheeler, ... F & R Roe and Albina
are to pay for the injuries to Ralph,
when Wheeler's actions were not
the cause of the accident.
Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out of
the presence of the jury. He now argues that
the statement was improper, prejudicial, and
untrue for the reason that "any recovery
would come from the insurance carrier," and
that the remark unfairly implies that defendants would personally pay any damage award.
We are not convinced that there is any
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it
reflects the fact that judgment would be rendered against the various defendants under
joint and several liability, and does not indicate the source of funds to pay such a judgment. It does not inappropriately state that
insurance would or would not pay any judgment, see Utah R. Evid. 411, thus improperly
eliciting sympathy or tempering the size of any
award. Cf. Pricl v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d
65 (N.D. 1986) ("We are talking about money
that my client will have to pay out of his own
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude that
the remark was not unfairly prejudicial.
Plaintiff also objected to the following
portion of defendants' closing argument:
[T]he foreseeability question is:
How was Stan Wheeler expected to
foresee that at that precise time if,
as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion
chances that it would happen right
at that particular timePlaintiff argues that this was a misstatement
of the law because "foreseeability relates to
whether accidents of this general nature might
happen." He further asserts that the statement
was prejudicial and that "(t]he only explanation for [the] verdict is that the jury was
confused by [defense counsel's] misstatements
of the law."
We disagree. Even if counsel's remarks
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact
appears to be negated by the court's admonishment:
The Jury is directed to look at the
Instructions. They set forth the law
in that regard. Statement of counsel
is to be disregarded except as it is
accurate.
See Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error
shown where court admonished jury following
remarks during closing argument). When
considered in the context of the entire closing
argument, plaintiff's objection, and the
court's admonition, we conclude there was no
unfair prejudice. See generally Halford v.
Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 411-12 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury
instructions. The first instmaion involved the
placement of emergency warning devices
behind Wheeler's parked truck. We agree that
the given instruction significantly differed
from plaintiff's requested instruction.
However, the instruction concerned the issue
of Wheeler's negligence. We have already
established that this issue had been taken from
the jury. Any error could not have affected
the substantial rights of plaintiff, and was,
therefore, harmless.
Plaintiff also objects to the trial court's
instruction on the issue of causation, claiming
that the language is confusing and incomplete.
Plaintiff sought to further define and expand
the given instruction. While it is true, as plaintiff argues, that jury instructions should be
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in
lay people's language without belaboring
definitions," Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse
Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 (1965),
the adoption of plaintiffs suggestions would
have run counter to this rule. Although we
cannot ascertain from the record the rationale
behind the trial court's overruling of plaintiffs objections, any expansion of the given
instruction would have likely hindered, rather
than enhanced,. the jury's comprehension of
the issue.
The challenged instruction must also be
considered in the context of the instructions as
a whole. Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086,
1092 (Utah 1985); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d
1185, 1187 (Utah 1981). Other instructions
propose plaintiffs theory of the case, i.e.,
"concurrent negligence," and add meaning to
the instmaion at issue. Although plaintiff
contends that the jury believed that causation
meant "fault," he fails to support this supposition. We cannot delve into the jury's reasoning process, and cannot speculate what
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident.
However, it is just as reasonable to presume,
as in Waiters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458
(Utah 1981), that the jury determined that the
degree of Stephen Ostler's inattentiveness was
not foreseeable. Thus, "he failed to observe
the situation he should have ... [and] this later
negligent aa became the sole proximate cause
of the collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed
to show that any alleged confusion was substantial and prejudicial, we reject plaintiffs
claim of error.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION
We last address plaintiffs argument that
the trial court erred in not directing a verdict
of proximate cause as a matter of law. Our
review of a challenge to the denial of a motion
for a directed verdict is governed by the standard described in Penrod v. Carter, 111 P.2d
199,200 (Utah 1987):
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A motion for a directed verdict
requires the trial court to consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom it
is directed. The case should not be
taken from the jury where there is
substantial dispute in the evidence
.... On appeal, this Court applies
the same rules.
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assocs.,
Inc. v. Wamick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah
1983).
The trial court reserved the issue of
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict
that Wheeler was negligent. "Proximate cause"
is one of the essential elements of a negligence
action, see Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,
726 (Utah 1985), and is specifically "that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause),
produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred." Mitchell v.
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah
1985). Proximate causation is generally a
question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Watters, 626 P.2d at 457-58.
The trial court denied plaintiffs motions
for a directed verdict on the issue of causation. Under the applicable standard of review,
we are required to view the evidence in defendants' favor. That evidence, tending to establish that proximate cause was not only in
substantial dispute, but was the very essence
of the controversy between the parties, indicates that the trial court properly declined to
remove the issue from the jury. We find no
error in the ruling below.
In conclusion, none of plaintiffs claims
constitute reversible error. We have reviewed
other issues raised by plaintiff and find them
to be without merit. The judgment is affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Provo, Utah
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
D.Bo,
Petitioner,
v,
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION, State of Utah,
Respondent.
No. 880329-CA
FILED: September 8, 1989
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Bradley P. Rich, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
R. Paul Van Dam, Sheila Page, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent
Before Judges Billings, Croft,1 and Garff.
OPINION
CROFT, Judge:
D.B. seeks judicial review of an Order of
Review entered April 26, 1988 by the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing of
the Department of Business Regulation
("Division") revoking D.B.'s license to practice as a clinical and certified social worker.
D.B. was brought before the Division by a
petition charging him with "unprofessional
conduct" in violation of specific Division
rules. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("A.L.J.") and Board of
Social Work Examiners ("Board"). Based
thereon, the Board made findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and recommended revocation of D.B.'s license. The Board's findings
and conclusions were adopted by the Division,
and its order of revocation was entered. A
request for review by D.B. followed. Without
further hearing, the Division affirmed its prior
order. This judicial review followed.
D.B. contends that his rights under the
federal and state constitutions were violated by
the A.L.J., who failed to provide him with an
opportunity to cross-examine the Division's
witnesses at the hearing. "It is the function of
a court called on to review an order of an
administrative agency to determine whether
there has been due process of law(.]" 73A
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure 229 (1983); see Vance v. Fordham, 671
P.2d 124 (Utah 1983); Athay v. State Dep't of
Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965 (Utah
1981); In re License of Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(UtahApp. 1988).
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STANLEY E. WHEELER,
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STATE OF UTAH

)
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)
)

My name is Patricia Hanna.

ss.

I give the following testimony under

oath:
1.

I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati.

2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Utah.

ennui

3.
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I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law.

in logic and argumentation.

However, I am trained

Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large

measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic
reasoning.

I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well

as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry.

My

curriculum vita is attached.
4.

I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the

Utah Court of Appeals in

Ostler v, Albina. et al.

render an opinion of that Opinion.

I have been asked to

Since I am not an attorney, 1 have not

been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong.

Rather, I have

been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes
issues raised in the briefs.
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking.
6.

In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision

making process.

If this Opinion had been written by one of my

undergraduate students as an exercise in a course,-! would have given it a
grade of 'D;'

from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing

work.
7.

In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could

have been endorsed by three judges.

Due to time pressures or

misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis.

I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a

single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
8.

My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows:
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General Structure of Aooeal
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III,
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full
force.
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this.
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler
(hereafter, Wheeler)er al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability.
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the
plaintiffs case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable

The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48.
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious
breakdown in the present case.
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeal
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points.
Assumptions
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked h
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intc
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given.
Point I
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of tr
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although £
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause,
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict agait
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this
decision.
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit,
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive

irness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no
jication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was
at the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is
jected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be
elevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that
would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors
r
eady were fully aware of the phenomena. The appeal argues that these
ounds are all inadequate.3
The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices.
id denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in
neraencv lane
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory,
lich is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether
ishing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them,
uch as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at
e time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this
jring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's
jck.

In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler
as not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such
wices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided.
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact
nation, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck
id not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the
stler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field.

At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to
itify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;" however, it is clear from the
nscript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's
cision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245).
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fathe.
Ostler was awake or asleep.
Taking each point in isolation, might give
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlook
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time
of the accident.
2.

Was father Ostler awake?

The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter.
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisiv
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate.
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says tha
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jur\
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, thi
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the.
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear
would be directed verdicts.
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention
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es give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying
ly that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive
ty to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the
cidentM (Opinion, p 4)

In light of Ostler's point, this statement is

nply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context.
Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in
)lation of several federal regulations governing interstate

truck

ivers, in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that
heeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane
levance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold.

The

One, it contributes to his

>gligence, the decision to rule it out because negligence was not
levant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable.
Dwever, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability
chaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's
>sition and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would
feet whether and to what extent he should be held liable.

Further, if

heeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and
*eded to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an
tempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability.

The

ourt of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by
rected verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant.

See

Utah R. Evid 402

evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6).
The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabihtv of possibility of
jch an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a
ossibilitv
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues
i show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the
tended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless
lere was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to
rovide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within,
lowing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane),
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen.
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grout
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's rulin
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in thi:
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximatf
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common
knowledge.
Admissibility of this evidence
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to
•understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in
order to support his contention that Wheeler-was negligent, one of the
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable.
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a w
understood and valid form of argument.4
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the
accident.
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect oi
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is
therefore liable for the accident.

According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of I onic (London- 1962
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D.,
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178).
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If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there

ras no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes
f the accident.
ccident.

Had the truck not been there, there would have been no

Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes.

4.

Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or

isleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a
)roximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least
>artially liable for the accident. 5
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful
o the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it
Drevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further,to argue that each
Diece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of
events.

Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of

Dur lives.

For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant

[pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our
atmosphere and light's reaction to it.

So too, the fact that all the

evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto

render it

ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of
proximate cause.

This is especially so given the fact that the issue of

proximate cause was the key to the decision.

The Court of Appeals'

decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense
addresses it.
clearly

b

Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion

demonstrates

this.

A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate
causes of the accident.
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall,
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant,
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion o*
Ostler's arguments against this decision.
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the
jury. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) an
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them.
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thi.
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case.
Rule 702 states
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will a s s i s t the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of
fact in understanding evidence that is simply
difficult
[though]
not beyond
ordinary
understanding.
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd
Cir. 1985)
(Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18).

idavit of Patricia

Hanna

b^age 1 i

In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of
derstanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have
it evidence placed clearly before them.

Specifically:

1)

Members of

) jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not
tail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so
to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might
nk possible only for driver who was in fact asleep.

2)

There is no

ason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions
used in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights,

blinking tail-lights, and

res: or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like
at at issue.

3)

It is unclear that the average driver actually

iderstands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal
iservation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not).

4)

Dr is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the
ightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to
gnificantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers.
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the
ry need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is
/erwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as
te higher common law standard requires).

Not knowing these facts has a

ear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part,
nd on a judgment of Wheeler's liability.
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that
o expertise was needed to understand it.

The Court of Appeals argues

lat in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was
ubstantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial
jdge's ruling.

It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide

iscretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision
/ithout exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this
liscretion.
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's
;ase it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend
he nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case.
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of th
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to
make an essentially comparative judgment.
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing.
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is,
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a
failure to read the-briefs carefully.
Point II and Point III
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to
urinate
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations M0-. 15-. and 70- hour rules)
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim
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this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and
ility.

The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back

e again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is
ropriately excluded.

There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals

reciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony.
nt IV
statements during closing defendant's closing

statement

In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue
s not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some
e run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have
eseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his
ck at just that time.
[T]he foreseeability question is:
How was Stan
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances
that it would happen right at that particular t i m e q u o t e d in Opinion, p. 8).
is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would
er be able to foresee anything.
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to
'ect the juror's to their instructions.

He did not rule on the objection,

aarly leaving the misstatement u n c o r r e c t e d .

In some cases this might

ive caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it
luses harm.

The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to

e instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear,
)mplicated and difficult to understand.

This will be discussed in more

3tail under Point X below.
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together
ith Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its
istructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm,
his decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals'
ailure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations ant
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and
confusing.
Point V
Who Pavs
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading
statement made during closing.

Here there is only an implication that th

defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformatioi
was clearly stated.

The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems we

taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with
this,

the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV.

Point VII
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or
triangles
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury.
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of
a highway

from any cause other than

necessary

traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible,
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning
devices [flares or reflective triangles]

(I.C.C. rule,

quoted in Appeal, p. 41).
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the
devices.

However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so.

Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer o_r, if parkt
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances.
However

if you find that defendant

Wheeler

was

parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to
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determine whether or not Wheeler
should
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42).
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the
smergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the
Iriver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even
f substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to
legligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that
ruckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g.,
Dutting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the
udge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were
:orrect (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to
olace emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary
drivers.
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals'
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict.
Point IX
Video taoe demonstration
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act;
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?"
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful.
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment. Second, that it was
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury.
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing.
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual
accident. In such, a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case.
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc
0J2i have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the
point of the video is .illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on
the issue of proximate cause.
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was
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a re-enactment, but an illustration;

and upheld the trial court's ruling

the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or
t the trial court abused its discretion.
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point.

The very nature

decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by
nature confusing.

In view of

the vast body of evidence already denied

jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim
t showing them the video would be confusing.

At this stage of the trial

video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that
leeler's truck was not simply s o m e t h i n g

for father Ostler's truck to hit

though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been
re), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident
the sort that occurred.

The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries

) not causally overdetermined, 6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary
jsal factor.

Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see

s point.
int X
mrt's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect.
Ostler objected on several points:
1.

"Intervening independent cause" was undefined.

2.

Foreseeabihty was not the only test of causation

3.

Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to

be the standard of foreseeability.
4

The instructions were confusing.

If something is causally overdetermined. it will occur whether or not one of the causes
curs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you
ally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting
nstant. even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot
J, I die.
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion.
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of son:
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whit
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury.

The

jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I).
case that it is overwhelmingly

Taken in this context, Ostler's

likely that the jury's ultimate decision

was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instruction
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates.
Point XI
Directed verdict on causation
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the
judge were unclear and confusing.

In view of this it seems at least

unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however
the case at hand the error runs even deeper.
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th.
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a simila r
verdict on causation.

The defendant's response claims that if this were

allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and
causation; this is simply not so.

Ostler argues only that in this case is

there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply
that there is such an implication in every case.
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked
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lext to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any
ase.

The case at hand is not of this sort.

:ausation.

Here the negligence implies

This is shown by asking w h a t it was that made the act of

)arking in the emergency lane negligent.

The answer is two-fold:

o a class of persons which included Ostler and 2)

1)

risk

subjecting Ostler to

he hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60).
Thus, causation is implied by negligence.
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's
jriving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury.
Dy Ostler clearly support this contention.

The standards cited

7

Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the 'standard for a directed
/erdict is met:

reasonable minds cannot disagree.

They cannot disagree

oecause the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict.
Appellant's Substitute Brief,

p. 62, Ostler makes this clear:

In the

" The fact

that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are
apparent."

Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree;

otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic.

If we

are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even
though we are reasonable
The present case is of this unfortunate sort.

The jurors were led to

draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw
the correct conclusion.

They were neither allowed to judge the issue of

causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed.

The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B. 447 and 449 are especially
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.)
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal
are confusing.
First it is stated that generally proximate causation is
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case.
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to
relevant evidence and could not make the determination.
The Court of
Appeals' decision does not address this argument.
Second the Court of Appeals states that "'proximate cause' is one of
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence.
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning.
Conclusions
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they
deserved and required.
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EXHIBIT C

The Court's Instruction No. 27 reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 27. If an injury arises
from two distinct causes, consideration
then must be given to the question
whether the causal connection between the
conduct of the party responsible for the
first cause and the injury was broken by
the intervention of a new, independent
cause•
If so, the person responsible for
the first cause would not be liable for
the injury. If, however, the intervening
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence
of the same general nature was foreseen
or should reasonably have been foreseen
by the person responsible for the first
cause, then such person's conduct would
be the proximate cause of the injury,
notwithstanding the intervening cause,
and he would be liable therefor.
Thus, if you find the collision of
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of
the highway, or the likelihood of an
occurrence of the same general nature,
was within the natural and continuous
sequence of events which might reasonably
be foreseen to follow the actions of
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that
the actions of Stanley wheeler were a
concurring proximate cause of the
collision, even thought the later
negligent act of Stephen Ostler cooperated to cause the accident.
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler
in causing the collision were of such
character as not reasonably to be
foreseen in the natural and continuous
sequence of events started by Stanley
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler
are the independent intervening cause
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause
of the injury.

EXHIBIT D

The major flaw in Instruction No. 27 is that the
rm

intervening independent cause (as introduced in the

rst paragraph of Instruction No. 25) is not defined for th<
ry.

The Restatement Torts,2d includes 13 sections defining

at concept.

(See Restatement §440-453.)

Of course, all of

ose sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447
relevant.

(For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-

, above.)

Other sections are also relevant.

(See Point

, below.)

In the absence of a fair definition, the jury

s left to flounder.
Second, Instruction No. 25 assumes that "foreseeality" is the only test which is important in determining
usation in this case.

That is simply wrong.

A textual

scription would be as follows:
The Restatement, Torts,2d contains a
detailed, definitional discussion of an
intervening force—which by its active
operation, may or may not prevent an
actor's antecedent negligence from being
a "legal" cause in bringing about harm to
another person. . .The Restatement,
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as
the important considerations in determining whether an intervening force is a
superceding cause of harm to another,
thus breaking the chain of causation.
>eiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11.9 (1983)
emphasis added).
Third, the instruction says that, "if the actions
: Stephen Ostler in causing the collision were. . .not
>asonably to be foreseen. . .", the chain of causation was
:oken.

This is saying that the precise or specific manner

: harm or accident ("the actions of Stephen Ostler")

must be foreseeable.

Instead, only a generalized risk of

harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events
need not be foreseeable.

Rees v. Albertsons, supra ;

Restatement of Torts,2d §435, 'Foreseeability of Harm or Its
Manner of Occurrence.
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confusing.

It is likely that the judges of this Court will have to

read that instruction two, three or four times to understand
it.

It is simply impossible for a lay person without three

years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that
language.
The object of jury instructions is to
enlighten the jury on their probLems.
Instructions should fit the facts shown,
making them as clear in meaning and
concise as possible in lay people's
language without belaboring definitions.
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24
(1965).

When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal

is proper.

Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 1137, on

rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986).

EXHIBIT E
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

Regular October Term, 1989

November 29, 1989

Jane Doe,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Shirlene Hafen, as personal
representative ad litem of
the Estate of Melvin Reeves,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 890331

Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as
prayed.

EXHIBIT F
(Article Amicus Curiae Committee)

Amicus Curiae Committee

Insurance Advertising: Need to Protect
Constitutional Right to Conduct Voir Dire
You've seen them. They disgrace the his trial date approached in federal dispages of Tune, Newsweek, and other trict court. Beustring represented the
national publications. They are the widow of a police officer who was killed
"Lawsuit Crisis" ads invented by the when the transmission of his cruiser slipInsurance Information Institute. A ped out of park. Prior to trial of his proddejected high-school football player, a ucts liability action against Ford Motor
worried clergyman, or a polio victim Co., Beustring moved to voir dire the
stares at the reader. The text in these and panel concerning the "Lawsuit Crisis"
other ads in the series claims that schools ads. The trial judge refused, and the jury
are canceling sports programs, doctors came back with a defense verdict.
are refusing to deliver babies, cities are
ATLA filed an amicus brief in the
cutting services, and the clergy are re- Tenth Circuit.
luctant to counsel their congregations.
ATLA's brief opens with a look at the
All because of the "Lawsuit Crisis."
origins of the advertisements in question.
One purpose of this expensive public Plummeting interest rates in the midrelations campaign is, of course, to drum 1980s, following years of pathological
up support for various tort reform pro- price wars and abusive cash-flow underposals in legislatures. But another ob- writing, caused panicked carriers to hike
jective is what former ATLA president premiums and cancel coverage in a sucEugene Pavalon has deftly described as cessful effort to protect their balance
"poisoning the well." [See Advocate, sheets at the expense of policyholders.
Nov. 1989.] The ads reach potential The Insurance Information Institute anjurors in personal injury cases and create nounced a $6.5 million advertising camthe notion that by awarding large damage paign to "change the widely held percepverdicts, even if supported by the tion of an insurance crisis to a perception
evidence, the jurors are contributing to of a lawsuit crisis." Journal of Coma public crisis.
merce, Mar. 19, 1986.
Efforts to block publication of this
The ads are false and misleading. Obtype of advertising have met with little jective studies confirm that there is no
success. In the view of most courts, the evidence of the litigation "explosion"
ads are noncommercial speech, entitled that the ads decry. Moreover, as a 60
to the full protection of the first amend- Minutes investigation reported in a
ment. See, e.g., New York Public Interest program that aired on Jan. 10, 1989,
Research Group, Inc. v. Insurance Infor-allegations of a crisis in obstetrical
mation Institute, 531 N.Y.S.2d 1002 services, school sports, city services,
(Sup. Ct. 1988).
and clergy malpractice have no basis in
One safeguard in the hands of plain- fact.
tiffs' attorneys is the right to voir dire
Nevertheless, the ads are very effecpotential jurors concerning their ex- tive. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus conducted
posure to such advertising and its effect empirical studies of the impact of a simion their ability to render a fair verdict. lar type of advertisement in the 1970s.
It is not a wholly satisfactory remedy, She found that even a single exposure to
but it may be counsel's only opportunity the advertisements resulted in jurors'
to uncover and counteract poisoning the giving a substantially lower verdict in
well.
test cases. Loftus, Insurance AdvertisThis was the position of attorney ing and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68
Glenn Beustring of Tulsa, Oklahoma, as (Jan. 1979).
4

ATLA argues that the right to uncover
such a prejudical influence on the minds
of jurors flows directly from the Oklahoma constitutional guarantee of trial by
jury. As a leading federal court explains,
voir dire plays a critical role in securing
the constitutional right to an impartial
jury. Only by probing the attitudes of
prospective jurors can counsel intelligently exercise the right to challenge for
cause or the right to peremptory challenges. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109
(9th Cir. 1981).
As the Montana Supreme Court discerned a decade ago:
When insurance companies inject the
issue of insurance into the consciousness of every potential juror
through a high-priced advertising
campaign, as has been illustrated in
this case, they threaten every plaintiffs
right to an impartial jury. In such
cases, it is only fair that attorneys have
some means to secure this right for
their clients. Liberal voir dire is the
best means to this end.
Boroski v. Yost, 594 R2d 688, 694
(Mont. 1979). See also King v. Westlake,
572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978) (upholding
voir dire concerning exposure to insurance industry ads).
More recently, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the right to trial by a fair
and impartial jury guaranteed by the
state constitution entitled plaintiff to voir
dire concerning "Lawsuit Crisis" ads.
Babcock v. Northwest Mem. Hosp., 767
S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989).
ATLA urges the Tenth Circuit to adopt
this highly persuasive reasoning and
hold that the district judge's refusal to
conduct voir dire on potential jurors as
requested was unconstitutional and
reversible error.
•
Jeffrey Robert Wliite, ATLA assistant
general counsel.
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POINT FOUR
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-inchief.

The court reasoned that the "moth phenomenon" only works

if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck.
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler
was awake:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for
a determination on his part that there was a
man that was either, that was not asleep or
that the was merely Somewhat impaired in his
appreciation of things around him.
(R. 2226,)
However, the defense offered several photographs into
evidence showing how a parked truck would have appeared to father
Ostler at various distances.

(Exs. 53 through 68.)

Ostler's

brief explained that those photographs rest on exactly the same
v
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon."

Specifically, the

photographs of the parked truck are not material if father
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the truck.
Appellant, at p. 19.)

(See Brief of

But likewise, testimony on the "moth

phenomenon" is not material if father Ostler's eyes were not
open to "lure" him toward the lights.
In short, the trial court should have admitted both
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck and Ostler's rebuttal
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or the trial court should
have rejected both pieces of testimony.

However, it was

logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime

phenomenon."

Both pieces of evidence were based on the

foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked
truck.

.
Again, Oatlcr's brief was entirely silent on this

critical issue!

EXHIBIT H
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i Ostler's experts testif

J that father

Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis).
that testimony was as follows:

The basis for

First, Wheeler testified, by

offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were
awake:
MR. WHEELER:
"Well, it appeared to me as
if the guy was driving in a daze. He
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off
the road, and cut over figuring this
truck was on the road, and just pulled
right directly in behind me. And there
was nothing I could do, just sit there
and hold on. M
QUESTION:
"Was it a sudden cut or did he
sort of gradually veer off?"
ANSWER: "No, it was like he was changing
lanes, like you change lanes going down
the freeway."
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane
had he been in?"
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't
know, but you know it was very apparent
that he was pulling, trying to get in
behind me, that's the way I'm looking at
it any way. It looked like he thought to
himself, 'I'm off the road and that
truck's on the road, and I'd better get
in behind him. ' " -*
(Tr. 256.)
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a
reconstructionist that the driver was awake.

If a driver

fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn.
(Tr. 249-250.)

Ostler's expert was able to monitor this

phenomenon in his sleep laboratory.

J

(Tr. 251.)

wheeler's observations were made through his rear view
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research
with respect to mirrors on trucks. (Tr. 253.\

Thijuu, there was testimony that father Ostler had
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop.

(Tr.

250. )
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior
to thfe accident scene.

If father Ostler had been asleep, he

would have run straight off the road at the curve.

(Tr.

252* )
Fifth, there was testimony that a sleeping truck
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep
his foot on the gas.

(Tr. 283.)

In this case, the Ostler

vehicle was travelling at approximately 48 miles per hour at
impact.

(R. 1029.)

The inference is that father Ostler was

not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more.
(Tr. 2 8 3.)
The court rejected all of this evidence.

Thus, the

court stated:
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis
for a determination on his part that
there was a man that was either, that was
not asleep, or that he was merely
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of
things around him.
(Tr. 245-)
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules
of Evidence.
Preliminary Questions. When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to,
the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment
of the condition.

EXHIBIT I

YOU Pay for Plaintiffs' Lawyers
I laintiffs1 attorneys, who file
lawsuits on behalf of injured
persons, often call the contingency
fee they charge the key to the
courthouse door. A contingency
fee is an amount of money a
person agrees to pay an attorney
for services in conducting a
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney
winning an award for the ciicnL If the client loses, the
attorney receives no pay.

Contigency system-spawns suits —
Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half
of the damages awarded to their clients, the
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the
increase in both the size and number of lawsuits filed
in recent years. Tney claim it is in the lawyer's own
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the
award money.
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are
added together, you can understand why so many
victims complained when they received less of the
award than their attorneys.
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses.

Who really pays the fees?
Who pays the planuffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and
leave it at that. But ultimate!v it's vou—the

consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums
that are the source of the payments to these attorneys.
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily.
Some states have acted to correct the situation by
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a
plaintiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed
statements showing how their settlements are spent—
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to
satisfy the victim's damages.
Many state legislatures are considering other
alternatives, as welL One such alternative is a siiding
fee scale, with the percentage of the settlement that
goes to the victim increasing as the settlement itself
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers
of legal scr/iccs have adequate information available tc
them when they shop for lawyers. For example,
lawyers might be required to use a standard form
itemizing the fee agreement.

More ideas to consider
Other measures deserving consideration include fines
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are costly to defend,
clog the courts, and require taxpayers to foot the bill
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support
personnel. Another possibility is awards for defense
costs to people who successfully defend themselves anc
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies
don't have to pay for being proved innocent.
We commend all efforts to bring legal costs into
line and believe that it will serve ail aspects of the
public to do so.

Leo E. Denlea Jr.
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Farmers Group, Inc.
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Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
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VIII.
As

Stephen

Ostler

FACTS
was

driving

on

return

from

California, towing another vehicle on a "dolly" behind a small
pickup truck, his son, Ralph, plaintiff, was sleeping in the
back of the pickup.

At about 3:00 a.m. Ostler's compact pick-

up left the lane of traffic and struck the rear of the defendants'

truck

Stephen

parked

Ostler,

plaintiff, was

on

the shoulder

was

killed

thrown

onto

of

1-15.

The driver,

Ralph

Ostler,

instantly.
the

road

and

severely

the

injured.

Ralph Ostler sued the driver of the parked truck, the owner of
the truck, and the employer of the driver.
During trial, plaintiff conceded that his father, the
driver
fault

of

the small

in causing

truck, was

the accident.

negligent

and

partially at

During the trial, the trial

court directed a verdict against the trucker for negligence.
The central issue at trial was proximate cause.
The

jury

returned

that Stephen Oslter's

a verdict

negligence

for defendant

(the driver

finding

of plaintiff's

vehicle) was the intervening and sole proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Ostler v.

Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989).

XI.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

CERTIORARI IS IMPROPER, THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED
APPROPRIATELY UPON THE CASE AND CONTROVERSY
Plaintiff's counsel states that Certiorari is proper
because the Court of Appeals " . . .
ed and

usual course of

S.Ct. 43(3) (1989).

judicial

departed from the accept-

proceedings.

. . " R. Utah

Yet Plaintiff fails to state what consti-

tutes the facts specifying the "so called" departure from the
accepted and usual course of proceedings.
Plaintiff cites an affidavit of Ms. Hannah, a philosophy teacher at the University of Utah.
davit

is a part of

He claims the affi-

the Utah Court of Appeals record.

The

affidavit was filed with the Petition for Rehearing filed by
the Plaintiff.

Filing a paper, not part of

the record on

appeal, as an attached exhibit does not make the attachment a
part of the official record, as set forth in Rule 11(d)(2)(B)
of the Rules of Utah Supreme Court or Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

Therefore the affidavit

of Patricia Hannah is not a part of the record and the statements made by her are of no consequence to the issue of Certiorari for claimed unusual judicial proceedings.
Although the affidavit is not part of the record and
thus not to be considered by the Court or the decision making
process,

some

of

the

statements

of

Ms. Hannah

should

be

Ms. Hannah also concludes
failed

to

take

argumentation

into

made

account

in

the

courts have discretion
opinion.

They

are

issue on appeal.

that

many

"the Court of Appeals

important

appeal."

Id.

at

aspects
6.

of

The

appeals

in those issues to be addressed

not

required

As stated

to

address

each

the

in the

and

every

in State v. Carter. 776 P.2d

886

(1989) :
this Court need not analyze and
address in writing each and every argument,
issue, or claim raised and properly before
us on appeal.
Rather, it is a maxim of
appellate review that the nature and extent
of an opinion rendered by an appellate court
is largely descretionary with that court.

In applying this principle to cases before
us, we have, after fully considering the
substance of particular claims raised on
appeal, summarily (and often without written
analysis) dismissed the same as meritless or
of no effect.
(Emphasis added)
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d at 888-89 (Footnotes omitted).
Without
analysis and
clude

that

qualifying Ms. Hannah

the common
since

the

law of Utah,

Court

failed

as an expert

in legal

it is ludicrous to conto

address

every

issue,

there has been a break down of the judicial process and that
the Supreme

Court

should

grant Certiorari

because

the Judges

of the Court of Appeals can not write a passing paper.
The next
"We

have

them

to

reviewed
be

to the last sentence
other

without

issues

merit."

raised

Ostler,

in the opinion states,
by plaintiff
781

P.2d

at

and

find

451.

The

In
very

the

present

authorities

cited

case,
by

the

the

trial

court

plaintiff

and

followed
did

the

apply

the

appropriate law of proximate cause and did submit the issue of
proximate cause to the jury.
Early

in the

trial,

the trial court

determined

that

Wheeler, the driver of the truck parked on the shoulder of the
highway, was per se negligent and directed a verdict of negligence

against

him

based

Ann.

§41-6-103(i)(1988).

P.2d

445

(Utah

App.

on Wheeler's
Ostler

1989).

violation

v. Albina

However,

the

of Utah Code

Transfer
Court

Co., 781

of

Appeals

stated that the trial court,
reserved
the
issue of whether
Wheeler's
negligence was
"proximate cause" of
the
accident.
The
jury eventually
concluded
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was the
"intervening and sole proximate cause" of
the plaintiff's injuries, and rendered a
special verdict for defendants.
Id. at 446-447.
Plaintiff
affirmance
Plaintiff

of

the

contends

statute, defendant
of plaintiff's

claims
trial

the Court
court's

of Appeals

erred

submission

to

the

by

jury.

that solely because defendant violated
is both negligent

injuries.

and

the proximate

(Substitute Petition

for

its

the

cause

Certiorari

at 7 ) .
However,
Plaintiff's

under

counsel,

issue for the jury.

the
And,

established
question

Utah
of

law

proximate

as

cited

cause

is

by
an

in Ostler
Court

v. Albina

of Appeals

confusion.

Transfer

Co., 781

P.2d

at

clearly addresses more than

450-451,

the

jury-instruction

The Court of Appeals says the challenged

instruc-

tion
must also be considered in the context of
the instructions as a whole . . . Other
instructions propose plaintiffs1 theory of
the case, i.e., "concurrent negligence," and
add meaning to the instruction at issue.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 451 (Citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals found the jury instructions as a
whole
rule

satisfy
that

jury

necessary

instructions

when determining whether
Godesky

legal

requisites.

should

It

is

be considered

a

as a whole

issues have been adequately

v. Provo City Corp.,

690 P.2d

general

covered.

(Utah 1984).

541

The

Court in Godesky states,
The Court cannot be said to have
properly instruct the jury when
instructions
are
fully covered
instructions given.

failed to
requested
in other

Id. at 545 (Citations omitted).
Notwithstanding
tions

as

elements

a whole.
of

Plaintiff's
tiff's
27).

the correctness

Instruction

law plaintiff's
Substitute

listing

of

27,

itself,

deficiencies

in

its language.

jury

instruc-

includes

it lacks.

for Certiorari

Instruction No. 27 defines independent

in the totality of

the

counsel contends

Petition

supposed

No.

of

at

10

the
See,

(Plain-

Instruction

No.

intervening cause

The instruction as a whole

to look at the Instructions. They set forth
the law in that regard. Statement of counsel is to be disregarded except as it is
accurate. See. Hall v. Blackham. 18 Utah 2d
164. 417 P.2d 664. 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error shown where court admonishes jury
following remarks during closing argument).
Ostler. 781 P.2d at 450 (emphasis added).
Also.

Plaintiffs

citation

and

interpretation

of

State v, Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). misconstrues the
requirements upon the trial court to dispel mistakes of counsel.

In Shickles a prosecutor misstated the law twice during

his closing argument and misled the jujry as to the effect of a
verdict
P.2d

of not guilty by reason of insanity.

at 298.

The Shickles court found

court because "the trial
roneous

impression

Shickles, 760

fault with the trial

judge did nothing to dispel the er-

created;

indeed

even rule on the objection."

the

trial

judge did not

Shickles. 760 P.2d at 299.

The

Shickles court finds that the criminal defendant.
through an appropriate channel, such as a
curative instruction or statement by the
judge, will be entitled to inform this jury
of such procedures.
[quoting Dipert v.
State. 259 Ind. 260. 262. 286 N.E. 2d 405
(1972)]
Shickles. 760 P.2d at 300 (emphasis added).
In
statement
statement.

the present

is disputed,

case, even though
the

trial

the alleged mis-

judge did give a curative

And. according to the Shickles court, all that a

criminal defendant

is entitled

to is to have the "jury rule

criteria

for

granting

Although

one

issue

certiorari

is similar

as

specified

in

in the two cases

the

Rule.

they are not

identical.
In Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d

456

(Utah App. 1989),

the

issue briefed for appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals regarded
plaintiff's counsel's specific guestions
the

jury.

potential
inject

Plaintiff's
jurors

the

contained

interest

concept
the

counsel

so

of

in

claimed

he wanted

to discover

insurance

companies

which

insurance

called

"tort

in an attempt to bias

into

reform11

the

lawsuit.

propaganda

would

Doe
of

the

also
in-

surance companies.
In contrast, in the present case, the voir dire issue
is that

of

the "tort reform," not a specific question to in-

ject insurance.
certiorari

Thus, Plaintiff's counsel would like to grant

in a case that has only a sub-issue which is simi-

lar to Doe v. Hafen.

The Doe case contained other issues that

are not in the case at bar.

Some of the other issues are:

Should the Court have allowed Reeve's widow
to sit at counsel table during voir dire?
Did the Court properly admit evidence of
plaintiff's miscarriage and voluntary sterilization?
Did the court award prejudgment
interest
as required
by Utah
Code Ann.
§28-27-44 (1987).
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457.
This case has many complex issues, such as the exclusion

of

federal
to

testimony

of

the

"moth

phenomenon"

regulations, exclusion of a video

reconstruct

the

accident,

impeachment

or

lure

effect,

tape that purported
of

a witness,

pur-

to post warning devices was negligence and caused plaintiff's
injury.

But. such a theory is not an independent alternative

basis of liability, but rather a redundant portion of plaintiff's "first" theory of negligence -- the drivers negligence
in parking in the emergency lane.
Plaintiff's alternative theory is not an independent
basis of liability itself.

Obviously, the truck driver would

not be neligent if he did not park along the freeway and did
not post the warning devices.
liability

is

his

parking

The basis of the truck driver's
the

truck.

Because

the

truck

driver's negligence had already been determined by the Court
as a matter

of

law. no

additional

issue of negligence was

required to be submitted to the jury
There is no alternative chain of causation as Plaintiff claims, rather there are circumstances which tend to show
the trucker was negligent, such as the length of time he was
parked,

in what position

he was parked, and whether

were displayed where he was parked.

flares

Since the negligence had

been determined, the trial court properly submitted only the
issue of proximate cause to the jury.

POINT VII
CERTIORARI IS IMPROPER BECAUSE CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF
COUNSELS ASSERTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ADEQUATELY
CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY BY
OSTLER'S EXPERTS
Plaintiff's

counsel

contends

that

if

he

had

been

allowed to offer foundational proof of whether Stephen Ostler

Certainly, these are reasoned

explanations given by

the Court of Appeals as to why the evidence should not have
been allowed.
Even

if

the

preliminary

question

of

fact

(whether

Father Ostler was awake) was the sole basis for the Court of
Appeals1

determination, to exclude the evidence of the expert

witness,

such exclusion

does not beg the question.

As the

United States Supreme Court stated in Huddleston.
the court simply examines all the evidence
in the case and decides whether the jury
could reasonably find this conditional]
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.
Huddleston v. United

States. 485 U.S. at

. 99

L.Ed. 2d 771. 782-83 (1988)(emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals in essence states that no jury
could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance
of the evidence.

The Court of Appeals says. "Even Plaintiff's

own experts admitted that there was no conclusive way to determine Stephen Ostlers
accident."
The
ruling

that

state of consciousness prior to the

Ostler. 781 P.2d at 448.
Court
the

of

Appeals

jury could

affirmed

the

trial

court's

not reasonably find that Father

Ostler was awake or asleep by a preponderance of the evidence,
and affirms the trial court's exclusion of the expert's testimony.

Such

action

of

the

Court

of Appeal

was

appropriate

considering Huddleston. and the Utah Rules of Evidence.

This

exclusion of evidence was within the broad discretion of the
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Utah

445

iiuun was not abuse of discretion and {'!)
defense (ounsols closing argument

was

not unfairly prejudicial
Affirmed

1 Jur> €^UltK)
Voir din* in automobile accident ca~se
sufficient!) addressed plaintiff's concerns
of potential bias against large monetarv
awards where court, in lieu of plaintiffs
proposed questions asked juror* if the)
would object to awarding amount of dam
ages being asked for and whether the\
were capable of rendering fair and true
verdict ba.sed on evidence

Ralph OSTLER, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
\LBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC.,
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R Roe,
Inc., Defendants, Third-Part> Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
Wanda OSTLER, Stephen K. Ostler, Gary
W. Ostler, Vyron R. Ostler, Dale F. Ostler, Donnell B. Ostler, Sonda Mae
Ostler, Ralph O. Ostler, Brian L. Ostler,
Carlyle E. Ostler, Margaret Ostler, and
Nathan J. Ostler, as heirs of Stephen
Ostler, Gary Ostler, Dale Ostler, and
Eugene Ostler, d / b / a Go Cars, ThirdParty Defendants.
No 880228-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah
Sept 8, 1989
Rehearing Denied Oct 19, 1989

Injured automobile passenger brought
4<iion against driver and owner of other
chicle to recover for injuries The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Cullcn Y
'hnstensen J entered indtrmpnt nn mrv

2 Kvidence <s=>99
Probative value of evidence is deter
mined on basis of need and its ability to
make existence of consequential fact more
or less probable Rules of Evid , Rule 403
3. Evidence <s=>555.8(l)
Expert testimony regarding "moth
phenomenon," offered in injured passenger's suit to explain why dnver veered off
highway and struck parked truck, was
properly excluded for lack of foundation,
there was no evidence that dnver was
awake prior to night-time accident or that
parked truck had lights on which would
"lure" dnver
4. Evidence «=»359(6)
Videotape of vehicle dnving off road
way at actual accident location, purporting
to show that no mishap would have oe
curred had truck not been parked on road
shoulder, was properly excluded from in
jured passenger's negligence suit, video
tape differed from actual accident in that it
was produced dunng daylight conditions
and employed alert, professional stunt dnv
er Rules of Evid , Rules 401, 403
5. Appeal and Error e=M056.1(3)
Even if exclusion of federal motor
earner regulations and road safety and de
sign evidence was error, in injured passen

446

Uuh
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and prejudicial, court had already ruled
that parking of truck v,as negligence as
matU r of 11\* and jur\ *a,s as capabk a>
ix|Krt in making determination of fori see
ahilit)
Rules of Evid Rule 402
6 Automobiles «=»243<3)
Question of how long truck had boon
parked on shoulder of highway prior to
accident was properly excluded as irrelevant, evidence would have gone to issue of
truck driver's negligence, which issue had
already been resolved by directed verdict
7 Appeal and Error «=1060 1(8). 1060 6
Negligence defendant's closing argu
ment, reflecting fact that judgment could
be entered against defendants but not indi
eating source of funds to pay such judg
ment, was not unfairly prejudicial defen
dant did not improperly state that insur
ance would or would not pay judgment and
thus did not improperly elicit sympathy or
temper size of any award Rules of Evid ,
Rule 411
8. Trial <s=>133 6<4)
Any harm in negligence defendant's
closing argument's misstatement of law of
foreseeability was negated by court's ad
monishment to disregard statements of
counsel as to law, and look only to court s
instructions
9. Trial <3=>261
Court properly rejected negligence
plaintiffs suggested expansion of causa
tion instruction, any expansion of given
instruction would likely have impaired,
rather than enhanced, jury's comprehen
sion of issue
10 Automobiles <3=3245<50)
Issue of proximate cause in automobile
accident was for jury, evidence tended to
establish that proximate cause was not
only in substantial dispute but was very
essence of controversy between parties

Robert J DeBry, Daniel F BerUh War
ren W Dnggs, and Dale F Gardiner (ar

M Daylc J«.ffs (argued) and Robert L
Jeffs Provo, for defendants third partv
plaintiffs drid respondents
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ
OPINION
BENCH, Judge
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict
against him in a negligence action
We
affirm
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father
Stephen home to Utah from a business tnp
to California At approximate^ 3 00 a m
the Ostler's compact pickup was north
bound on Interstate 15, a few miles south
of Payson, Utah Stephen Ostler was dnv
mg For unknown reasons, the pickup left
the lane of traffic and struck the rear of a
truck and semitrailer unit parked on the
paved shoulder of the roadway
Stephen
Ostler was killed instantly Plaintiff, who
had been sleeping on the bed of the pickup
was thrown onto the roadway and critically
injured
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist
down as a result of his injuries
He
brought a personal injury action in the
district court against the driver of the
semitrailer (defendant Stanley E Wheeler),
the driver's employer (defendant AJbma
Transfer Co, Inc), and the semitrailer
owner (defendant F & R Roe, Inc ) Dining the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded
that Stephen Ostler was negligent and par
tially at fault for the accident Early in the
trial the court determined that Wheeler
was also negligent and directed a verdict of
negligence against him The basis for this
ruling was that Wheeler had parked hiir
semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled
access highway in violation of Utah Cod*
Ann § 41-6-lOJOXi) (1988) The court n
served the issue of whether Wheeler's ne^
hgence was a proximate cause" of th*
accident
The jury eventually conclude*:
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was th<

OSTLER v. ALBINA TRANSFKK CO . INC.
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verdict for defendants
Plaintiff appeals
from the \crdict, alleging numerous errors
VOIR DIRK

(!) We first address plaintiffs claim
that jury voir dire was inadequate to reveal
bias related to a "tort reform" advertising
campaign conducted by a national msur
ance company It is obvious from the trial
transcript that the gust of plaintiffs ques
tions went to the issue of potential juror
bias against large monetary awards
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the court to permit the
parties to supplement voir dire with questions that are material and proper
However, the court has considerable discretion
to "contain voir dire within reasonable limits." Hornsby v Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P 2d 929, 932-33 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) Whether that discretion has
been abused is determined from the totality
of the questioning. Doe v. Ha/en, 772 P.2d
456, 457-58 (Utah C t A p p 1989).
In heu of plaintiffs proposed questions,
the judge informed the venire that plaintiffs claim may exceed a million dollars
and asked if any would object to an award
of that magnitude. None did. The judge
also asked if any of the prospective jurors
believed that people should not resort to
the courts to settle disputes or recover
damages for injuries. Again, none did.
The judge followed with a question asking
whether any believed they were incapable
of rendering a fair and true verdict based
on the evidence. None responded affirmatively. In their totality, and in context
with the remainder of voir dire, these questions are substantively responsive to plaintiffs concerns and appear sufficient to reveal " t o r t reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown an abuse of
discretion in the court's voir dire of prospective jurors.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Di-:-i.//

of proffered testimony from two experts
The excluded evidence covered a variety of
topics, including a scientific theory referred
to as the "moth phenomenon," certain fed
eral motor earner regulations, road safety
and design, and a videotape prepared for
plaintiff that purported to show what
would have happened if the semitrailer had
not bevn unlawfully parked
12] The general rule regarding the ad
mission or exclusion of evidence is that the
trial court's decision will not be overturned
in the absence of an abuse of discretion
Pearce v Wistisen, 701 P 2d 489, 491 (Utah
1985) Witnesses qualified as experts may
testify if "scientific, technical, or other spe
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to deter
mine a fact in issue " Utah R.Evid 702
However, "(ijt is within the discretion of
the trial court to determine the suitability
of expert testimony in a case and the qualifications of the proposed e x p e r t " State v
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982)
(decided under former rule)
Although
such testimony may be relevant, it may be
excluded if the court determines "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R Evid 403. The
probative value of evidence is determined
on the basis of need and "its ability to
make the existence of a consequential fact
either more or less probable " State v
Johnson, 115 Utah Adv Rep 6, 8, — P 2d
,
(1989) (quoting State
v
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1989))
13) We have examined the record and
can find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony of
two of plaintiffs seven experts It is quite
clear that the reason or reasons why Stephen Ostler's vehicle slammed into the rear
of Wheeler's semitrailer could not h*» AOHK
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I vni if sii<.n i tlu or\ i^ a inussibh un It r
th< thn hold rciniin nunl of uilu n nl it lia
biht\ s<< .V<i/< i I\im?it(u>ch 77r> I'Ai
{s.h HS MM (l)Uh T)h()) the tlxorv is
pri HUM o on the fait that a driver must lx
«iu ik( in ordt r to IK SO lured
Plain
tiffs own <\ptrt idmitted that there was
no IOIHIIMV( wa\ to determine Stephen
OstU r s sUU of cons< lousness prior to the
ioci<1t nt Nor does the theory nece'ssanlv
esUhhsh causation because plaintiffs ex
j>ert conceded that there wa.s no evidence
of tiie factors triggering the moth phenom
enon
Without this foundation, the court
determined that the expert testimonv on
the moth phenomenon would not be helpful
to the jury, and furthermore, that it would
be prejudicial to present an opinion based
on such pure conjecture
This is consistent with the principle that
"anv expert evidence scientifically based
or otherwise" must, on balance, "be helpful
to the trier of fact " Id at 398 n 8 Such
evidence must be scrutinized carefully to
avoid the 'tendency of the finder of fact to
abandon its responsibility to decide the c n t
ical issues and simply adopt the judgment
of the expert despite an inability to accu
rately appraise the validity of the underly
ing s c i e n c e " Id at 396
Whether the
probative value of evidence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a
determination within the sound discretion
of the trial court State v Johnson, 115
Utah Adv Rep at 9, — P 2d at
Un
der rules 403 and 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence we conclude that the trial judge
was within his discretion to exclude the
testimonv
(4) Similarly, the trial court concluded
that plaintiffs videoUped demonstration
w i s more apt to be confusing to the jury
than helpful
The videotape depicted a
compact pickup truck driving off the road
way at the actual accident location
It
purported to show that no mishap would
have occurred had Wheeler's truck not
been parked on the road shoulder
Plain
tiff first AnruoH that the videoUoe was for

other eases It is obvious however th it
tlu film did not illustrate the accident but
rither [Kirtraud pi unUffs prediction of
events under i different set of facts
\^
sm h the potential for unfair prejudice is
illustrative evidence* v\as signific mt md
the trial court was within its discretion to
exc hide it
Pluntiff alternaUveU argues that the
videoUpe wa>> admissible as evidence
Plaintiff cites LhRo^ano
i Hawns
196
fai App id 1224, 242 Cal Rptr 423 (19b7)
for the projjosition that expenmenUl evi
dencc is admissible provided it is conducted
under subsUntially similar conditions as
that of the actual incident "The standard
that must be met in determining whether
the proponent of the experiment has met
the burden of proof of establishing the
preliminary fact essential to the admissibih
t) of the experimental evidence is whether
the conditions were substantially identical,
not absolutely identical " Id. 242 Cal Rptr
at 426 (quoting Culpepper v
Volkswagen
of America
Inc, 33 Cal App 3d 510, 521,
109 Cal Rptr 110 (1973)) DiRosano
lm
poses two other requirements—that the experimental evidence be relevant and not
consume undue time, confuse the issues, or
mislead the jury IdL 242 Cal Rptr at 426
In Whitehead v American Motors Sales
Corp, 101 Utah Adv Rep 27, — P 2d
(1989), the Utah Supreme Court discussed
the Culpepper three-prong test in determining the admissibility of motor vehicle
crash test films
The court upheld the
admission of the films into evidence and
held that certain discrepancies between the
films and the actual accident went to
weight, rather than admissibility The cir
cumstances of the accident were known
and the films were offered to show the
handling characteristics of similar vehicles
In this case, application of the Whitehead test supports exclusion of the evidence Plaintiff admits that the videoUpe
differed from the actual accident in that
the videoUpe was produced during daylight conditions and employed an alert, pro-
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II appears however thai the u>nditions of
the films production * e r e fir from similar
to the actual a u i d e n t The differences in
lighting and driver .il« rtness and skill \MTe
crucial The literal tontroversv, of this law
suit is the inexplicable departure of a \ e
hide from the lane of traffic
The video
tape does not and cannot depict the condi
Uons that iaused thai departure An> oth
er depiction is as the trial court concluded,
not reconstruction but speculation
In
contrast to Whitehead, the circumstances
of this accident are not known and there is
no indication that the design characteristics
of vehicles were responsible The discrepancies between the film and plaintiffs acci
dent seem to go l>eyond weight Since the
film would not "make the existence of an)
fact
of consequence
more probable
than not" under Utah R Evid 401, we are
not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the
first two prongs of similarity and relevance
under the Whitehead test
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our
doubt as to the film's relevance and similar
lty, we conclude that, m any event, the trial
court properly excluded the videotape as
substantive evidence on the grounds of potential confusion
See Utah R Evid 403
Under Whitehead's
third prong, such evi
dence may be excluded in the court's dis
cretion even if it is relevant, when a deter
mination is made that it may confuse or
mislead
101 Utah Adv Rep at 31, —
P 2d at
(trial court upheld although
unclear whether court excluded evidence
under rule 401 or 403, either theory of
exclusion being proper) Since plaintiff has
not demonstrated that the finding of poten
tial confusion was an abuse of the court's
discretion, we hold that the videotape was
properly excluded
[5] We last address plaintiffs claim of
error regarding the exclusion of evidence
on federal motor carrier regulations and
road safety and design
Plaintiff argues
that this evidence was relevant to the issue
of foreseeabihty under his theorv of con
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The lavs does not iu < ess m l \ retognpt
onl\ one proximate < iuse of an mjur\
consisting of onl\ one fai tor one act or
the conduct of onl\ one person To tlu
contrary the acts md omissions of two
or more persons m i\ work concurrent^
as the efficient cause of m mjurv and in
such a case each of the participating
acts or omissions is regarded in lav. as a
proximate cause and both mav be held
responsible
We have examined the record and agree
that some of this evidence ma> be relevant
to the issue of foreseeabihtv
Other e\i
dence goes to the issue of Wheeler's negh
gence, a matter previously decided b> di
rected verdict, and may be excluded as
irrelevant
See Utah R Evid 402 ("Evi
dence which is not relevant is not admissi
ble")
The court excluded the relevant
portions of the expert's proffered testimony on the grounds that such evidence
would not be particularly helpful to the
jury The court believed that the jury was
as capable as the expert to make the deter
mination of foreseeability
In any event,
plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of
showing that the claimed error was substantial and prejudicial
See Ashton
v
Ashton, 733 P 2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987),
Utah R Civ P 61 In the absence of such a
showing, we consider plaintiffs claim to be
without merit

IMPEACHMENT
(6] Plaintiff argues that the court's re
fusal to permit him to show that Wheeler
may have been parked on the shoulder oi
the highway for as long as thirty minute*
unduly restricted cross-examination
Al
though plaintiff concedes that the t n a
judge has broad discretion in regulating
the scope of such testimony, see, c g
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv Rep at 28, —
P 2d at
, he claims that the cour
abused its discretion by misapplying th<
law Plaintiff claims that he was attempt

4f)fl

Utah

781 PACIFIC RKPORTKK, 2d SKKIKS

It is unnecessary to resolve this argu
ment when the alternate basis for the
court's ruling is considered, namely, that
the question of how long Wheeler had been
parked ultimately went to the issue of
Wheeler's negligence. Since that issue had
been resolved by directed verdict, the e\
eluded testimony was irrelevant
Similar
ly, plaintiff claims that he was not permit
ted to imi>each Wheeler with Wheeler's
"pnor bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's violation of federal motor earner regulations
These acts also concerned the issue of
Wheeler's negligence and were properly excluded

CLOSING ARGUMENT
[7] Plaintiff complains of statements
made by defense counsel during closing
a r g u m e n t Defense Counsel made the following remark:
This case is to decide whether Wheeler,
. . . F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for
the injuries to Ralph, when Wheeler's
actions were not the cause of the accident
Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out
of the presence of the jury. He now argues that the statement was improper,
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that
"any recovery would come from the insurance carrier," and that the remark unfairly
implies that defendants would personally
pay any damage award.
We are not convinced that there is any
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it
reflects the fact that judgment would be
rendered against the various defendants
under joint and several liability, and does
not indicate the source of funds to pay such
a judgment. It does not inappropriately
state that insurance would or would not
pay any judgment, see Utah R.Evid 411,
thus improperly eliciting sympathy or tempering the size of any award Cf. Pnel v.
R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N D.1986)
("We are talking about money that my

[H] Plaintiff also objected to th- folio*
mg portion of defendants' closing argu
ment
|T]he foreseeabihty question is
How
uds S u n Wheeler expected to foresee
that at that precise time if, as Mr PeBry
said, one in a billion chances that it
uould happen right at that particular
tune—
Plaintiff argues that this was a misstatement of the lav* because "foreseeabihty
relates to whether accidents of this general
nature might happen " He further asserts
that the statement was prejudicial and that
"[t)he only explanation for [the] verdict is
that the jury was confused by (defense
counsel's] misstatements of the law "
We disagree. Even if counsel's remarks
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact
appears to be negated by the court's admonishment:
The Jury is directed to look at the Instructions. They set forth the law m
that regard. Statement of counsel is to
be disregarded except as it is accurate.
See Hall v. Blackkam, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error
shown where court admonished jury following remarks d u n n g closing argument).
When considered in the context of the entire closing argument, plaintiffs objection,
and the court's admonition, we conclude
there was no unfair prejudice. See generally Halford v. Yandell, 558 S W 2d 400,
411-12 (Mo.Ct.App.1977).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff further assigns as error two
jury instructions The first instruction involved the placement of emergenc\ warning devices behind Wheeler's parked truck.
We agree that the given instruction significantly differed from plaintiffs requested
instruction However, the instruction con
cerned the issue of Wheeler's negligence
We have already established that this issue
had been taken from the jury Any error
could not have affected the substantial
rights of plaintiff, and was, therefore,
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tion, claiming that the language is confusing and incomplete. Plaintiff sought to
further define and expand the given instruction. While it is true, as plaintiff argues, that jury instructions should be
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in
lay people's language without belaboring
definitions," Johnson v. ComuKill Warehouse Co.. 1G Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25
(1965), the adoption of plaintiffs suggestions would have run counter to this rule.
Although we cannot ascertain from the
record the rationale behind the trial court's
overruling of plaintiffs objections, any expansion of the given instruction would have
likely hindered, rather than enhanced, the
jury's comprehension of the issue.
The challenged instruction must also be
considered in the context of the instructions as a whole. Madsen v. Broum, 701
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Utah 1985); State v.
Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981).
Other instructions propose plaintiffs theory of the case, i.e., "concurrent negligence," and add meaning to the instruction
at issue. Although plaintiff contends that
the jury believed that causation meant
"fault," he fails to support this supposition.
We cannot delve into the jury's reasoning
process, and cannot speculate what
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident
However, it is just as reasonable to pre
sume, as in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah 1981), that the jury determined that the degree of Stephen Ostler's
inattentivene8S was not foreseeable. Thus,
"he failed to observe the situation he
should have . . . [and] this later negligent
act became the sole proximate cause of the
collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed to
show that any alleged confusion was substantial and prejudicial, we reject plaintiffs
claim of error.

A motion for a directed verdict requires
the trial court to consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party
against whom it is directed. The case
should not l>e taken from the jury where
there is substantial dispute in the evidence . . . On ap|>eal, this Court applies
the same rules.
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assocs.,
Inc. v. Warnick 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah
1983).
The trial court reserved the issue of
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict
that Wheeler was negligent. "Proximate
cause" is one of the essential elements of a
negligence action, see Williams v. Melby,
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and is specifically "that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred." Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). Proximate causation is generally a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. Watters, 626 P.2d at 457-58.
[10] The trial court denied plaintiffs
motions for a directed verdict on the issue
of causation. Under the applicable standard of review, we are required to view the
evidence in defendants' favor. That evidence, tending to establish that proximate
cause was not only in substantial dispute,
but was the very essence of the controversy between the parties, indicates that the
trial court properly declined to remove the
issue from the jury. We find no error in
the ruling below.
In conclusion, none of plaintiffs claims
constitute reversible error. We have reviewed other issues raised by plaintiff and
find them to be without merit. The judgment is affirmed.

DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION
We last address plaintiffs argument that
the trial court erred in not directing a verdict of proximate cause as a matter of law.
O u r r o v i ^ u / n f n nYinWanem

*/\ •k.o ^ n n l n l *C _

GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
^ \
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Rule 43- Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a pane! of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A COMPARISON OF INSTRUCTION NO. 27 AND THE
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS DEMONSTRATES THE ERROR
Plaintiff
instructed

on

argues

the

law

that
of

the

jury

independent

was

not

adequately

intervening

cause.

(Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 10.)
Defendant responds with generalities.

Defendant argues

that:
It is a general rule that jury instructions
should be considered as a whole. . .Instruction No. 27 defines independent intervening
cause in the totality of the language. The
instruction as a whole satisfies the elements
of law of proximate cause as stated in Restatement § 447.
(Brief

in

Opposition

to

Substitute

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari at p. 9-10.)
Aside from these glittering generalities, defendant no
where shows how or why or where Instruction No. 27 explains all
of the elements of independent intervening cause.
Unfortunately,
resolve

this

issue,

there
this

is no
court

short-cut.
must

In order to

laboriously

compare

Instruction No. 27 (Exhibit A) with Restatement of Torts § 442,
442A, 442B 447 & 449 (Exhibit B) .

Such a comparison will show

that the court's Instructions No. 27 does not even come close to
a full explanation of independent intervening cause.

Unfortunately, there is no easy short-cut.
resolve

this

issue,,

Appeals

opinion

the court

on expert

should

testimony

compare

(quoted

In order to

the Court

above) with

of
the

expert's actual testimony (see Exhibit D attached).
In effect, plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional
right

to

have

a

jury decide

facts.

It has

been

held

that

certiorari is appropriate where lower courts deprive a litigant
of his right to a jury determination.

Rogers v. Missouri P.R.

Co., 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.E.2d 493, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957).
DATED this rC?5 day of January, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT B

INSTRUCTION NO. 27

If an injury arises from two distinct causes,
consideration then must be given to the question whether the
causal connection between the conduct of the party responsible
for the first cause and the injury was broken by the intervention of a new, independent cause.
If so, the person responsible for the first cause
would not be liable for the injury.

If, however, the inter-

vening cause or the likelihood of an occurrence of the same
general nature was foreseen or should reasonably have been
foreseen by the person responsible for the first cause, then
such person's conduct would be the proximate cause of the
Injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause, and he would
be liable therefor.
Thus, if you find the collision of the vehicle
driven by Stephen Ostler with the tractor-trailer of Albina
Transfer Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of the highway,
or the likelihood of an occurrence of the same general nature,
was within the natural and continuous sequence of events
which might reasonably be foreseen to follow the actions of
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that Che actions of
Stanley Wheeler were a concurring proximate cause of the
collision, even though the later negligent act of Stephen
Oscler cooperated Co cause Che'accident.
^

Buc if Che actions of Stephen Ostler in causing

the collision were of such character as not reasonably to
be foreseen in che nacural and concinuous sequence of
evencs started by Stanley Wheeler, then the acts of Steven
Ostler are the independent intervening cause and, therefore,
the sole proximate cause of the injury.

EXHIBIT t!

§ 4 4 2 . Considerations Important in Determining Whether an
Intervening Force is a Superseding Cause
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding
cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise have
resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather
than norjnal in view of the circumstances existing at the
time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to
act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the
other and as such subjects the third person to liability
to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a
third person which sets the intervening force in motion.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see § 45L
Comment on Clause (b):
6. As to the statement in Clause (b), see § 435 (2) and
Comments c and d.
Comment on Clause (c):
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §§ 443-449.
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligence"
are used to denote the fact that the actor'a-iiegligent conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that,
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation
if the situation were in itself a legal injury.
Comment on Clause (d):
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see §452,
Comment on Clause (e):
/• As to the statement in Clause (e), see §§447-449,
Comment on Clause (f):
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with
§§ 448 and 449,

§ 442 B
4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into i t The same
result
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public sidewalk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject
to liability to C.
6. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full
of gasoline and damages it, so that gasoline runs into the
public street. The risk is thus created that persons using
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander,
negligently strikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline
vapor is ignited, and the resulting flash of fire injures C, a
pedestrian on the sidewalk. A Railroad is subject to liability to C.
e. Intentionally tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated
in this Section does not apply where the harm of which the risk
has been created or increased by the actor's conduct is brought
about by the intervening act of a third person which is intentionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal
acts may in themselves be foreseeable,' and so within the scope
of the created risk, in which case the actor may still be liable
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the intervention of the third person. The reason usually given by the
courts is that in such a case the third person has deliberately
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).)
Illustrations:
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to
C.
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except that B
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen.
A Railroad is not liable to C.
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negligently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating
the risk that it may accidentally or negligently be knocked

§ 4 4 7 . Negligence of Intervening Acts
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does
not make it a superseding cause of harm to another
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
should have realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing
when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person
had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a
situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. The statement in Clause (a) applies where there is a
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the conduct being negligent because of other and greater risks which
it entails. If the realizable likelihood that a third person will
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which
make the actor's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449.
Illustration:
1. A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight jolt
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks
it in a street where to his knowledge small boys congregate
for play, B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck.
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article
to fall upon and hurt C, a comrade standing close by. B's
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm.
Comment on Clause (b):
6. The actor at the time of his negligence may have no
reason to realize that a third person might act in the particular
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts,
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason
to realize that it will create the situation which the third person's
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation
is known to exist, the likelihood that some negligent act may
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious.
Illustration:
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm.

§ 4 4 9 . Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which
Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
4
hereby.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. This Section should be read together with § 302 B, and
•che Comments to that Section, which deal with the foreseeable
likelihood of the intentional or even criminal misconduct of a
third person as a hazard which makes the actor's conduct negligent. As is there stated, the mere possibility or even likelihood
that there may be such misconduct is not in all cases sufficient
to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence. It is only where
the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation
between them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where
the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct
has created or increased the risk of harm through the misconduct, that he becomes negligent.
6. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which
makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor
to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed
to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery
because the other's exposure to the very risk from which it
was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm
to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to
make the duty a nullity.
Illustrations:
1. A is traveling on the train of the B Railway Company. Her ticket entitles her to ride only to Station X,
but she intentionally stays on the train after it has passed
that station. When she arrives at Station Y the conductor
puts her off the train. This occurs late at night after the
station has been closed and the attendants have departed.
The station is situated in a lonely district, and the only
way in which she can reach the neighboring town is by passing a place where to the knowledge of the conductor there
is a construction camp. The construction crew is known to
contain many persons of vicious character. While attempting to pass by this camp, A is attacked and ravished by
some of the construction crew. The B Railway Company
is subject to liability to A.

EXHIBIT C

Trial Transcript

Q

Volume II

Page 211

Lines 14-24

I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.

Have you

had any special experience or any special study in driver
alertness or falling asleep at the wheel, any laboratory
work?
A

Yes.

Q

And would you describe that for the Court?

A

Well, in one of my first research activities in

1948-f49 was a study of why, how come so many California
motorists are running off the road over New Mexico Highways.
This was kind of an armchair study that we were told to do
by the State of California.
*****

Trial Transcript

Volume II

Page 212

Lines 10-19

Now, I was
able to do this safely by utilizing my driving simulation
laboratory.

This is like a flight simulator, where an

actual vehicle is operated on steel rollers in a laboratory,
the driver controls the engine speed and steering.

And what

happens in response to his speed and steering maneuvers is
the change in the wide-screen, deeply curved, specially
designed motion picture system that was developed with some
of the faculty at UCLA at the time.

Later it has been used

and is still being used in the motion picture industry.

Trial Transcript

Q

Okay.

question.

Volume II

Page 225

Lines 2-25

Now I'm going to give you a hypothetical

And in my hypothetical I want you to assume the

following:

That the date is April 19, 1984.

mately 3:00 a.m.

It's a dark cloudy night.

Itfs approxiAnd that a

truck is parked, a 16-wheel truck is parked, about three
miles south of Payson, exactly at the area you examined, you
explained to the judge you examined it, and that that semi
truck is parked on the paved shoulder with its right hand
wheels approximately three feet into the dirt, or it's left
wheels approximately four feet of the right solid line.

I

want you to further assume that the semi truck has blinking
lights.

I want you to further assume that an automobile

approaches from the rear and crashes into the semi truck
in approximately the position indicated on Plaintiff's
Exhibit 12. And I want you to further assume that there
are no skid marks.
And my question is: As a human factors scientist,
based on those facts, can you form an opinion whether the
driver was asleep or awake?
MR. JEFFS:

Objection.

No foundation

laid as to what he predicates it on.
THE COURT:
question "Yes" or "No."
A

Yes.

Well, he can answer the

Trial Transcript

Volume II

Page 227

Lines 1-25

than the fully conscious areas of the brain.

And it is a

monotonous task, a lonely open road, particularly. And because
of our sleep-wake patterns we are subject to those difficulties in the night hours when we usually are asleep, and our
performance degrades.
The degrading aspect is that we, less participation
by our upper-brain area, our fully conscious decision-making
brain areas, in a sense fail us. And it leaves us with this,
just this rudimentary control ability.

Now, we are not

asleep, but we are certainly not fully awake and conscious
as we would like to be.

And this happens, unfortunately,

all the time in the driving scene.
Q

And is there a relationship between that, that half-

way state or semi-state and the lights, the blinking lights
ahead?
A

Well, yes, there is. What happens, what likely

happens, as best we can understand, is that in this reduced
state of awareness, the image of a vehicle's tail light ahead
of us, in the night, is not an unusual thing.
unusual.

It's not

In fact most of the time there's some kind of

traffic ahead of us.
The ability to distinguish between those tail
lights, as on a moving vehicle, as opposed to a stationary
vehicle, is very difficult without the aid of some, something
that's right on the ground.

It1*

t-^~o~ i.-^t.^

Trial Transcript

Volume II

Page 229

Lines 1-25

is required by law to activate their flashing lights.
So, it's not that unusual to, in fact we encountered one coming down this morning, a slow-moving vehicle in
the travel lane with the flashers.

So it doesn't neces-

sarily mean that that's a stopped vehicle.
So this is, these are the explanations that occur.
There's one other, and that is, if a vehicle operator is in
a sense lured over towards a set of flashing lights, and
that happens all too often, not only with flashing lights
on stopped vehicles but with flashers on these barricades,
flashing lights are not allowed on barricades that delineate,
they must be steady-burn, they are allowed to try to get
attention, but if you are going to delineate the path with a
roll of barrels or barricades with flashing lights on them,
I mean, not flashing, they must be steady-burn, and they have
a little switch.

And I've gone into that for the barricade

industry and a lot of work in that field.

So it's, if a

flashing light does attract the attention of a motorist,
they would be somewhat off to the side from straight ahead.
I'm assuming a flashing light on a stopped vehicle on the
shoulder, such as police vehicles when they are dealing with
motorists.

That flashing stimulus is very likely to attract

our attention.

And when we are attracted visually to some-

thing off the side, there's an almost irresistible, what we
call, "orienting response."

Trial Transcript

Volume II

Page 249

Lines 8-25:

BY MR. DEBRY:
Q

Dr. Hulbert, I want to just be clear in this

record, and the Court has expressed some concern, that when
you testified that this man, in your opinion, was awake as
opposed to asleep, what factors did you take into consideration when you said in your opinion he was awake?
A

What --

The police report indicating a rather shallow

angle of impact, as opposed to say a more abrupt angle off
the road.

And the observation of Mr. Wheeler, the big rig

driver, in his mirror of the manner or the path that the
striking vehicle took prior to impact.

I've taken those

two elements into acocunt.
Q

Now explain why the angle of impact would assist

you in forming an opinion that he was awake?
A

Well, in many such events that I have had occasion

to analyze, with the help of reconstructionists, if the
angle is a relatively sharp angle of impact, it would indicate
a more of a sudden and complete loss of consciousness or

Trial Transcript

Volume II

MR, DEBRY:

Page 251

Lines 1-25

Well, it isn't leading,

the Jury is not here.
THE COURT:

Well, I want him to, I'm

going to ask him the same question, so he may answer.
A

Well, when the, when the eyes closed, and I was

able to minotor their facial aspects, when the lids actually
closed, then there would be a more abrupt.
Now, see, we had, they had to steer, to stay on
the road, we had a signal in the simulator device, so that
if they didn't steer then they would go off the road.

So,

and when the eyes closed there was a more abrupt, because,
occasionally, also, there would be a falling, a nodding of
the head and some movement of the hands on the steering wheel.
So, when the eyes close and when the head drops,
then there is a more abrupt transition.

Before that the eyes

are open, they are just, and they are staying on the road,
and then there comes a time when their eyes are open and they
are drifting off the road.
Q

I think we've got it, but compare the actions of

Mr. Ostler, the Ostler vehicle, as it was described by
Wheeler, as Wheeler described it, with what you've seen in
your laboratory when people go to sleep; compare the two?
A

Well, that's essentially what I did in carrying out

my analysis, that Mr. Wheeler's description of his observation
of the path that the striking vehicle followed --

Trial Transcript
Volume II
Page 246 Lines 1-7

Page 245

Lines 12-25:

THE COURT: Counsel, I don't have any
question the expertise of the doctor in several fields. But
I'm not persuaded that in this case the testimony is going to
be helpful to the Jury, I've heard nothing to indicate any
basis for a determination on his part that there was a man
that was either, that was not asleep, or that he was merely
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of the things around
him.
It seems to me that that's something that the Jury
can, just as well as anyone else, can infer and can determine
from their own experience in this type of circumstance,
and that it can be argued by counsel, I don't see that it's
going to be helpful from that standpoint. And I do think it
may be prejudicial to have an opinion that's based on nothing
more than likelihood or a possibility, pure speculation.
The facts are that the man ran off and hit into the
back of the truck. There is nothing that's been shown or
indicated that that is consistent with being asleep, any
less than being with, consistent with being inattentative.
So that the Court is going to sustain the objection
to the testimony of the doctor on that basis.

• •*••

Exhibit H

M. DAYLE JEFFS. #G16 5 5
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law. P.C.
Attorneys jor Defendant
90 North lO'O East
P. O. Box 888
Provo. Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RALPH OSTLER.
Plaintiff.

MOTION TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVIT OF
PATRICIA HANNA

vs .
ALBINA TRANSFER CO.. INC..
F & R ROE. INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

CASE NO. 890529
COURT OF APPEALS NO.
880-0229-CA

Defendants.
/

COME NOW

the Defendants

and

pursuant

to Rule 23 of

the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, moves the Court to strike
the affidavit of Patricia Hanna in support of the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.
as

specified

Supreme

Court

The affidavit is not a part of the record

in Rule
as

11(d)(2)(B)

is more

fully

of

set

the

Rules

forth

of

in the

the

Utah

Memorandum

attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

7 '—

1990.

M. Dayle Je

day

of

January.

M. DAYLE JEFFS. ttG165S
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys Tor Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 888
Provo. Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RALPH OSTLER.
Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF THE MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT
OF PATRICIA HANNA

vs.
ALB1NA TRANSFER CO.. INC..
F & R ROE. INC.. and
STANLEY E. WHEELER.

CASE NO. 890529
COURT OF APPEALS NO.:
880-0228-CA

Defendants.
/

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

September

8.

1989

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

rendered its decision in the above entitled case.
Plaintiff's

counsel

filed

eration on September 21. 1989.
affidavit of Patricia Hanna.

a

Petition

for

Reconsid-

Attached to the Motion was the
On October 18. 1989 the Court of

Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Plaintiff, next filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December

15. 1989.

Attached

was the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna.

as part of the Petition,

POINT I
The Court Should Strike The Affidavit of Patricia Hanna
Since It Is Not A Part Of The Official Record On Appeal.
Rule

11(a)

of

the

Rules

of

the Utah

Supreme

Court

Composition
of
the record
on appeal.
The
original papers
and exhibits
filed
in the
district court, the transcript of proceedings,
if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of
the district court shall constitute the record
on appeal in all cases. However with respect
to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed
under Paragraph
(d) of this rule shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court.
Utah. 11(a) (as amended. 1987).
Paragraph

(d)(2)(B)

items to be included

of Rule

11

in the transmittal

gives a list of

the

to the Supreme Court.

The list does not contain any Affidavits outside of the record.
. Only those designated papers and the
following, to the extent applicable, shall
be transmitted to the clerk of the Supreme
Court by the clerk of the district court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule
7(a). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii)
the final judgment, order, or
interlocutory
order
from
which the
appeal is taken;
(iv)
other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v)
any supporting opinion, findings
of fact or conclusions of law filed or
delivered by the trial court;
(vi)
the motion. response, and accompanying
memoranda upon which the
court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii)
jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
Utah. 1 K 2 H B )

fas amended. 1987K

The
the

affidavit

Plaintiff's

of

Petition

Patricia
for

Hanna

was

first

Reconsideration.

The

filed

in

rales of

the Utah Court of Appeals does not provide for a Petition for
Reconsideration, but does provide for a Petition for Rehearing
under

Rule

official

35.

record

The

affidavit

in the action in

support of the Petition for Reconsideration.

Patricia Hanna's

should

be

because

stricken

it was

become a part of the

filed

affidavit

simply

does not

from

the

Petition

for Writ of

Certiorari.
Plaintiff's

counsel

did

not

Rule 11(b) to supplement the record.

follow

the procedure of

That Rule states:

If anything material to either party is
omitted from the record by error or accident or
is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the district court or the Supreme
Court, either before or after the record is
transmitted
to the Supreme Court, on proper
suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct
that the omission or misstatement be corrected,
and if necessary that a supplemental record be
certified and transmitted. The moving party, or
the court if it is acting on its own initiative,
shall serve on the parties a statement of the
proposed changes. Within 10 days after service
any party may serve objections to the proposed
changes. . .
Utah, 11(b) (as amended, 1987).
If a party wants

to supplement

the record on appeal.

they are to notify the Supreme Court and the opposing party is
given
changes

the

opportunity

to

or supplementation.

therefore

the Affidavit

file

objections

to

the

proposed

This procedure was not followed,

of Patricia Hanna

should

be stricken

from the Petition.
by an affidavit

In fact, the record cannot be supplemented

commenting

on the thought processes of the

Judges of the Court of Appeals.
POINT II
The Affidavit Of Patricia Hanna Should Be Stricken Since
She Has Not Been Trained In Law Or A Legal Authority.
The Affidavit of Patricia Hanna is a criticism of the
opinion written by the Utah Court of Appeals.

She states that

she would give the opinion a "D" if it were written by one of
her undergraduate students.
Ms. Hanna does not have the legal training to interpret the opinion of the Court.

An opinion of the Court is to

decide the case and controversy.

It is not to be a creative

writing assignment for the benefit of society.
Even if the affiant were trained in legal reasoning
and

writing.

it

is

not

appropriate

to

file

challenging the thought processes of the judges.
the Court

affirmed

the Juries verdict

and

and

affidavit

In this case

findings

of

the

district court.
The legal reasoning of the Court of Appeals and the
findings of the Jury do not necessarily fit into the reasoning
of a philosopher untrained in legal theory.

The affidavit is

a criticism of the Court and the judicial system.

That does

not give the affidavit an evidentiary basis to be attached to
the Petitfon for Writ of Certiorari.

The affidavit should be

stricken from the Petition.

6> ZK

RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this /

day

of

1990

f/

M. Dayle ^ f f s /

/

January,

Exhibit I

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
February 5, 1990
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq,
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84603

Ralph Ostler,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Albina Transfer Co,, Inc.,
F & R Roe, Inc., and
Stanley E. Wheeler,
Defendants and Respondents

Respondent's Motion to
Strike the Affidavit
of Patricia Hanna
No. 890529

Motion to Strike Affidavit is grantedGeoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

RECOVER
FEB

7 1990

Exhibit J

BEFORE THE UTAi: SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

RALPH OSTLER
i i\ t I N o ,

890S29

Plaintiff and
Petitloneif
TRANSCRIPT Ob

vs.
ALBINA TRANSFFP
F h R ROE, INC .
WHEELER,

f LL( TRONIC TAPES
ETANLE-

Defendant 'and
^Respondents. -"
* * *

raken:at the Utah State,Capitol Building'^Salt'"Lake
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mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on

2

the inherent logic of an appellate court opinion.
MR. DeBRY:

3

It does boggle the mind, and that's why

4

I say it's once-in-a-1ifetime, but look at the reverse side of

5

the coin.

What if it's true?
THE COURT:

6

The Affidavit

—

Then you take your appeal and get a

7

reversal.

There's already a remedy provided for your

8

situation, Mr. DeBry, and it is not to bad mouth the Court

9

that's rendered the opinion that you don't like.
Well, we don't

10

MR. DeBRY:

11

JUSTICE DURHAM:

—

We're equally competent to make the

12

analysis Miss Hanna makes.

13

make the analysis that Miss Hanna makes.

14

MR. DeBRY:

15

JUSTICE DURHAM:

In fact, we are more competent to

Yes, you are.
And why —

you know, without

16

qualifying her as an expert, without any kind of an

17

evidentiary hearing, why ought we to look at her particular

18

critique?

19

do with independent, autonomous, general bodies of social

20

science literature, not a specific critique and attack upon

21

the work of an appellate court.

22

All the cases and precedents you cite to us have to

MR. DeBRY:

I don't see any analgy there.

First of all, the problem is we don't

23

have an automatic right to an appeal.

24

right to appeal, I would never have put her Affidavit in.

25

grant certiorari is discretionary.

If we had an automatic
To

Professor Hanna does not

10
comment on whether -- she specifically states she does not
comment on whether or not the opinion is true or accurate or
correct.

Like I said, she doesn't comment on whether or not

the opinion is correct.

Her comment is on whether or not the

process was followed.
Now, I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's
question, because you're looking at me very sternly, when I
say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and you say it borders
on contempt.

But I say what if it's true?

Suppose we had an

opinion written by three •— just three judges of the Court of
Appeals.

Suppose the opinion came out something like this:

One page opinion that says, "You lose," and the first judge to
sign it signs the opinion.

The second judge to sign it signs

off and says, "I didn't read the briefs, but nevertheless it
sounds okay to me.

I concur."

Now, what if the third judge

said, "I didn't read the briefs, but it sounds okay to me and
I concur."

Obviously, this Court would have little trouble

finding that there's serious problems about the administration
of justice and due process and you'd take corrective steps.
The problem is, judges don't sign that way.

They don't sign,

"I read the briefs" or "I didn't read the briefs," and I can't
ask them.
JUSTICE DURHAM:

But you could come up on your

Petition to Cert, to us and say, "The briefs say X, the
opinion says Y.

The judges couldn't have read the briefs,

11
1
2

we're entitled to Cert."
MR. DeBRY:

What's the difference?

Well, the difference is it's really hard

3

to get a Petition for Certiorari granted and there are a lot

4

of reasons to grant it and a lot of reasons not to grant it.

5
6
7

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Sure, but your Petition, your

Affidavit isn't going to make it any easier.
MR. DeBRY:

If her Affidavit is true, I suggest that

8

it's not contempt, I suggest that it's a matter of utmost

9

gravity that judges in inferior courts are not reading briefs,

10

or not reading briefs carefully, and that's an issue that

11

infects not only this case, that's an issue that could infect

12

many other cases, and this court in its supervisory capacity

13

should take that into consideration in whether or not to grant

14

Cert, because whether or not you grant Cert., one issue you

15

make take into consideration is whether or not you're

16

answering a question in this case or whether or not you're

17

answering a question in a much broader context.

18

Although this is a controversial Affidavit, and I

19

filed the Affidavit knowing that and with much reluctance, I

20

think if it's true, is a matter of utmost gravity.

21

will ever know it's true unless you grant Cert, and review the

22

case on the merits.

Nobody

23

THE COURT:

Thank you.

24

MR. JEFFS:

I would only say that when Counsel says

25

Mr. Jeffs, anything else?

that she drafted the Affidavit, the many pages, 20, nearly 19

12
1

pages of a detailed analysis of the opinion, does not appear

2

to be anything except an attack on the Court and we renew our

3

motion.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

Thank you.

motion under advisement.
(Court adjourned.)

The Court will take the
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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH

ss .
COUNTY OF SALT

LAKE)

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that LANETTE SHINDURLING, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby
certify:
That this transcript is full, true and correct and
contains all of the evidence, all of the objections of counsel
and rulings of the court and all matters to which the same
relate which were audible through the said tape recording*
I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action,
and that I am not interested in the event thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record and, therefore, the name associated with the statement
may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 27th day of February, 1990.

1ANETTE SHINdURLING, C.S.R. - R.P,
Utah License No. 122

Exhibit K

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
March 6, 1990
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq,
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84603

Ralph Ostler,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Albina Transfer Co., Inc.,
F & R Roe, Inc., and
Stanley E. Wheeler,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 890529

This day Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, denied,

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Exhibit L

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH OSTLER
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

vs.

840467408

RULING

ALBINA TRANSFER CO INC et al
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on
the motion of Defs seeking sanctions against counsel for PI under
the provision of Rule 11 URCP andf Sec 78-27-56 UCA. The Court
has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no
oral argument being requested, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1. Said motion is denied.
The Court is of the opinion that since the alleged
scurrilous matter was presented to the Utah Court of Appeals,
such Court should make the determination as to whether or not
sanctions should be imposed.
In the event the Utah Court of appeals should
determine that sanctions are appropriate, that Court may then
choose to remand the matter to this Court to make a factual
determination as to the amount of such sanctions to be imposed
(Porco vs Porco 752 P2d 365).
Dated this J2/
day of February, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

^uT^^ufU
CULLEN
cc:

Robert J. Debry, Esq,
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.

CHRISTEN

KfedHVED

Exhibit M

M. Dayle Jeffs, #G1655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RALPH OSTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & RROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

PETITION FOR SANCTIONS
AGAINST ROBERT J. DEBRY
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF,
RALPH OSTLER

Court of Appeals No.:

Defendants.

COMES NOW the defendants/respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R
Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler, and hereby ask the court to impose sanctions against Robert
J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for plaintiff/appellant, Ralph Ostler, Court of Appeals #8800228 CA, for all pleadings filed after the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
decision. Such sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56
(1989).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. A jury found for defendants and an appeal was taken. There is no dispute that
plaintiff had the right to pursue the appeal. Defendants do not assert that the initial appeal was
not made in good faith, although later filings described herein cast some doubt on such good
faith.
2. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court on
September 8, 1989. (Exhibit A, Attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof).
3. Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the Appeal on September
21, 1989. Attached to the Petition for Reconsideration was the affidavit of Patricia Hanna
(Exhibit B, attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. The Court of Appeals denied
the Petition for Reconsideration on October 18, 1989.
4. Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 15, 1989. See
Exhibit D, attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
5. Seven days later, Mr. DeBry filed a Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
See Exhibit E attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
6. Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the Substitute Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on January 15, 1990. See Exhibit F attached hereto and by reference made a part
hereof.

7. Mr. DeBry filed a Reply to Brief in Opposition to Substitute Petition for Writ

of Certiorari on January 25, 1990 (incorrectly denominated Brief in Opposition to Substitute
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). See Exhibit G ( attached hereto and by reference made a part
hereof.
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8. Included in the Petition and Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari was the
same affidavit of Patricia Hanna, Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Utah, which had been attached to the Peition for Rehearing (Exhibit B). The thesis of this
affidavit was that the Opinion of the Court of Appeals "reflects a breakdown in the decision
making process". See paragraph 6, page 2 of the affidavit. Ms. Hanna also said that the
Opinion was the equivalent of "failing graduate work". See paragraph 6, page 2 of affidavit.
9.

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the above-mentioned affidavit and

presented oral argument to do so before the Utah Supreme Court on February 5, 1990. (See
Exhibit H, Motion to Strike the Affiavit of Patricia Hanna, attached hereto and by reference
made a part hereof.
10. The Utah Supreme Court granted the Motion to Strike the affidavit of Patricia
Hanna on February 5, 1990. See Exhibit I attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion to Strike the
Affidavit.
11. The Utah Supreme court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on March
6, 1990. See Exhibit K attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
12. Defendants/respondents apply to the Court to impose sanctions on Mr.
DeBry, pursuant Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-37-56(1989) of attorneys fees and costs and any
additional amount the Court finds appropriate and within its discretion to impose.
13. Defendants, through counsel, filed a Motion to Impose Sanctions with the
Trial Court on January 4, 1991.
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14. On February 21, 1991, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen issued an Order indicating that such
sanctions should be addressed to this court and allowing defendants/respondents to file a Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 33 Motion to Impose Sanctions (Order of the Honorable
Cullen Christensen, dated February 21, 1991, is attached hereto as Exhibit L).

POINT I
Sanctions are appropriate pursuant to
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Generally, attorney's fees may be recovered in Utah if provided for by statute
or contract. Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover,
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, attorney and/or double costs are
awarded in cases of frivolous appeals.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in relevant part, "if the
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award . . . single or double costs. . . and/or reasonable attorneys fees to the
prevailing party." Sanctions for frivolous appeals have only been applied in egregious cases,
such as when an appeal was filed in order to "take unconscionable advantage" of the other party
and therefore failing to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with no
reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment." (emphasis

4

added) Maughan, 770 P.2d at 162. See also, Porco v. Porco. 759 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (Appeal filed to harass defendant).
Moreover, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate when a pleading or motion
is filed without reasonable inquiry as to whether it is "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law," and is brought for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation." (emphasis added) See, Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor. 770 P.2d at 171, 172 (Utah App. 1989).
The standard to be employed under Rule 11 is an objective one: did the attorney
act reasonable under the circumstances. See, Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163 (Utah
App. 1989). The Court said in Taylor that this objective standard "allows sanctions to be
imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith'
standard." Id. at 170. The Court also stated that whether specific conduct violates Rule 11 is
a question of law. If this rule is violated, based on an objective standard, it is mandatory to
impose sanctions. It is within the Court's discretion to tailor the sanction to the circumstance
but usually is based on costs and attorneys fees.
An examination of the affidavit of Patricia Hanna clearly demonstrates that it is
nothing more than a criticism of the court and judges of the court "with no reasonable likelihood
of success."
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion
to Strike the affidavit before the Supreme Court. On page 8, line 6, Justice Stewart suggests
that the affidavit "borders on contempt." Justice Durham states, beginning line 25 of page 8:

6

"It boggles the mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on the inherent logic of an
appellate court."
The affidavit was not part of the record on appeal and was an attempted criticism
of the thought processes of the appellate panel to pursuade them, first, to reconsider the appeal
and, secondly, to provide that as a basis for the requested Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Counsel for the appellant in arguing the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia
Hanna characterized it as a "once in a lifetime motion". Exhibit J, page 7, lines 14-17. Justice
Durham readily saw that allowing an affidavit outside the record as a basis for a Petition for
Certiorari could be abused and would be a whole new concept in an attack on a lost appeal
(Transcript Exhibit J, page 8, lines 170-25). Justice Durham also characterized this particular
affidavit as a "specific critique and attack upon the work of an appellate court". Transcript
Exhibit J. page 9, lines 20 and 21.
There can be little doubt that the Justices of the Supreme Court hearing this
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna were exercised at the audacity of plaintiffs
counsel in submitting such an attack on the court as a basis for a Writ of Certiorari. Such
recognition by plaintiffs counsel was shown by his own statement on page 10 of the transcript,
Exhibit J. wherein Mr. DeBry said "Now I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's question,
because you're looking at me very sternly, when I say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and
you say it borders on contempt".
While counsel tried to urge the court that it was a matter of the gravest concern,
an examination of the affidavit itself shows how direct the attack was on the logic and analysis

6

process of the Court of Appeals. Referring the court directly to the parts of the affidavit, Page
2, paragraph 6:
In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have
given it a grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have
counted as failing work.
The last sentence of paragraph 7:
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis
which they deserved and required.
The first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 3:
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the
interrelated nature of the arguments in the appeal; . . .
The third sentence of the last paragraph on page 3:
Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no appreciation of
the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a bearing on
more than one aspect of the case.
The last sentence of the top paragraph on page 4:
I can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a
serious breakdown in the present case.
The middle of the first paragraph on page 4:
. . . indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' decision to
reject the appeal fails to take account of or to address the points
raised by Ostler's counsel.

7

The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6:
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic
of Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the
Court of Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal.
The next to the last sentence on page 9:
The Court of Appeals' decision shows absolutely no appreciation
of this fact, and in no sense addresses it.

The last sentence on page 11:
. . . this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's case
it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to
comprehend the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did
to Ostler's case.
The last sentence under point 1 on page 12:
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision that Ostler does not
prove a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to
me to show a failure to read the briefs carefully.
The last sentence on age 13:
The Court of Appeals . . . says that taken in context, the remark
caused no harm. This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects
the Court of Appeal's failure to take the misstatement and its
correction in context, viz. the larger context of the legal issues
involved in the jury's deliberations and the fact that their
instructions on these matters were unclear and confusing.
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 15:
Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal.
The first sentence in the first paragraph on page 17:
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point.
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The first sentence on page 20:
The Court of Appeal's grounds for their decision to reject the
appeal are confusing.
The last sentence in the second paragraph on page 20:
In short, the entire section on p. 10 stands as an enigma in the
Court of Appeals' reasoning.
The conclusion of the affiant, Ms. Hanna shows the thrust of the affidavit:
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude
that in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take
into account many important aspects of the arguments made in the
appeal; at several points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is
beside the point and fails to address the arguments made in the
appeal. Due to time pressures or misunderstandings, a single
individual might fail to grasp the points at issue and the structure
of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems highly unlikely that
three individuals could all have made the same errors in analysis.
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis
which they deserved and required.
In the present case, the pleadings filed by Mr. DeBry after the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court jury verdict are predicated upon an affidavit outside the record which is
an attack on the fundamental process of judicial review and is a challenge to the integrity of the
judges who sat in review of the trial court. As such, it created a "needless increase in the cost
of litigation."
Every motion filed by Mr. DeBry after the appellate decision came down was
denied. The affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached as Exhibit B, was improperly submitted to the
Court and had no basis for admittance under existing law.

9

Appellant's counsel did not present any valid argument why the law should be
extended to allow the filing of such a disparaging affidavit. Certiorari was denied Mr. DeBry
after a Petition and a Substitute Petition to the Utah Supreme Court. Clearly, after the Court
of Appeals affirmed, the subsequent pleadings were "without merit."

Utah Courts have

interpreted "without merit" to mean an appeal "without a reasonable legal or factual basis."
O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 309, (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Moreover, subjective good faith is not a defense to Rule 11 or Rule 33 sanctions.
Even if pleadings are filed in good faith, if they are not well-grounded in fact, nor warranted
by existing law or create needless litigation, a sanction is mandatory under Rule 11. Burkhart
v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1986); Tavlor. Supra.
Mr. DeBry, not his client Ralph Ostler, should be sanctioned. "If there is a
frivolous appeal and the fault lies with the attorney, that is where the sanction will lie." Braley
v. Campbell. 832 F.2d 1504, 1442 (10th Cir. 1984), Cert, denied 471 U.S. 1014 (1985).
POINi il
Sanctions are Appropriate Pursuant to I'tab ( \n\v \tnt
§78-27-56(1989)
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56(1989), a trial court "may award
reasonable attorney's fees" if the court finds that the action or defense is without merit and "not
brought or asserted in good faith." Therefore, it is within the court's discretion to award
attorneys fees and costs. The trial court has the authority to award to the defendant "costs and
fees on appeal as it deems appropriate." Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).

10

This statute is the exception to the American Rule for attorney's fees:
1) In civil actions, the courts shall award reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit or not brought or asserted
in good faith, except under subsection 2.
2) The court, in its discretion, may award fees or a limited fee
against a party under subsection 12, but only if the court:
a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in
the action before the court; or
b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of subsection 1.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1989).
In order to recover fees under § 78-27-56, the court "must make findings that 1)
the claim or claims were "without merit", and 2) the party's conduct was lacking in good faith".
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 966 (Utah App. 1989).
In Ostlber v. Albina Transfer Co.. Appellate #880-0228-CA, the answer to every
pleading filed after the appellate decision was in keeping with the trial court's and Court of
Appeal's decision. Mr. DeBry filed Petitions for Certiorari that were supported by an affidavit
he himself saw as a "once-in-a-lifetime shot." See Exhibit J. page 7, line 23. The Court stated
it shouldn't even happen "once-in-a-lifetime."
The affidavit of defendant's counsel sets forth the costs & attorney's fees incurred
for services rendered after the decision in favor of the defendants by the Utah Court of Appeals
as a result of the meritless and improper filing by plaintiffs counsel. Post-appeal fees and costs
equal $3,646.28, plus the research and preparation and hearing of this motion in the amount of
$1348.88 and $2SS 00 foi preparation for and oral argument, if argument is so required.

11

Defendant's counsel attests that these fees are reasonable. (Affidavit ol M. Dayle Jeffs, attached
hereto as Exhibit M and by reference made a part hereof).
Defendants hereby pray that the Court find Mr. DeBry's post-appeal pleadings
without merit and thus warranting an award to defendants of reasonable attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION
Sanctions should be imposed on Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for
plaintiff/appellant Ralph Ostler. Sanctions are proper pursuant to Rule 11, as Mr. DeBry created
needless litigation, Rule 33 of the Utah Rules ot Appellate Proceduie and Rule I 1 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1989) as Mr. DeBry's
pleadings were without merit and were not brought in good faith as to their merits based on the
objective standard.

Defendants hereby pray for sanctions in the amount of $5,249.28 as

reasonable attorneys fees and costs, and any additional amount the Court deems appropriate.
Dated and signed this

day of April, 1991.
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M. Dayle Jeffs, #G1655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

IN THF UTAH COURT (>I APPEALS

RALPH OSTLER,
Plaintiff,

j
j

v.

|

ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

j

Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE

Court of Appeals No.:
j
j

I hereby certify that the original and 4 copies of Petition for Sanctions against
Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as Counsel for Ralph Ostler was hand delivered to the Clerk of
the Court, Utah Court of Appeals and a copy to the below named party by hand delivery, this
date, May 3, 1991, to the following address:
Robert J. DeBry
DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Murray, Utah 84107

Exhibit N
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH COURT OF .APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER,
Appellant,

MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE
AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION;
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

vs,
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

rasp No: 8 8 ()?,.'8 ~(?A

Respondents.
Appellant, Ralph Ostler, respectfully moves this court to
recall the mandate and to correct its p n o i

-.-•••>>.

u^. : >

(781 P.2d 4 4 5 ) .
Appellant further moves to consolidate this motion with
the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J. DeBry in his Capacity
as Counsel for Plaintiff Ralph Ostler (Case No. 910246-CA) filed on
May 3, 1991.
DATED this

day of June, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Appellant

ROBERT J .

i

k giimr % j # * * * * H *»' " * * , :

fc- jr

*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that J true and correct copy of the
foreqoifiq MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed,
postage prepaid, this ^ - 2 /

day oi June, 1991, to the following:

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

0566-157\jn
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (8 01) 2 62-8915
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE
AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION;
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

RALPH OSTLER,
Appe1 lant ,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

Case No: 880228-CA

Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Recalling
procedure.

There s-

* " e

mandate

is

an

unusual

and

drastic

two aspects to any such motion: first, can

the court recan * * ^indate; and second, should the court recall
the mandate.
In this memorandum, appellant w i n -i .
issue (i.e

can ti le coin t

. . . the mandate).

*

*

The latter issue

(i.e., should the court recall the mandate) is briefed more fully
in the Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Sanctions Against
Robert J. DeBrv in his Capacity as Counsel for Plaintiff Ralph
Ostler Case No. 91024 6-CA which is incorporated hereat.1

Appellant has moved to consolidate Case No. S^^^^^d^-Gase
No. 9102 4 6 on the grounds that the issues in thCli^^-fe:t#ers
overlap,

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT HAS POWER TO RECALL THE MANDATE
Appe 11 at«.: v/uur t. s havc i nherettt ,Jut hor 11y I" -1 reca I I the
mandate to prevent injustice. Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC. 463
F.2d 268 (CA DC 1971) . The doctrine is equally applicable in state
appellate courts,
tne case

A careful explanation of the doctrine is found

- Lindus v. Northern Insurance Co, of New York, 438

The propriety of recalling a mandate once
it has issued has caused considerable confusion among the various courts. See e.g.,
Slappy v Georgia Power Co., 109 Ga.App. 850,
137 S.E.2d 537; Southwestern Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623, 241 P.2d 985. We
believe, however, that the proper criterion to
be considered in determining whether to recall
a mandate was succinctly expressed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in United
States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99, 77
S.Ct. 652, 653, 1 L«Ed.2d 683, where it is
stated:
"* * * the interest in finality of litigation must yield where the interests of
justice would make unfair the strict
application of our rules,"
Faced with the same problem that we now have
before us the United States Supreme Court in
Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
382 U.S. 25, 86 S.Ct. 153, 15 L.Ed.2d 21, in
order to prevent injustice, granted a second
petition for rehearing three years after the
mandate has issued. See also Cahill v. New
York, N.H.& H.R. Co., 351 U.S. 183, 76 S.Ct.
758, 100 L.Ed. 1075; Chapman v. St. Stephens
Protestant Episcopal Church, 105 Fla. 683, 136
So. 238, 138 So. 630, 139 So. 188, 145 So.
757, 84 A.L.R. 566.
2

A decision to recall a mandate must of
necessity include a balancing of competing
interests*
Where the interests of justice
outweigh the interest in bringing litigation
to an end the court should recall the mandate.
See also: Boudar v. E.G. & G,, Inc.. 742 P.2d 491, 493 (N.M. 1987)
(••Our decisions must be final because they are rightf and not right
because they are f i na1. . . .,f

dazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-

Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) ("

where enforcement of

a judgment is 'manifestly unconscionabl e1. . . they have wielded
tne power |io recall the mandate] without hesitation,"); Coleman v.
Turpen, 827 F.2d 667, 671 (10th Cir. 1987) (». . . an appellate
court has powe

lme a mandate . ,

to prevent

an injustice. . . ,f)

DATED this

day of June, 1991.
ROBERT 3. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney fQB Appellant

By:

ICfi;Ur /

nL
^

ROBERT J. DEBRY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy o£ the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE AND
TO CORRECT THE OPINION; AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

(Ostler v.

Albina, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this <^A

day of

June, 1991, to the Iollowing:
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84 603

w/rnsA
0566-158\jn
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Exhibit 0

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RALPH OSTLER
AFFIDAVIT OF
CARL S. HAWKINS

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER

Case No. 910246-CA

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

)
) ss.
)

My name is Carl S. Hawkins.
under oath:

I make the following statements

1. I am a Professor of Law and former Dean of the J. Reuben
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I have taught Torts
for the last eighteen years at B.Y.U. and for sixteen years before
that at the University of Michigan Law School. I am a co-author of
three editions of nationally-published casebooks on Torts and
Advanced Torts, and I have published articles on Torts in several
professional journals. I am a member of the bar of the District of
Columbia, and of the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Utah
(inactive status).
2. At the request of Robert J. DeBry, I have read the opinion
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the above case, and I have also
read the briefs of the parties in order to form an opinion as to
the nature of the Torts issues involved in this case as it stood
when Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing with the Court of
Appeals.

3. This case involves, among other issues, fundamental
questions of negligence theory, including the question of whether
the scope of liability for violation of a particular legal rule
should be determined by the court as a matter of legal policy, or
whether that issue should be given to the jury, as if it were an
issue of fact, under a "proximate cause" instruction. The Fourth
District Court in this case did the latter. The opinion of the
Court of Appeals obscures this basic legal question as to the scope
of liability by addressing it in terms of whether there was
intrinsic error in the trial court's instruction to the jury on
independent, intervening cause (Instruction No. 27).
4. There is substantial judicial and scholarly authority which
holds that, before factual issues of causation are given to the
jury in negligence cases, the court must determine as a matter of
law whether the defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to the
plaintiff, and whether the particular rule which defendant
allegedly violated was meant to guard against the particular risk
of injury that plaintiff incurred. See, for example, DfAmbra v.
United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Hill v. Lundin &
Associates, Inc., 256 So.2d 620 (La. 1972); Laird v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972); Stoneburner v. Greyhound
Corp., 375 P.2d 812 (Or. 1962) concurring opinion of Goodwin, J.;
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk versus Proximate Cause, and the
Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah
L.Rev. 1; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
Mich. L.Rev. 543 (1962) ; Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law,
61 Col. L.Rev. 1401 (1961).
Under this analytical method, the
issues in this case could be set forth in the following way:
(1) Does the driver of a truck and semitrailer on an
Interstate highway owe a duty of reasonable care to other
persons using the highway?
(2) If so, does that duty require compliance with Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 41-6-103, which prohibits the stopping of a vehicle

on a controlled access highway —

that is, was this statutory

provision meant to guard against the risk of injury to a
passenger in another vehicle that inadvertently ran into the
rear of the parked vehicle?
(3) Did defendant violate that duty?
(4)

Was

there

a

substantial

causal

connection

between

defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury?
(5) What damages resulted from plaintiff's injury and what
proportion thereof was attributable to defendant's
comparative negligence?
5. Under this analytical method, questions (1) and (2) would
be

questions

defendant's

of

law

legal

for

duty

the

and

court

whether

in

deciding

the

rule

scope

of

invoked

by

the

plaintiff

provides protection

occurred.

This approach would not necessarily result in a decision

in favor of the plaintiff.

against the kind

the
of

injury

that

Even though the court would undoubtedly

answer question (1) in the affirmative, it could conceivably make
a negative decision on question (2), taking responsibility for a
clear legal decision that the statutory rule against stopping on a
contr2olled access highway was not meant to protect passengers in
another vehicle that ran into the rear of the parked truck.

But

when the issue is put in this way, the court might very well decide
that the duty should cover such risks, in order to deter such
collisions.

Unless

the

following vehicle

is

intentionally

or

recklessly driven into the parked vehicle, the most effective way
to reduce the incidence of such rear-end shoulder collisions would
be to deter conscious decisions to park on the shoulder rather than
trying to control the wider range of variables, both mechanical and
human, that may cause other vehicles to drift inadvertently onto
the shoulder.
effect,

asked

Plaintiff's Petition
for such

a

legal

for Rehearing

determination

Restatement of Torts (Second), Sections 442-447.

by

(pp.6-7), in
reference

to

6. Question (3), the breach of duty or negligence issue, would
usually be a fact issue for the jury, but in this case it was
undisputed that defendant trucker had violated the statutory
provision that prohibits stopping on the controlled access highway•
Once this provision is construed as intended to prevent this kind
of rear-end collision, it follows that defendant's violation of the
statute was negligence, as a matter of law. Restatement of Torts
(Second), Section 286.
The trial judge recognized this by
directing a verdict against defendant on the negligence issue.
7. Question (4), as to the causal connection between
defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, might also be a fact
issue for the jury, but in this case it was undisputed that
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the collision with the
semitrailer unit that defendant had parked in the "recovery lane"
of the highway. Once the court has decided that the statutory rule
which defendant violated was meant to guard against this kind of
injury, the jury should not be invited to nullify that legal
determination by importing questions of "proximate cause" and
"intervening cause" into a causal relation instruction, when, in
fact, the causal connection between defendant's negligent conduct
and plaintiff's injury was beyond dispute. Thus, by this line of
analysis, the trial court should have directed a verdict for
plaintiff on the issue of causation as well as on the issue of
defendant's negligence, as argued in Appellant's Substitute Brief,
pp. 59-65.
The only issues left for jury submission would be
disputed factual questions as to plaintiffs' damages and the
proportionate amount attributable to the truck driver's comparative
negligence.
8. The suggestion, that the jury could have found that Stephen
Ostler's inattentiveness "became the sole proximate cause of the
collision" (781 P. 2d at 451), would have no place under the
analytical approach outlined above. It is undisputed that the
physical obstacle against which plaintiff's vehicle collided was
placed where it was by defendant's negligent conduct. The notion

that something else could be the "sole proximate cause" may be
understood only in the context of an approach that asks the jury to
decide, under the name of "proximate cause," the ultimate policy
question as to the scope of legal liability for violation of the
statute, even though defendant's negligent conduct was a cause of
plaintiff's injury.
9. For the purpose of the pending Petition For Sanctions, I
assume it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court should
have determined the scope of liability as suggested above, instead
of giving that issue to the jury under an "intervening cause"
instruction, nor whether the case would have been decided
differently if it had. It should only be necessary to determine
whether there was arguable merit in these Tort issues that
Plaintiff's lawyer was trying to raise by his Petition For
Rehearing and whether such issues were raised by appropriate means.
In my opinion, this case did raise fundamental questions of Tort
law which the Petition For Rehearing was trying to bring to the
Court of Appeals' attention.
10. I am familiar with the affidavit by Samuel D. Thurman in
which he gives his opinion (as an expert on legal ethics) ,
including the following statement:
"Even if Dr. Hanna's affidavit is deemed more critical than
those customarily seen in legal proceedings, Mr. DeBry had an
affirmative duty to zealously pursue his client's objectives
Especially in a Petition for Rehearing, where the chances
of success are usually remote, the attorney should be at
liberty to utilize more imaginative procedures and advance
more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration."
Mr. DeBry may have felt it necessary to resort to the "imaginative
procedure" of filing Dr. Hanna's affidavit with his Petition for
Reconsideration, because of the way in which the Court of Appeals'
opinion (781 P.2d at 450-451) had obscured the basic scope of

liability issues which he had tried to raise on appeal. In my
opinion, Dr. Hanna's criticism of the Court's analytical method
tries to address, in non-legal terms, issues that would be
recognized by respected legal authorities as serious questions of
Tort law implicated in the Court's decision.

Carl S. Hawkins

Subscribed and sworn to before me the

M

day of J u n e , 1991,

Notary P u b l i c
Residing i n : ^frfr I**My commission e x p i r e s
JASON LAWRENCE
4320 S « A 700 East «3
Salt lake City. Utah 84107

COMM. EXP. 8-6-94
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

JEFFS & JEFFS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST ROBERT J.
DEBRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, RALPH
OSTLER

RALPH OSTLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

Case No: 910246-CA
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
My name is Michael Goldsmith.

I give the following

testimony under oath:
Introduction
1.

I am a professor of law at the J. Rueben Clark Law

School, Brigham Young University.
2.

At the request of Robert J. DeBry, I have reviewed

various materials concerning the motion for sanctions presently
pending before this court.
3.

My

opinion, based

both

on these materials and

governing legal principles, is that the motion for sanctions is
unwarranted.

4.

For the convenience of the court, this affidavit is

organized into six parts. Part I submits for your consideration my
qualifications as an expert witness. Part II explains my approach
to the issues raised by this case. Part III reviews admissibility
principles governing expert testimony.

Part IV considers the

exclusion of expert testimony on foreseeability.

Part V discusses

the

so-called

exclusion

phenomenom."

of

expert

testimony

on

the

"moth

Finally, Part VI addresses whether sanctions are

warranted in this case.
I
General Qualifications
5.

I have taught evidence at B.Y.U. since 1985. Before

then, I taught evidence at Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville,
Tennessee.
6.

In 1984, I co-authored with Irving Younger a case-

book entitled Principles of Evidence. The book has been adopted by
numerous professors at other schools, and will soon be published in
its second edition.
7.

I have lectured on evidence law to students and

practitioners throughout the country.
8.

Because evidence law interfaces with civil litiga-

tion generally,

I am also familiar with Rule

11 principles.

Indeed, I have published on this subject, and called for more
aggressive application of sanctions to curtail abusive litigation.
2

See Goldsmith

& Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations

in

Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 55, 92-97 (1986); Goldsmith, Civil
RICO Reform: The Basis For Compromise, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 827, 881-82
(1987).

Within the context of the general debate over civil RICO

reform, I have also testified about this subject before the United
States Congress. RICO Reform, Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. Part 2, Serial 140, at 1261
(1986).
9.

My curriculum vita is attached as exhibit 1.
II
Analytical Approach

10.

I have reviewed the following materials in connec-

tion with this case: a) all appellate briefs submitted by counsel
through conclusion of the appellate process; b) Professor Hannafs
affidavit; c) the motion for sanctions and accompanying memorandum;
d) pertinent portions of the record; e) the opinion rendered by the
Court of Appeals; and f) the affidavits submitted by Dean Sam
Thurmond and Dean Carl Hawkins.
11.

Given the numerous evidentiary issues raised on

appeal, I have confined my analysis to those matters deemed most
critical to the outcome of the case. Therefore, I did not consider
every evidentiary point of conflict.

3

12 .

Furthermore, although objectively reasonable grounds

support numerous issues raised in the petition for reconsideration,
Mr. DeBry has requested that I confine my analysis to those
evidentiary issues that clearly resulted in error by the Court of
Appeals.
13.

Before presenting this analysis, I wish to state

that my remarks reflect neither disrespect for the Court nor an
intent to embarrass any of its members.1

If anything, I find the

motion for sanctions, filed more than a year after conclusion of
the

case,

exceedingly

peculiar.

The

thrust

of

the

apparently seeks to protect this Court from criticism.

motion

The Utah

Court of Appeals, however, is a well respected institution, and
hardly needs motions of this kind to protect its reputation.
14.

Furthermore, I undertook my analysis with the belief

that outstanding jurists both welcome constructive criticism and,
not

infrequently,

take

action

to

rectify

previous mistakes.

Justice Jackson, for example, once observed:
But if I have agreed to any prior decision which
forecloses what now seems to be a sensible construction
of this Act, I must frankly admit that I was unaware of
it. . . . Under these circumstances, except for any
personal humiliation involved in admitting that I do not
always understand the opinions of this Court, I see no

]

Mr. Debry also assures me that he will file a motion to seal
the affidavits submitted by the experts supporting his position.
4

reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I
was unconsciously wrong yesterday.2
15.

Keeping within the spirit of Justice

Jackson's

remarks, I believe that the published opinion committed serious
error in at least two critical respects: a) the exclusion of expert
testimony

concerning

the foreseeability

of collisions

in the

emergency lane; and b) the exclusion of expert testimony concerning
the so-called "moth phenomenon."

To appreciate the basis for my

conclusion, the evidentiary principles governing expert testimony
must be briefly reviewed.
Ill
Admissibility Principles Governing Expert Testimony
16.

The Rules of Evidence modify common law doctrine by

liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony.

Before the

enactment of Rule 702, "courts frequently asserted that there was
no need

for

expert

testimony

unless the

issue to which the

Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948)
(Jackson, J.). On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated:
Precedent, however, is nor lacking for ways by which
a judge may recede from a prior opinion that has proven
untenable . . . .
Bur an escape less self-depreciating
was taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a
barrister's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed that a man of
my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an
opinion." If there are other ways of gracefully and good
naturedly surrendering former views to a better
considered position, I invoke them all.
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J.,).
5

testimony would be directed is Nnot within the common knowledge of
the average layman.fM

3 Weinsteinfs Evidence sec. 702[02], at 702-

9 (1990). This standard no longer governs. As Weinstein observes:
Must a court exclude expert testimony if the subject
is within the comprehension of the average juror? Such
a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness
expressed in Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly that
there is a bright line separating issues within the
comprehension of jurors from those that are not.
Secondly, even when jurors are well equipped to make
judgments on the basis of their common knowledge and
experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to
bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful.
Id. at 702-15 (emphasis added); see D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 3
Federal Evidence sec. 380, at 633 (1979).
17.

Given

this

liberalized

standard,

"doubts

about

whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be
resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors
such as time or surprise favoring exclusion."
Evidence sec. 702 [02], at 702-30.

3 Weinstein!s

This approach is warranted

because "[t]he jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to
ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations."
18.

Id.

The trial judge's ruling, however, ordinarily is

reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, and is rarely
disturbed on appeal.

Ici. at 702-22 & 26. The abuse of discretion

standard, however, does not apply if the trial court "rests its
decision on a misstatement of law." Roe v. Deere and Co. , 855 F.2d
151, 155 (3rd Cir. 1988). Under such circumstances, the ruling must
be examined for "legal error."

Id.
6

19.

Based on these principles, I believe that the trial

judge clearly abused his discretion in declining to admit expert
testimony concerning the foreseeability of a collision in the
emergency lane.

In addition, the trial judge's decision excluding

expert testimony on the "moth phenomenon11 was both an abuse of
discretion and based on an incorrect legal standard. These rulings
are discussed separately below.
IV
The Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Foreseeability
20.

To establish proximate cause and foreseeability,

Appellant sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the
following factors: a) the purpose of the emergency lane; b) the
fact that road designers recognize that vehicles will sometimes
drive into the emergency lane; c) that emergency lanes are designed
to provide a recovery zone for errant vehicles; and d) that truck
drivers are trained to know that errant vehicles may drive into an
emergency lane, and, thus, are instructed not to park in such
lanes.
21.

The trial court rejected this evidence because it

would not be "helpful" to the jury. Transcript, at 245, 254, & 293.
22.

In my judgment, the excluded evidence would have

been very helpful to the jury.

For example, most people probably

assume that emergency lanes are intended to provide an area to make
emergency repairs or to leave a car temporarily pending repairs.
7

Few of us know that such lanes are also designed to provide a
recovery zone for errant vehicles, much less that truckers receive
specific training on the need to keep such lanes open.
testimony

ordinarily

would

be necessary

to make

Expert

this point.

Indeed, I believe that such testimony would have been admissible
under the more stringent pre-Rules "necessity" standard applied by
many courts.
23.

The Court of Appeals, however, never addressed the

issue of helpfulness.

The opinion states that some of this

evidence pertained only to the question of negligence.

As the

trial judge had directed a verdict on the negligence issue, the
Court of Appeals concluded that such evidence was properly rejected
as irrelevant.
24.

117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.
As to the evidence bearing on foreseeability, the

Court of Appeals merely noted that the trial judge had rejected
this testimony because it "would not be particularly helpful to the
jury.

The [trial] court believed that the jury was as capable as

the expert to make the determination of foreseeability."

Id.

Rather than review this issue, however, the Court of Appeals
rejected the appeal because "plaintiff has failed to carry his
burden of showing that the claimed error was substantial and
prejudicial."
25.

Id.
By taking this approach, the Court of Appeals made

two fundamental mistakes.

First, the Court failed to recognize
8

that all of this evidence pertained to foreseeability.

The fact

that such evidence also bore upon negligence did not preclude its
relevance to foreseeability, which constitutes a separate element
of a tort claim.
N.E.2d

832, 834

See, e.g. , Sheehan v. City of New York, 354
(N.Y. 1976) ("negligence and proximate cause

frequently overlap in the proof and theory which support each of
them"); c£. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)
("proof used to establish . . . separate elements may in particular
cases coalesce").
26.

Second, the Court failed to recognize that excluding

this evidence was inherently prejudicial because it prevented
appellant from presenting the only available evidence on a critical
element of its case.

"[W]hen the erroneously excluded evidence

would have been the only or primary evidence in support of . . . a
claim
Weinstein's

, the error is generally found prejudicial."
Evidence

extensive authority).

sec. 103[06],

at

103-70

(1990)

1

(citing

See also Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. ,

722 F.2d 1134, 1140 (3d Cir. 1983) (expert testimony "crucial;"
"[w]ithout it, plaintiffs could not establish causation.") ; Shad v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986)
(exclusion

of

expert

testimony

prejudicial,

as

plaintiffs

"prevented . . . from presenting their case to a jury") ; Linkstrom
v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269, 271-272 (3d Cir. 1989) (exclusion
of expert testimony on causation deemed prejudicial).
9

27.

Under such circumstances, there is a "reasonable

likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
Slusher v. Osoital by Ospital. 777 P.2d

437, 444

(Utah 1989)

(setting forth the general standard) .3 Indeed, it makes no sense
to reject evidence as unhelpful to the jury and then to deem the
exclusion non-prejudicial when the jury returns a verdict directly
at odds with the proffered evidence.
V
The Exclusion of Expert Testimony on the Moth Phenomenon
28.

Appellant sought to introduce evidence of the so-

called "moth phenomenon" to explain how a drowsy driver could have
been lured by flashing taillights to crash into appellees1 truck.
Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 2-3.

The trial rejected this

Significantly, the "reasonable likelihood" standard does not
require proof of a probability. State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913, 920
(Utah 1987) ("[Tjhoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in
the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of
the 'more probable than not1 portion of the spectrum").
In the present case, the significance of the error was
compounded by the following improper statement, made by defense
counsel, during closing argument:
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan Wheeler
expected to foresee that at that precise time if, as Mr.
Debry said, one in a billon chances that it would happen
right at that particular time—
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 17. The Court of Appeals did not view this
remark as prejudicial, within the total context, because of the
trial judge's neutral admonishment to the jury. Id. The excluded
expert testimony, however, would have explained to the jury why
such accidents are foreseeable generally and why truckers, in
particular, know to expect them.
10

evidence as unhelpful, lacking factual foundation, and prejudicial.
117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
29.

The Court of Appeals did not address separately the

question of helpfulness under Rule 702.

Instead, the opinion

implies that the trial judge merged this issue into his analysis of
foundation and prejudice. Id. According to the opinion, the trial
judge reasoned that absent foundation, such testimony would be
unhelpful

and

prejudicial.

Id[.

The Court of Appeals then

sustained the trial judge's ruling simply by finding no abuse of
discretion under Rule 403. Id.
30.

The trial court, however, did not merge his analysis

of helpfulness and foundation.

Transcript, at 245, 254, & 293.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have treated these issues
separately.

As few jurors would be familiar with the "moth

phenomenon," such expert testimony would obviously help explain why
an awake drive would drive straight into the rear-end of a truck
that is flashing its taillights. Indeed, this testimony also would
have qualified under the pre-Rules "necessity" standard governing
expert: proof.

Thus, the trial court's rejection of this proof as

unhelpful constitutes an abuse of discretion.
31.

The

Court of Appeals' analysis

of the

factual

foundation supporting this testimony is also problematic.
Court stated:
[T]he theory is premised on the fact that a driver must
be awake in order to be so "lured." Plaintiff's own
11

The

expert admitted that there was no conclusive way to
determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior
to the accident.
Nor does the theory necessarily
establish causation because plaintiff's expert conceded
there was no evidence of the factors triggering the moth
phenomenon.
Id. (emphasis added).
32.

This analysis commits two mistakes.

tiff was not required

to establish

First, plain-

Steven Ostler's

state of

consciousness "conclusive[ly]." As the relevance of the proffered
testimony was conditional upon proof of Ostler's consciousness, the
trial judge's preliminary factual determination was governed by
Rule 104(b). Under that provision, a proponent need only establish
a prima facie case with respect to the underlying fact at issue
(e.g. Ostler's state of consciousness). Rule 104(b) is designed to
protect against judges removing a matter from the jury's domain
whenever the court is not personally persuaded of the existence of

12

certain facts.4

In the present case, however, that is precisely

what occurred,
33,

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals mistakenly emphasized the

apparent concession by appellant's expert.

In so doing, the Court

overlooked the fact that appellant cited other portions of the
expertfs testimony supporting application of the moth phenomenon to
this case.
another

Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 4-5.

expert

also

testified

that

4

the

In addition,

foundational

factors

0f course, courts routinely preclude evidence from jury
consideration when making competency determinations under Rule
104(a). Thus, for example, witness competency is governed by Rule
104(a). But the question of witness competency remains distinct
from the relevance of his testimony, which is determined by Rule
104(b).
Though courts rarely mention Rule 104(b) in resolving factual
questions involving expert testimony, the approach outlined above
best reflects the theory underlying Rule 702: weaknesses in an
expert's position are to be developed on cross-examination. Cf.
Coleman v. De Minico, 730 F.2d 42, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1984)
(sustaining admissibility of expert testimony based on incomplete
factual record and noting that facts at issue "do not lend
themselves to precise quantification") ; Singer v. E.I du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, (8th Cir. 1978) (court rejected attack
on expert testimony as speculative; this "attack must be viewed in
light of the new Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert
testimony. . . . While an opinion still ^rises no higher than the
level of evidence and the logic upon which it is predicated, ' it is
now for the jury, with the assistance of vigorous crossexamination, to measure the worth of the opinion"); Hurst v. United
States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989) ("A trial court should
exclude expert testimony only if it is so fundamentally unsupported
that it cannot help the factfinder") ; Snvder v. Whitt'aker Corp. ,
839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) ("that these facts [supporting
expert testimony] were thin" could be attacked on crossexamination) ; United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, 578 F.2d 156,
159-160 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Rule 104(b) to expert testimony).

13

supporting this theory were present.
my judgment, the moth phenomenon

Transcript, at 278-281.

In

is supported by prima facie

evidence.
34.

Although the Court of Appeals may not have been made

fully aware of the complete factual record,5 the commission of
error is further indicated by the Court's affirmance of the trial
judge notwithstanding appellees having opened the door to such
proof by their own trial tactics.
35.
phenomenon,

After rejecting appellant's evidence on the moth
the

trial

judge

allowed

defendant-appellees

to

introduce extensive proof concerning the ability of an awake driver
to stop before hitting a truck parked in the emergency lane.
Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 19-20; Appellant's Reply Brief, at
10-12.

As this evidence necessarily assumed an awake driver, the

trial court should have permitted plaintiff to introduce the "moth
phenomenon" in rebuttal.
side of the picture.

Failure to do so gave the jury only one
Thus, prejudicial error occurred.

Cf.

Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1140-41 (3rd Cir.
1983) (in reversing for failure to admir expert testimony, Court
characterized evidence as "crucial" because of the need to rebut
Appellant's briefs summarized the evidence supporting Ostler's
awakeness, but did not specify that two experts testified to the
adequacy of the factual foundation.
The appellate opinion,
however, recognizes that testimony from two experts was excluded.
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15. In addition, appellant's references to
the record included pages containing "moth phenomenon" testimony
from both experts. Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 3-5.
14

opponent's proof); Murphy v. Magnolia Electric Power Association,
639 F.2d 232, 235
evidence

struck

(5th Cir. 1981) ("exclusion of

at the heart

of appellants1

[rebuttal]

case");

Fox v.

Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (exclusion of
expert testimony constitutes reversible error, "especially . . . in
light of the district court's subsequent admission" of expert
evidence to the contrary).
147-148 (1984).

See generally McCormick on Evidence

The Court of Appeals opinion, however, never even

addresses this issue.
VI
The Sanctions Issue
36.

Given the preceding analysis, I do not believe that

sanctions are warranted in this case.

Objectively reasonable

grounds supported Mr. DeBry's decision to ask the Court of Appeals
to reconsider its ruling.
37.

Admittedly, Mr. DeBry chose an unorthodox method to

petition the Court for reconsideration. However, given the failure
of his initial appeal, he obviously felt the need to do something
thar would get the Court's attention. The Hanna affidavit achieved
that function.

In addition, as a motion for rehearing ordinarily

does not afford counsel the opportunity to address numerous issues,
the Hanna affidavit gave Mr. DeBry a vehicle for presenting a wide
variety of evidentiary issues. These issues, in my judgment, were
not frivolous.
15

38.

Moreover, I agree with the views expressed by Dean

Thurmond in his affidavit.

Given both the seriousness of the

issues at hand and the extent of injuries incurred by his client,
it was not unprofessional for Mr. DeBry to take the extreme measure
of filing an extra-record affidavit.

Rule 11 and its various

counterparts were not intended to chill creative advocacy.
39.

For more than a decade, I have stressed to my

students the need to become "can do" lawyers.

Too many attorneys

approach the law in a wooden and mechanical manner. The quality of
legal representation —
suffer as a result.
Times

243

(1978)

and ultimately the quality of justice

—

See A. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His
(recounting

an

incident

in

which

Kennedy

criticized the "can't do" lawyers on his staff).
40.

Whether the Court agrees with his tactics, Mr.

DeBry1s submission of the Hanna affidavit is an effort at "can do"
lawyering.

Unorthodox methods do not always succeed but, so long

as they are supported by objectively reasonable grounds, sanctions
should not be imposed for such advocacy.
DATED this

£

day of July, 1991.

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL GOLDSMITH IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ROBERT J. DEBRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL

ilV <\c(
FOR PLAINTIFF, RALPH OSTLER (Ostler v. Albma, et al.) was-m4i-]red,
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M. Dayle Jeffs
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Albina Transfer Co., Inc.,
F & R Roe, Inc., and Stanley E.
Wheeler,

Noom*
the C o *
Uteh Court of Applets

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Petitioners,

Robert J. DeBry, In His
Capacity as Counsel for Ralph
Ostler,

Case No. 910246-CA
F I L E D
(August 5, 1991)

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Petitioners
Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Russon (Law and Motion).
Petitioners1 filed a petition in this court seeking
sanctions against Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as counsel
for Ralph Ostler in an earlier appeal. That appeal culminated
in the opinion reported at 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989), cert
denied, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 1990). Respondent Robert
J. DeBry filed a response to the petition and the following
motions:
Motion To Recall The Mandate and To
Correct The Opinion; and Motion To
Consolidate
Motion To Seal The Record
1. Petitioners used the caption (I-MH t-jie original appeal,
filed by Ralph Ostler, as the caption Cor then pleadings.
That appeal was culminated over a year before the present
petition was filed. The petition is, accordingly, considered
as an original proceeding filed in this court and the caption
has been adjusted to reflect that fact.

3.

Motion To File Supplemental Affidavit In
Support of Memorandum In Opposition To
Petition For Sanctions Against Robert J.
DeBry As Counsel For Plaintiff Ralph
Ostler

This court's initial inquiry must be whether there is a
basis for jurisdiction to determine the petition for
sanctions. The appellate process, including action on the
petition for writ of certiorari, has been concluded for over a
year. Accordingly, we consider the petition as an original
proceeding in this court. The petition does not contain a
jurisdictional statement and purportedly relies upon Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1991
Supp.) as the basis for the claim. While those provisions
pertain to the substantive claim, they do not state a basis for
jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(1990) describes this court's
subject matter jurisdiction. Subsection (1) describes this
court's original, as opposed to appellate, jurisdiction.^ The
petitioners have not cited any provision of section 78-2a-3(l)
as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the petition
for sanctions. Similarly, they have not conformed their
petition to the pleading requirements of Utah R. App. P. 19
pertaining to petitions for extraordinary writs, nor do they
characterize the petition as being filed under that rule.
The request for sanctions should have been made while
the appeal was pending.
Petitioners argue, however, that the
acts complained of occurred after this court's opinion issued,
in connection with the petition for rehearing and petition for
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) provides: "The Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all writs and process
necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and
decrees; or (b) in aid of its jurisdiction."
3. The procedure for seeking sanctions on appeal was clarified
in amendments to Utah R. App. P. 33, and Utah R. App. P. 40
that became effective in April of 1990. Rule 33(c)(1)
provides, in part, "A party moy * onno^+- finni^ies under this rule
only as part of the appellee's ip^tivn OJI summary disposition
under Rule 10, as part of the Rppellee"^ brief, or as part of a
party's response to a motion or other paper." Rule 40
incorporates the procedures of Rule 33 by reference.

writ of certiorari. This court did not call for a response to
the petition for rehearing. Petitioners, however, filed
responses to the petition for writ of certiorari on January 15
and January 25, 1990. Neither response included a request for
sanctions. Petitioners filed a motion to strike the Hanna
affidavit in February, 1990, and again did not request
sanctions, although they were successful in obtaining a ruling
by the Utah Supreme Court striking the affidavit. A petition
for sanctions was filed in the trial court ten months after the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. The claim for
sanctions was ripe, at the very least, during proceedings in
the Utah Supreme Court. Issuance of the remittitur ended this
court's jurisdiction to consider the claim for sanctions on
appea1.
We dismiss the petition for sanctions for lack of
jurisdiction. On the same basis, we deny the motions to recall
mandate, to consolidate the present petition with the original
appeal, and to supplement the response to the petition. We
further deny the motion to seal the records of this court in
the original appeal and in the proceedings on this petition.
ALL^CONCUR:

rn-

. Garff,

3U^^

Judge//
/ /

Leonard H. Russon, Judge
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RALPH OSTLER,
Petitioner,
vs.

]

HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,

'
)

Case No:

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Petitioner
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
M. DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys for Albina Transfer, Inc.
F & R Roe, Inc. and Stanley Wheeler
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Petitioner
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RALPH OSTLER,

)

Petitioner,

]

vs.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS1
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

;

HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,

|
)

Case No:

Respondents.

Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ
of Mandamus directing

the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise

jurisdiction over Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate filed with
the Court of Appeals.

1

Ostler has also filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in this case. The issues in both petitions overlap.
ii
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POINT III
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III.
ALL PERSONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE INTEREST MIGHT
BE SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED
Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R Roe, Inc., Stanley E.
Wheeler, and the Utah Court of Appeals including panel members
Judith M. Billings, Regnel W. Garff, Leonard H. Russon are persons
or entities whose interests might be affected by this petition.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The issue in this petition is whether a writ of mandamus
should issue to compel the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise its
jurisdiction to decide the merits of a Motion to Recall the Mandate
filed by Ostler.
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PETITION
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup
driven by Ostler's father and a truck parked
emergency lane.

in the highway

Ostler was a passenger in the pickup Ostler's

father was the driver.

Wheeler was the driver of the truck.

Wheeler's employers are Albina Transfer Co., Inc. and F & R Roe,
Inc.

(The defendants, below, are hereinafter collectively referred

to as "Wheeler".)

1

As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries. Ostler does
not walk.

He is painfully confined to a wheel chair.
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked

the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the
respondents on the issue of negligence.
trial.

However, Ostler lost at

The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct

was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

upheld

the

trial

court.

(Appendix 1 ) . Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing
with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) , and thereafter a petition
for certiorari with this Court.

(Appendix 3) .

petitions,

Affidavit

Ostler

filed

the

of

In support of the
Patricia

Hanna,

chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of
Utah ("Hanna affidavit") (Appendix 4 ) .
After both petitions were denied, Wheeler filed a Motion
for Sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals.

The motion alleged

that the petition for rehearing, the petition for certiorari and
the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and contrary to
U.R.C.P. 11.

(Appendix 5 ) .

Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for
Sanctions.

(Appendix 6 ) .

Ostler's memorandum was supported by

affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College
of Law (Thurman) , the former Dean of the Brigham Young University
2

College of Law

(Hawkins), and a nationally known professor of

Evidence (Goldsmith).

(See Appendices 7, 8, 9 ) .

However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the
Motions for Sanctions.

Based upon the same affidavits, Ostler

affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate.
Faced

with

the

affidavits

of

Thurman,

(Appendix 10) .
Hawkins

and

Goldsmith, Wheeler elected not to file any memorandum in opposition
to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.
In a three page unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals
denied Wheeler's Motion for Sanctions.

The Court of Appeals also

denied the Motion to Recall the Mandate.

(Appendix 11).

Only one

sentence was devoted to Ostler's Motion To Recall the Mandate:
[F]or lack of jurisdiction . . . we deny the
motions to recall mandate and to supplement
the response to the petition.
Ostler timely petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus.
VI.
WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE
REMEDY EXISTS AND WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE
The Utah Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of
Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.

Rather, the Court of

Appeals ruled, without explanation, without analysis, and without
citation of authority that it lacked jurisdiction to recall the
mandate.

The correct procedural device to challenge the ruling of

the Court of Appeals is by mandamus.
3

When an inferior court or tribunal [Court of
Appeals]
having
jurisdiction,
erroneously
rules it is without jurisdiction and for such
reason refuses to hear or proceed with a cause
and dismisses it, mandamus is the proper
remedy to compel the court to reinstate the
cause, assume jurisdiction and proceed with
it. (Emphasis added).
State el rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727, 729 (1982).
Thus, no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists,
mandamus is the proper remedy.
VII.
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO FILE
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The district court is an inferior court to the Utah Court
of Appeals.

Further, only this court has jurisdiction to issue a

writ of mandamus directed to the Utah Court of Appeals.

VIII.
COPIES OF THE OPINION
Copies of the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, and parts of
the record which are essential to an understanding of the matters
set forth in this petition are attached as Appendices 1-11.

A

memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition for
a writ of mandamus is included below.

4

IX,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF OSTLER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
It must be stressed that Ostler does not seek a writ
compelling the Court of Appeals to grant the Motion to Recall the
Mandate,

Ostler

simply

Appeals to exercise

seeks

a writ

compelling

the Court of

its jurisdiction to consider the Motion to

Recall the Mandate on the merits.
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INHERENT POWER OR JURISDICTION
TO CONSIDER A MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE
Appellate courts have inherent power or jurisdiction to
recall and review their own judgments, mandates, and orders.

This

is so even if the motion was filed after the time allowed for a
petition for rehearing, or even if a petition for rehearing was
denied.

See Cahill v> N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 351 U.S. 183

(1956); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954
(N.M. 1984); Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968); Reimers
v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954); Lindus v.
Northern Insurance Co. of N.Y., 438 P.2d 311 (Ariz. 1968); Chapman
v. St. Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church, 138 So. 630 (Fla.
1932); Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25
(1965).
As

the

Tenth

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals

Coleman v. Turpin, 827 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1987):
5

explained

in

[A]n appellate court has power to set aside at
any time a mandate
to prevent an
injustice or to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process.
Id. at 671.
The appellate court's power or jurisdiction to recall its
mandate and reconsider its decision exists regardless of whether
there is a rule or statute specifically authorizing the court to do
so.

e.g. , Yonadi v. Homestead County Homes, 127 A.2d 198 (N.J.

1956); see Boudar v. EG&G Inc. , 742 P. 2d 491

(N.M. 1987).

The

basis for this rule is that:
[T]he interest in finality of litigation must
yield where the interests of justice would
make unfair the strict application of . . .
rules.
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 100 (1957).
An appellate court's inherent jurisdiction or power to
recall the mandate springs from English equity common law jurisprudence.

The United

States Supreme Court, in holding that a

Circuit Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction, power, and duty to
recall its mandate and vacate its earlier judgment explained:
From the beginning there has existed . . . a
rule of equity to the effect that under
certain circumstances . . . relief will be
granted against judgments regardless of the
terms of their entry. Marine Insurance Co. v.
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332; Marshall v. Holmes, 141
U.S. 589. This equity rule, which was firmly
established in English practice long before
the foundation of our Republic . . . developed
and
fashioned
to
fulfill
a
universally
recognized need for correcting
injustices
which,
in certain
instances, are deemed
6

sufficiently gross to demand a departure from
rigid adherence to term rules.
•

*

*

It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to
relieve hardships which, from time to time,
arise from a hard and fast adherence to
another court-made rule, the general rule that
judgments should not be disturbed after the
term of their entry has expired. Created to
avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this
equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to meet
new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct particular injustices . . . .
•

*

*

We think that when this Court, a century ago,
approved this practice and held that federal
appellate courts have the power to pass upon,
and hence to grant or deny, petitions for
bills of review even though the petitions be
presented
long after the term of the
challenged judgment has expired, it settled
the procedural question here involved.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co. , 322 U.S. 238,
248-49 (1944).
By statute, Utah adopted the Common Law of England:
The Common Law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the
constitution or laws of the United States, or
the constitution or laws of this state, and so
far only as it is consistent with and adopted
to the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessity of the people hereof,
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.
(Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953 as amended).

7

In this case, the Court of Appeals, in one sentence,
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to
Recall the Mandate. That ruling implies that its prior defective
decision must stand.

However:

[Appellate decisions] must be final because
they are right, and not right because they are
final, even if we must take the untoward
action of acknowledging our incorrect limitation of the issues presented to us on previous
rehearing.
Boudar, supra at 443.
Applying statutory principles similar to the common law
principles
decision

described

effectively

above, the Utah Supreme
granted

a

motion

to

Court

recall

in an
the

1885

mandate

(although without using the name) . Fenton v. Salt Lake Co. , 4 Utah
116 (1885).
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that a
trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from
a

judgment even after a notice of appeal

Western Surety Co. , 757 P.2d

878

is filed.

(Utah App. 1988).

Baker v.
The Baker

decision is based on the idea that a trial court has jurisdiction
to review, correct and amend its own judgments.

see generally,

Baker at 880-81; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 463
F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

However, the Court of Appeals failed to

recognize that it has the same inherent power to review its own
decisions that the trial court had in Baker, supra.

8

POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 JURISDICTION TO RECALL
THE MANDATE ALSO SPRINGS FROM UTAH STATUTE
As set forth in Point I above, the Court of Appeals has
inherent power and jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to
Recall the Mandate.

However, the Utah Court of Appeals also has

statutory power to consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.2
The Court of Appeals had original jurisdiction over the
Ostler appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b), (cases
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) explicitly grants the Court
of Appeals, "jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
judgments and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction."
A motion to recall the mandate is in the nature of an
extraordinary writ or proceeding necessary to effect its judgment
orders and decrees,

see generally, e.g.,

Greater Boston TV Corp.,

supra; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. , supra; Yonadi, supra; Coleman, supra.
Thus, Utah appellate courts have specific statutory power
or jurisdiction to consider motions to recall the mandate.

2

The rules of appellate procedure do not address the issue.
However, whether a rule exists is not critical to the analysis
because the rules of appellate procedure neither "extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. . . ."
(U.R.A.P. 1 ) .
9

POINT III
BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL PROCEDURAL CONTEXT OF THIS
CASE, THE THREE EXPERT AFFIDAVITS ARE APPROPRIATE
AND HELPFUL TO THIS COURT IN DECIDING WHETHER
TO GRANT MANDAMUS
The

affidavits

of

Thurman,

Hawkins

and

Goldsmith

(Appendices 7, 8, 9) show that there has been a grave miscarriage
of justice in this case.

According to Dean Samuel Thurman: "In

Ostler proximate cause should have been directed by the trial
court."

(Appendix 7 at p. 4).

According to Dean Hawkins: "The

opinion of the Court of Appeals obscures the basic legal question
as to the scope of liability. . . . "

(Appendix 8 at para. 3) .

Also, Dean Hawkins states: "Thus, by this line of analysis, the
trial court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff on the
issue

of

causation

negligence."

as well

as

on

the

(Appendix 8 at para. 7 ) .

issue

of

defendant's

According to Professor

Goldsmith: " . . . The published opinion committed serious error in
at least two critical respects. . . . "

(Appendix 9 at para. 15).

Professor Goldsmith's affidavit also directs the court's attention
to the following comments of Justice Jackson:
But if I have agreed to any prior decision
which forecloses what now seems to be a
sensible construction of this Act, I must
frankly admit that I was unaware of it. . . .
Under these circumstances, except for any
personal humiliation involved in admitting
that I do not always understand the opinions
of this Court, I see no reason why I should be
10

consciously
wrong
today
because
unconsciously wrong yesterday.
Massachusetts v. United
(Jackson, J.).

States, 333

U.S.

I

was

611, 639-40

(1948)

On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated:
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by
which a judge may recede from a prior opinion
that has proven untenable. . . . But an escape
less self-depreciating was taken by Lord
Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a barrister's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed
that a man of my intelligence should have been
guilty of giving such an opinion.11 If there
are other ways of gracefully and good naturedly surrendering former views to a better
considered position, I invoke them all.
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J.).
However, a threshold issue may be whether such affidavits
are appropriate.

It is important to note that the expert affi-

davits came into this case as a defensive measure.

After Wheeler

won his case in the trial court and the appellate courts, he
petitioned the Court of Appeals for sanctions.

Specifically,

Wheeler urged that Ostler's petition for certiorari and the Hanna
affidavit were frivolous and in bad faith.
The only way Ostler could show that the petition and
affidavit were not frivolous was by obtaining affidavits from
experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics
(Thurman). Thus, Wheeler's motion for sanctions triggered the need
for the expert affidavits.
11

The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of
Appeals.

Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits

of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however,
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be
recalled.
Therefore, granting mandamus will not open the floodgates
for the use of such expert affidavits in other appellate proceedings. This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits
(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively.
X.
CONCLUSION
The

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

to

consider

Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate, and Mandamus should be
issued to the Court of Appeals directing it to consider the merits
of Ostler's motion.
DATED this ^7

day of

ys rj7~

, 1991.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Petitioner

By: . O . v i ' ^
ROBERT J. DEBRY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

7

day of

v

r

'

, 1991 to the following:

ry—t

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorney for Albina Transfer, Inc.
F & R Roe, Inc. and Stanley Wheeler
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

0566-162.2\jn
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Exhibit R

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RALPH OSTLER,
Petitioner,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC.
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

Case No:

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Petitioner
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
M. DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorneys for Respondents
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A08 4 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Petitioner
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 2 62-8915
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RALPH OSTLER,
Petitioner,
vs.
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC,
F & R ROE, INC., and
STANLEY E. WHEELER,

Case No:

Respondents.
Pursuant to Rules

4 6 and

4 9 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari to review that portion of the unpublished
Court of Appeals1 opinion entered on August 5, 1991, wherein the
Court of Appeals ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.

1

Ostler has also filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
issues in both petitions overlap.

ii
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III.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to this proceeding are petitioner Ralph
Ostler, and respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R Roe,
Inc., Stanley Wheeler.
IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does an appellate court have jurisdiction to consider an
uncontested Motion to Recall the Mandate, particularly when the
motion is filed in response to a petition for sanctions?
V.
OPINIONS BELOW
The official unpublished opinion is attached

in the

Appendix.
VI.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The date of the decision sought to be reviewed is August
5, 1991.

The statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the

Utah Supreme Court to review the decision are:
Utah Const. Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 4.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2, (3)(a) and (5).

1

VII.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory provisions are U.R.A.P. 46,
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3, Utah Code Ann. . § 78-2-4.

Copies

attached in the Appendix.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup
driven by Ostler's father and a truck parked
emergency lane.

Ostler was a passenger in the pickup.

father was the driver.
truck.

in the highway
Ostler's

Respondent Wheeler was the driver of the

Wheeler's employers are respondents Albina Transfer Co.,

Inc. and F & R Roe, Inc.
As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries. Ostler does
not walk.

He is painfully confined to a wheel chair.
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked

the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the
respondents on the issue of negligence.
trial.

However, Ostler lost at

The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct

was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries.
The Utah
(Appendix 1).

Court

of Appeals

upheld

the trial court.

Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing
2

with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) and thereafter a petition
for certiorari with this Court.

(Appendix 3).

petitions,

Affidavit

Ostler

filed

the

In support of the

of

Patricia

Hanna,

chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of
Utah ("Hanna affidavit11) (Appendix 4).
After both petitions were denied, respondents filed a
Motion for Sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals.
alleged

that

the

petition

for

rehearing,

the

The motion

petition

for

certiorari and the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and
contrary to U.R.C.P. 11.

(Appendix 5 ) .

Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for
Sanctions.

(Appendix 6).

Ostler's memorandum was supported by

affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College
of Law (Thurman), the former Dean of the Brigham Young University
College of Law (Hawkins), and a nationally known professor of
Evidence (Goldsmith).

(See Appendices 7, 8, 9).

However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the
Motions for Sanctions.

Based upon the same affidavits, Ostler

affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate.
Faced

with

the

affidavits

of

(Appendix 10) .

Thurman,

Hawkins

and

Goldsmith, the respondents elected not to file any memorandum in
opposition to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.
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experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics
(Thurman). Thus, Wheelerfs motion for sanctions triggered the need
for the expert affidavits.
The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of
Appeals.

Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits

of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however,
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be
recalled.
Therefore, granting mandamus will not open the floodgates
for the use of such expert affidavits in other appellate proceedings. This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits
(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively.
X.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Certiorari should be granted.

DATED this

"j^

day of

J^V*^

, 1991.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney/ftor Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Ostler v. Albina, et
al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this
1991 to the following:
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT
84603

i /'

0566-162.l\jn
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day of

St a^F"

,

Exhibits

M. Dayle Jeffs, #1655
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RALPH OSTLER,

|

Plaintiff,

|

AFFIDAVIT OF M. DAYLE JEFFS

Case No. 910404
ALBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC.
F&R ROW INC., AND STANLEY E.
WHEELER,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

j
|
|

Court of Appeals No.
910246-CA

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF UTAH )
COMES NOW M. Dayle Jeffs makes the following affidavit under oath:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.
2. I have represented Albina Transfer Company, Inc., Stanley E. Wheeler, and
F & R Roe In., in the above entitled case throughout the entire proceedings.

3. My clients have incurred attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $13,398.51
in representing the defendants subsequent to the ruling by the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial verdict in accordance with the attached statements Exhibit A.
4. My clients will have incurred $720.00 in additional attorneys fees through the
filing of the Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
5. I believe my clients will incur attorneys fees in the amount of $360.00 in
preparation and argument of the Petition for Writ of Mandamus on October 7, 1991.
6. Total fees incurred by my clients as a result of the numerous filing by Plaintiff
subsequent to the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court is $14,478.51.
Dated and signed this->c/_ day of September, 1991.

M. Dayle Jeifs

/'' /

^

On this date, September 30,1991, personally appeared before me M. Dayle Jeffs,
the owner of the above affidavit, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same.

I^5tary'Public
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ruling. Telephone conference with Court reporter.
Analysis of issues on Petition for rehearing in
Court of Appeals following remand by the Supreme
Court.
Examination of Supreme Court transcripts. Letter
Jon Topol.
Review of Supreme Court tapes in Supreme Court.
Letter to Jon Topol.
Total Services

DISBURSEMENTS
01/15/90
01/15/90
02/28/90

Postage
re: mailing appeal briefs.
Costs Expended
re: photocopying appeal
briefs
Costs Expended
re: Transcript of hearing.

7.83
42.00
36.70

Total Disbursements
Balance Due:

J e f f s and J e f f s
A 1 1 o r n e y s a t L. a w.-, F' „ 0«
P.O. Box 8 8 8
Provo, Utah 84603

Farmers Insurance
P. 0» Box 480
Prove, Utah 84603

rs

March 6 ? 1990
Page 1
Clients FT)
Hatter; 1

Ostler v Albina Transfer

eck ALBINA TRANSFER
y tt: 79 N0302 00 17
of Occurr: 04/19/84
balances
nts receiveds
balance less credits,1;
Disbursements
28/90

Costs Expended
res Transcript of Hearing,
Total Disbursements

U>6 .: / U

v

^^f:'^^r

,—

I

•

Associated Professional Reporters
10 West Broadway / Suite SOO / Cllft Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-3441
M. DAYLE JEFFS,

ESQ.

JEFFS &. JEFFS
P.O. BOX 888
PROVO, UT 84601
TO INSURE RECEIVING PROPER CREDIT
PLEASE INDICATE OUR INVOiCE NUMBER
WHEN REMITTING.
TERMS: NET 30 DAYS

ATTN

REPORTER

SHINDURLING
RE:
RALPH
OSTLER
VS.
ALBINA
TRANSFER
CO.,
°* Service:
05 , 1990
Your File #: 89 INC
Deposition of February
529
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

AM0
"NT $«
L F ^ PAID
o?J£L TO
LESS
DATP
TO DATE
$

Please Pay This Amount
09395
* ° T MADE AS SPECIFIED
WILL BE CHARGED COLLECTION COSTS Alun D C A

122

36.70
Q ojj
36.70

Jeffs and Jeffs
Attorneys at Law, P.C.
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603

Farmers Insurance
P. 0. Box 480
Provo, Utah 84603

r:

March 31, 1990
Page 1
Client: FD
Matter: 1

Ostler v A l b m a Transfer

ed: ALBINA TRANSFER
y tt: 79 N0302 00 17
of Occurr: 04/19/84
balance:
nts received:

831.20
831.20-

balance less credits:

0.00

te

Professional Services Rendered

)l/90

Examination of new transcript from the Supreme
Court. Letter to Jon Topol.
Telephone conference with Jon Topol - re: ruling
denying Certiori.
Letter to Jon Topol.

L2/90
3/90

Hours
0.50
0.40
0.30

Total Services
Attorney Recap
M. Dayle Jeffs

96.00

Hours

Rate

Amount

1.20

80.00

96.00

Balance due

96.00

Jeffs and Jeffs
Attorneys at Law, P.C
P.O. Box 868
Provo, Utah 84603

February 28, 1990
Paqe 1
Clients FD
hatter: 1

F a r me rs I n su ran ce
P. 0. Box 480
Provo, Utah 84603

iter:

Ostler v Albina Transfer

>ured: ALBINA TRANSFER
icy tt: 79 N0302 00 17
e of Occurr: 04/19/84
2,788.35

or balance:
ments received:
or

balance less credits:
Hours

Date

Professional Services Rendered

L/05/90
L/31/90__
~
2/05/90

0.50
Letter to Jon Topol.
3.50
Research and preparation of oral argun-ient of
Hotion to Strike Affidavit in the Supreme Court.
Letter to Jon Topol - re: Supreme Court Hearing.
2.90
Court Appearance in the Supreme Court - re:
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Patricia Hanna.
0.80
Telephone conference with Supreme Court Clerk res transcript of proceedings. Conference with
Jon - res Suporeme Court hearing. Telephone
conference with Clerk of the Supreme Court - re:
ruling.. Telephone conference with Court
reporter.
Anal/sis of issues on Petition for rehearing in
Court of Appeals following remand by the Supreme
Court *
E x a m i n a t i o n o f S u p i e m e C o u r t t r a n s r r i •:> t s „ L e 11 e r0 . HO
to Jon T o p o l .
R e v i e w of Suprefl'e C o u r t t a p e s in S u p r e m e C o u r t .
» si. \J
L e t t e r to Jon T Q O G I ,
0.50

1/06/90

/08/90

/13 / 9 0
/14/90
'20/90

JU

1o ta1
\ 15". o r n e y
Roner t }_ » J e f f s
F" a. r a 1 e g a 1 / L H. W C1 e r k
rL Davie Jeffs

\-,m

S e r vices
Rat.

Hmoun<;

30 .00
35.00
80.00

40,.00
122.. a()
6,52.00

Jeffs-and Jeffs
Attorneys at Law, F.C.
P.O. Bo;; 888
Provn, Utah 84607

January 31 , 1990
Page 1
Client: FD
Matter: 1

Farmer s Insurance
P. 0. Bo;; 480
Provo, Utah
84603

tter:

Ostler v Albina Transfer

sured: ALBINA TRANSFER
Licy #: 79 N0302 00 17
:e of Occurr: 04/19/84
49.8:
49.8:

.or balance:
'ments received:
or balance less credits:

Date

Professional Services Rendered

Hours

1/02/90

Research.
Drafting law points on Memorandum in
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari a. Drafting
Motion and Memorandum to Stril-e Affidavit of
Patricia Hanna.
Drafting part of brief in Opposition to
Certioraria. Research and drafting law points on
Brie?-f on Opposition to Petition for Certioraria.
Revise brief in Oppostion to Petition for
Certioraria. Revise brief in Opposition to
Petition for Certiorari. Drafting parts of brief
in opposition to Certioraria. Revise brief.
Revise Brief.
Preparation of Motion to Stril-e Affidavit of
Patricia Hanna. Editing and drafting Opposition
to Petition for Certioraria.
Drafting Memorandum opposing Certioraria. Edit
brief in Opposition Petition for Certioraria.
Research.
F m a l i z a t i o n brief opposing Petition
for Writ of Certioraria.
Research and F m a l i z a t i o n of Brief in Opposition
to Petition for Certioraria.
Telephone conference with Court of appeals.

10.00

1/03/90

1/04/90

L/05/90
L'09/90

./I 1/90
/13/90
/15/90
/31/90

Total
Attorney

Recap

Hour-:

11.50

4.25

1.50
3.80

1.90
3.50
14.00
0.40

Services

Rate

Amount

Jeffs and * Jeffs
Attorneys at Law, P.C,
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603

Farmers Insurance
P. 0. Box 480
Provo, Utah 84603

January 31, 1990
Page 2
Client: FD
Matters 1

ar:
Qstler v Albina Transfer
t.)
-eds ALBINA TRANSFER
:y #: 79 N0302 00 17
of Occurr: 04/19/84
Attorney Recap
M. Dayle Jeffs

Hours

Rate

Amount

21.90

80•00

1,752.00

Balance due

_Jtff fs and J e'f f s
Attorneys art Law5.JE—.C-«
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603

January 24, 1990
Page i
Client: FD
Matter: 1

Farmers Insurance
P. 0- Box 480
Provo, Utah 84603

rs

Ostler v Albina Transfer

3d: ALBINA TRANSFER
/ #: 79 N0302 00 17
:«f Occurr: 04/19/84
Di sbu rsemen t s
.5/90
5/90

postage
re: Mailing appeal briefs.
Costs Expended
re: photocopying appeal briefs-

7 - 83
42.00

Total Disbursements

Ba 1 an ce d u e

49. s:

49.83

